fix(pdf): security hardening — hex-encoded link URIs, strict branding URL schema, branding and labels re-validated at export, PNG dimension budget, CSS escape and parenthesis rules in the sanitiser, finite raster size, file size checked before read

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bchanot committed 2026-10-11 13:54:18 +02:00
1 parent 4930704d8a
commit 1f417b21fd
12 files changed
+437 -25

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+37 -4
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@@ -5,11 +5,21 @@ import { renderBrandingSvg } from './svg/view'
/**
* The branding images embedded once per document. A PNG is decoded from
* its base64; an SVG is sanitised and rasterised at the view width. Each
* slot fails alone: the page prints the credit's fallback text instead and
* the export reports a `logo_failed` warning.
* its base64 once its header fits the pixel budget; an SVG is sanitised and
* rasterised at the view width. Each slot fails alone: the page prints the
* credit's fallback text instead and the export reports a `logo_failed`
* warning.
*/
/** A logo PNG is at most 4096² pixels and 8192 px a side (STEP6 §15). */
export const PNG_CAPS = { side: 8192, pixels: 4096 * 4096 } as const
const PNG_SIGNATURE = [0x89, 0x50, 0x4e, 0x47, 0x0d, 0x0a, 0x1a, 0x0a]
const IHDR_TYPE = 0x49484452
const IHDR_END = 24
export type PngHeaderIssue = 'signature' | 'dimensions'
export type LogoSlot = Extract<ExportWarning, { kind: 'logo_failed' }>['slot']
export interface CreditAsset {
@@ -26,6 +36,24 @@ export interface BrandingImages {
partner: CreditAsset | null
}
/**
* Why a PNG is refused before any decoding, or null when its header fits
* the budget: the signature and the IHDR chunk must be there, and the
* announced width × height must stay under `PNG_CAPS`. The decoder would
* otherwise allocate the full bitmap of whatever size the header claims.
*/
export function pngHeaderIssue(bytes: Uint8Array): PngHeaderIssue | null {
if (bytes.byteLength < IHDR_END) return 'signature'
if (PNG_SIGNATURE.some((byte, i) => bytes[i] !== byte)) return 'signature'
const view = new DataView(bytes.buffer, bytes.byteOffset, bytes.byteLength)
if (view.getUint32(12) !== IHDR_TYPE) return 'signature'
const width = view.getUint32(16)
const height = view.getUint32(20)
if (width > PNG_CAPS.side || height > PNG_CAPS.side) return 'dimensions'
if (width * height > PNG_CAPS.pixels) return 'dimensions'
return null
}
function base64ToBytes(base64: string): Uint8Array {
const binary = atob(base64)
const bytes = new Uint8Array(binary.length)
@@ -38,7 +66,12 @@ async function embedImage(
asset: ImageAsset,
rasterizer: Rasterizer,
): Promise<PDFImage> {
if (asset.kind === 'png') return pdfDoc.embedPng(base64ToBytes(asset.base64))
if (asset.kind === 'png') {
const bytes = base64ToBytes(asset.base64)
const issue = pngHeaderIssue(bytes)
if (issue) throw new Error(`png refused: ${issue}`)
return pdfDoc.embedPng(bytes)
}
const { svg, size } = renderBrandingSvg(asset.svg)
return pdfDoc.embedPng(await rasterizer(svg, size))
}
+2
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@@ -25,6 +25,8 @@ export type ArchiveExportErrorKind =
| 'snapshot_too_large'
| 'sheet_mismatch'
| 'too_many_pages'
/** The branding or the label set fails its schema (URLs included). */
| 'branding_invalid'
export class ArchiveExportError extends Error {
constructor(
+17
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@@ -1,9 +1,11 @@
import { PDFDocument } from 'pdf-lib'
import {
assertSnapshot,
BrandingSchema,
buildSheetIndex,
ENVELOPE_FORMAT,
ENVELOPE_VERSION,
PdfLabelSetSchema,
snapshotIndexSource,
SnapshotError,
type Report,
@@ -43,6 +45,20 @@ export const PAGE_CAPS = {
viewsPerObservation: 8,
} as const
/**
* Step 0: the branding and the labels pass their schemas again. They reach
* the engine from an archive or from the application and end up in link
* URIs and drawn text, so a caller cannot be trusted to have validated them.
*/
function assertBrandingAndLabels(input: ExportInput): void {
if (!BrandingSchema.safeParse(input.branding).success) {
throw new ArchiveExportError('branding_invalid', 'branding')
}
if (!PdfLabelSetSchema.safeParse(input.labels).success) {
throw new ArchiveExportError('branding_invalid', 'labels')
}
}
/** Step 1: the snapshot gate, with every asset accepted by the sanitiser. */
function checkedSnapshot(sheet: SheetSnapshot): SheetSnapshot {
let parsed: SheetSnapshot
@@ -161,6 +177,7 @@ async function drawPages(pages: Pages): Promise<void> {
export async function exportReportArchive(
input: ExportInput,
): Promise<ExportResult> {
assertBrandingAndLabels(input)
const sheet = checkedSnapshot(input.sheet)
assertExportable(input.report, sheet)
const envelope = buildEnvelope(input, sheet)
+9 -4
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@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
import { PDFName, PDFArray, PDFString, type PDFPage } from 'pdf-lib'
import { PDFName, PDFHexString, type PDFPage } from 'pdf-lib'
export interface LinkRect {
x: number
@@ -8,14 +8,19 @@ export interface LinkRect {
url: string
}
/** A clickable `/Link` annotation opening `url`, appended to the page's Annots. */
/**
* A clickable `/Link` annotation opening `url`, appended to the page's
* Annots. The URI is written as a hex string: pdf-lib does not escape `(`,
* `)` or `\` in a literal string, so a hostile URL could otherwise close
* the literal and inject objects (a `/Next` JavaScript action, for one).
*/
export function addLinkAnnotation(page: PDFPage, rect: LinkRect): void {
const context = page.doc.context
const actionDict = context.obj({
Type: 'Action',
S: 'URI',
URI: PDFString.of(rect.url),
URI: PDFHexString.fromText(rect.url),
})
const annotDict = context.obj({
@@ -26,7 +31,7 @@ export function addLinkAnnotation(page: PDFPage, rect: LinkRect): void {
A: actionDict,
})
const annots = page.node.lookup(PDFName.of('Annots'), PDFArray)
const annots = page.node.Annots()
if (annots) {
annots.push(context.register(annotDict))
} else {
+50 -6
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@@ -5,10 +5,12 @@ import { SvgRejectedError } from '../errors'
* Allowlist sanitiser for the sheet drawings and the branding SVGs
* (STEP6 §15), on DOM Level 2 only. Elements and attributes outside the
* inventory of the real assets plus structural needs are removed with
* their subtree; `href` and `url(…)` must stay inside the document; a
* `style` attribute may carry no external reference; the halo filters are
* clamped. Element, nesting and `<use>` counters refuse an oversized tree.
* The caller learns what was removed (names only, never values).
* their subtree; `href` and `url(…)` must stay inside the document; no
* value carries a backslash (a CSS escape such as `u\72l(` would hide a
* reference from the rules below); a `style` or presentation attribute may
* call no function but `url(#…)`; the halo filters are clamped. Element,
* nesting and `<use>` counters refuse an oversized tree. The caller learns
* what was removed (names only, never values).
*/
export const SANITIZER_CAPS = {
@@ -126,9 +128,42 @@ const ALLOWED_ATTRIBUTES = new Set([
'style',
])
/** Attributes whose value is CSS-like: a function call there is a reference or an exploit. */
const PRESENTATION_ATTRIBUTES = new Set([
'fill',
'fill-opacity',
'fill-rule',
'stroke',
'stroke-width',
'stroke-linecap',
'stroke-linejoin',
'stroke-opacity',
'stroke-dasharray',
'stroke-dashoffset',
'stroke-miterlimit',
'opacity',
'filter',
'clip-path',
'clip-rule',
'mask',
'display',
'visibility',
'color',
'stop-color',
'stop-opacity',
'flood-color',
'flood-opacity',
'color-interpolation-filters',
'font-family',
'font-size',
'font-weight',
])
const LOCAL_REFERENCE = /^#[A-Za-z_][\w.:-]*$/
const URL_FUNCTION = /url\(\s*['"]?\s*(.?)/gi
const STYLE_FORBIDDEN = /expression\(|@import|javascript:|behavior:/i
const LOCAL_URL_OPEN = /url\(\s*['"]?\s*#/gi
const STYLE_FORBIDDEN =
/expression\(|image-set\(|@import|javascript:|behavior:/i
export interface SanitizeOutcome {
/** Removed element names and `element@attribute` pairs, in document order. */
@@ -157,11 +192,20 @@ function hrefIsLocal(value: string): boolean {
return LOCAL_REFERENCE.test(value.trim())
}
/** Any `(` left once the `url(#` openings are gone is a function we never allow. */
function callsOnlyLocalUrl(value: string): boolean {
return !value.replace(LOCAL_URL_OPEN, '').includes('(')
}
/** Whether an allowed attribute keeps its value, by name-specific rule. */
function attributeAcceptable(name: string, value: string): boolean {
if (value.includes('\\')) return false
if (!urlsAreLocal(value)) return false
if (name === 'href' || name === 'xlink:href') return hrefIsLocal(value)
if (name === 'style') return !STYLE_FORBIDDEN.test(value)
if (name === 'style') {
return !STYLE_FORBIDDEN.test(value) && callsOnlyLocalUrl(value)
}
if (PRESENTATION_ATTRIBUTES.has(name)) return callsOnlyLocalUrl(value)
return true
}
+11 -2
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@@ -27,6 +27,11 @@ export interface RenderedSvg {
size: RasterSize
}
/** A usable dimension: finite and strictly positive (`1e999` parses to Infinity). */
function isPositiveFinite(value: number | undefined): value is number {
return value !== undefined && Number.isFinite(value) && value > 0
}
/** Height over width of a `viewBox` value, or the fallback when unusable. */
function aspectOf(viewBox: string | null): number {
const parts = (viewBox ?? '')
@@ -34,10 +39,14 @@ function aspectOf(viewBox: string | null): number {
.split(/[\s,]+/)
.map(Number)
const [, , width, height] = parts
if (parts.length !== 4 || !(width! > 0) || !(height! > 0)) {
if (
parts.length !== 4 ||
!isPositiveFinite(width) ||
!isPositiveFinite(height)
) {
return ASPECT_FALLBACK
}
return height! / width!
return height / width
}
export function rasterSizeOf(viewBox: string | null): RasterSize {