fix(supabase): ceiling measured on bytes present in the bucket plus pending claims without bytes; confirm fails closed on an unsized object; cleartext host must start with a letter
Third audit (BLOCK 1): counting terminal rows while queued let begin spam pin the ceiling with declared sizes. The ceiling now sums storage.objects sizes of the bucket (whatever the row's state) plus the declared size of pending_upload rows whose quarantine object has not landed: a claim dies with its row, a present object counts whatever its row says, no full scan of the assets history. confirm_asset_upload treats an object without a size as upload_missing. pgTAP (plan 138): rejected rows without bytes weigh nothing, pending claims fill, superseded claims vanish, present bytes fill, unsized object refused. Worker: a single-label cleartext host must start with an ASCII letter (0X… hex forms refused, test added); STORAGE.md names the native-run search-domain residual.
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@@ -94,8 +94,8 @@ granted to the one role that calls it. Business refusals raise SQLSTATE
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| RPC | Effect | Refusals (message) |
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|---|---|---|
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| `begin_avatar_upload(declared_mime text, declared_size integer) returns jsonb` | locks the caller's `profiles` row (`for update`); checks the type and the size; rate: at most 10 rows created by the caller in the last hour, every status counted; global ceiling: the bytes that can exist (`declared_size` of in-flight rows, `byte_size` of clean rows, and terminal rows while their keys still wait in the purge queue) below `private.storage_ceiling()` (10 GiB); residual: a burst of accounts within the ceiling fills the filesystem quota, the hard bound; supersedes the caller's `pending_upload` / `uploaded` rows (→ `deleted`); inserts the row; returns `{"asset_id", "bucket_id", "quarantine_key"}` | `unsupported_type`, `too_large`, `rate_limited`, `storage_full` |
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| `confirm_asset_upload(asset_id uuid) returns void` | active account; own `pending_upload` row with a `storage.objects` row at `(bucket_id, quarantine_key)` whose `metadata->>'size'` is within the cap → `uploaded` | `not_found` (unknown or not own), `invalid_state` (not pending), `upload_missing` (no object yet), `too_large` (object over the cap or over the declared size: the row stays pending and expires after 24 h) |
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| `begin_avatar_upload(declared_mime text, declared_size integer) returns jsonb` | locks the caller's `profiles` row (`for update`); checks the type and the size; rate: at most 10 rows created by the caller in the last hour, every status counted; global ceiling: the bytes present in the bucket (sum of `storage.objects` sizes, whatever each row's state) plus the `declared_size` of `pending_upload` rows whose bytes have not landed, below `private.storage_ceiling()` (10 GiB): a claim dies with its row, so begin spam pins nothing; residual: a burst of accounts within the ceiling fills the filesystem quota, the hard bound; supersedes the caller's `pending_upload` / `uploaded` rows (→ `deleted`); inserts the row; returns `{"asset_id", "bucket_id", "quarantine_key"}` | `unsupported_type`, `too_large`, `rate_limited`, `storage_full` |
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| `confirm_asset_upload(asset_id uuid) returns void` | active account; own `pending_upload` row with a `storage.objects` row at `(bucket_id, quarantine_key)` whose `metadata->>'size'` is set and within the cap → `uploaded` | `not_found` (unknown or not own), `invalid_state` (not pending), `upload_missing` (no object yet, or an object without a size: fail closed), `too_large` (object over the cap or over the declared size: the row stays pending and expires after 24 h) |
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| `remove_avatar() returns integer` | every `profile_avatar` row of the caller in `pending_upload` / `uploaded` / `clean` → `deleted`; returns the count; logs `asset.avatar_removed` | none (0 rows is fine) |
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`auth.uid() is null` → `42501` on all three.
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@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ metadata chunk), hashes it and uploads it.
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| Variable | Required | Default | Meaning |
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| `SUPABASE_URL` | yes | | origin of the stack (`http://supabase_kong_faunosteo:8000` from the Supabase compose network, `http://127.0.0.1:54321` natively). Cleartext `http://` is accepted only for `localhost`, a dotted-quad loopback address, or a single-label host that is not a number (a Docker service name on the compose network, where a `search` domain cannot apply); any other host must be `https://`, the service key travels in the headers |
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| `SUPABASE_URL` | yes | | origin of the stack (`http://supabase_kong_faunosteo:8000` from the Supabase compose network, `http://127.0.0.1:54321` natively). Cleartext `http://` is accepted only for `localhost`, a dotted-quad loopback address, or a single-label host starting with a letter (a Docker service name; inside the compose container Docker sets `ndots:0`, so no search domain applies; on a native glibc run a mistyped name could be searched, so prefer loopback there); any other host must be `https://`, the service key travels in the headers |
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| `SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY` | yes | | the service key; never printed; the JWT `exp` claim, when the key is a JWT, is logged at start and warned about 30 days ahead |
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| `WORKER_ID` | no | `worker-<pid>` | tag of every log line |
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| `WORKER_POLL_SECONDS` | no | `2` | idle interval between claims |
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