From 0c6053c1746d9bb369c71b0e14d5438cc2175e4f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: bchanot Date: Tue, 13 Oct 2026 19:39:51 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] feat(workspace): real-stack avatar e2e, compose worker service, STORAGE.md contract packages/supabase/tests/e2e/avatar-flow.e2e.ts (pnpm e2e:avatar through scripts/avatar-e2e.sh: worker container on the Supabase network, 5 s sweep, no quarantine grace; a fresh account per run): clean upload and owner-only download (Bob, anon, quarantine key, direct final-key write refused), replacement purged after the grace (queue clock shifted through psql), late bytes through a still-valid signed upload URL swept, hostile and corrupted uploads rejected with closed codes, removal with the purge queue drained. Worker: the Storage API answers a missing object with HTTP 400 and statusCode 404; normalised to 404 so a purge of a never-written key is acked. docker-compose.yml: service worker under the worker profile (read-only, cap_drop ALL, no-new-privileges, 512m, 1 cpu, 64 pids, .env.worker, external Supabase network). docs/development/STORAGE.md: the implementation contract. --- crates/worker/src/http.rs | 38 +- docker-compose.yml | 32 ++ docs/development/STORAGE.md | 327 +++++++++++++++++ package.json | 3 +- .../supabase/tests/e2e/avatar-flow.e2e.ts | 331 ++++++++++++++++++ packages/supabase/vitest.e2e.config.ts | 17 + scripts/avatar-e2e.sh | 57 +++ 7 files changed, 798 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) create mode 100644 docs/development/STORAGE.md create mode 100644 packages/supabase/tests/e2e/avatar-flow.e2e.ts create mode 100644 packages/supabase/vitest.e2e.config.ts create mode 100755 scripts/avatar-e2e.sh diff --git a/crates/worker/src/http.rs b/crates/worker/src/http.rs index 9b302b45..8dc48110 100644 --- a/crates/worker/src/http.rs +++ b/crates/worker/src/http.rs @@ -153,10 +153,12 @@ impl Backend for HttpBackend { .header("Authorization", &format!("Bearer {}", self.key)) .call() .map_err(network)?; - if response.status().as_u16() == 404 { - return Ok(()); + // A missing object is a purge already done (HTTP 404, or this Storage API's + // HTTP 400 body with statusCode 404, normalised by `classify`). + match expect_success(&mut response) { + Err(BackendError::Status(404)) => Ok(()), + other => other, } - expect_success(&mut response) } fn mark_quarantine_purged(&self, asset_id: &str) -> BackendResult<()> { @@ -224,15 +226,24 @@ fn expect_success(response: &mut Response) -> BackendResult<()> { Err(classify(status, &text)) } -/// A PostgREST `P0001` body names a closed refusal; any other status is reported as such. +/// A PostgREST `P0001` body names a closed refusal; a Storage API "not found" (HTTP 400 +/// with `statusCode` 404 on this image family) is reported as 404; any other status as such. pub fn classify(status: u16, body: &str) -> BackendError { - if let Ok(value) = serde_json::from_str::(body) - && value.get("code").and_then(Value::as_str) == Some("P0001") + let Ok(value) = serde_json::from_str::(body) else { + return BackendError::Status(status); + }; + if value.get("code").and_then(Value::as_str) == Some("P0001") && let Some(message) = value.get("message").and_then(Value::as_str) && is_closed_code(message) { return BackendError::Refused(message.to_owned()); } + if status == 400 + && (value.get("statusCode").and_then(Value::as_str) == Some("404") + || value.get("error").and_then(Value::as_str) == Some("not_found")) + { + return BackendError::Status(404); + } BackendError::Status(status) } @@ -265,6 +276,21 @@ mod tests { BackendError::Status(400) ); assert_eq!(classify(500, "not json"), BackendError::Status(500)); + // storage-api v1.79 answers a missing object with HTTP 400 and statusCode "404". + assert_eq!( + classify( + 400, + r#"{"statusCode":"404","error":"not_found","message":"Object not found"}"# + ), + BackendError::Status(404) + ); + assert_eq!( + classify( + 400, + r#"{"statusCode":"400","error":"InvalidRequest","message":"x"}"# + ), + BackendError::Status(400) + ); } #[test] diff --git a/docker-compose.yml b/docker-compose.yml index 7bf2fde5..f834e181 100644 --- a/docker-compose.yml +++ b/docker-compose.yml @@ -13,3 +13,35 @@ services: env_file: - .env restart: unless-stopped + # Files worker (plan Step 8 / Rust R1, docs/development/STORAGE.md §3): the keyed + # job loop and the keyless decode child, one static binary on distroless. Started + # only with the `worker` profile: `docker compose --profile worker up -d worker`. + # It joins the Supabase compose network (never a published port) and reads its + # own env file, separate from the app's: SUPABASE_URL, SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY, + # WORKER_ID (chmod 600, excluded from any backup copy of env files). + worker: + container_name: faunosteo_worker + profiles: ["worker"] + build: + context: . + dockerfile: crates/worker/Dockerfile + image: faunosteo_worker:local + env_file: + - .env.worker + command: ["run"] + read_only: true + cap_drop: [ALL] + security_opt: + - no-new-privileges:true + mem_limit: 512m + cpus: 1 + pids_limit: 64 + networks: + - supabase + restart: unless-stopped + +networks: + supabase: + external: true + # Local CLI stack: supabase_network_faunosteo; self-hosted compose: its own name. + name: ${SUPABASE_NETWORK:-supabase_network_faunosteo} diff --git a/docs/development/STORAGE.md b/docs/development/STORAGE.md new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d79e8fe1 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/development/STORAGE.md @@ -0,0 +1,327 @@ +# Files foundation: Supabase Storage, the `assets` table and the Rust worker + +Status: Step 8 / Rust R1, 2026-10-13, branch `feature/step-08-files-foundation`. +Design origin: `STEP8_FILES_ANALYSIS.md` (D1 to D9 validated by the owner, D1 +amended to the Rust worker of `RUST_ARCHITECTURE_REVIEW.md` Part IV). This +file is the implementation contract: table, keys, RPCs, policies, worker +behaviour and client flow are what the code and the tests pin. + +First consumer: the profile photo (avatar). Every other bucket exists, closed. + +--- + +## 1. Model + +### 1.1 Statuses + +```text +pending_upload ─(confirm_asset_upload)─► uploaded ─(complete_avatar_job)─► clean + │ │ + │ begin supersedes / 24 h expiry ├─(reject_avatar_job, 3rd expired lease)─► rejected + ▼ ▼ + deleted ◄──────(remove_avatar, replacement by a newer clean row, begin supersedes) +``` + +`deleted` and `rejected` are terminal: the row stays (history, purge +bookkeeping) and matches no read or upload predicate. + +### 1.2 `public.assets` + +| Column | Type | Rule | +|---|---|---| +| `id` | uuid pk | | +| `owner_id` | uuid → `profiles.id` on delete cascade | | +| `kind` | text | `'profile_avatar'` only in Step 8 (CHECK) | +| `bucket_id` | text | `'avatars'` for that kind (CHECK) | +| `object_key` | text unique | final key, server-built: `profiles///avatar.webp` | +| `quarantine_key` | text | `quarantine///upload`; null once the worker confirmed the quarantine object is gone | +| `status` | `public.asset_status` | enum above | +| `declared_mime` | text | `image/jpeg`, `image/png`, `image/webp` (CHECK) | +| `declared_size` | integer | 1 … 5 242 880 (CHECK), the transport size announced by the browser | +| `byte_size`, `sha256` | integer, text | the clean output, set by `complete_avatar_job` | +| `rejection_reason` | text | closed set `unsupported_type`, `decode_failed`, `dimensions`, `processing_error`; non-null iff `rejected` (CHECK) | +| `attempts` | smallint | leases taken; the 3rd expired lease rejects with `processing_error` | +| `locked_at`, `lock_token` | timestamptz, uuid | the lease: set by `claim_avatar_jobs`, required by `complete` / `reject`, 10 min validity | +| `created_at`, `updated_at` | timestamptz | trigger `set_updated_at` | + +Indexes: unique partial `assets_one_clean_avatar (owner_id) where kind = +'profile_avatar' and status = 'clean'` ("the" avatar of an account is its +single clean row: no profile column, D5); `assets_claimable (created_at) +where status = 'uploaded'`; `assets_owner_idx (owner_id, created_at desc)`. + +Privileges: `revoke all` from `public`, `anon`, `authenticated`; `grant +select (id, owner_id, kind, bucket_id, object_key, status, declared_mime, +declared_size, byte_size, sha256, rejection_reason, created_at, updated_at)` +to `authenticated` (the lease columns and `quarantine_key` stay server-side; +a client must list its columns, `select=*` is refused). RLS +`assets_select_own` (`owner_id = auth.uid()`). No INSERT / UPDATE / DELETE +policy: every write is an RPC. + +### 1.3 Buckets (all private) + +| Bucket | Step 8 state | +|---|---| +| `avatars` | open: SELECT + INSERT policies through `assets`, 5 MiB, `image/jpeg`, `image/png`, `image/webp` | +| `logos`, `professional-documents`, `client-files`, `animal-files`, `report-files`, `imports` | closed: row exists, `public = false`, no policy names it, no cap or MIME list yet (their step sets them) | +| `anatomical-sheet-assets` | untouched (migration `20261009100000`, read through the sheet) | + +The migration upserts the rows (`on conflict (id) do update set public = +false`) so it converges on the local stack, the VPS and a managed project. + +### 1.4 Keys + +- Built by `begin_avatar_upload` from uuids; the user's filename never + reaches the server; one canonical name per kind (`avatar.webp`). +- Policies compare whole strings (`name = quarantine_key`, `name = + object_key`): no prefix match, no `storage.foldername()`, so PGlite and the + real stack evaluate the same expression. +- The worker validates every key it receives from the database before + putting it in a URL: exactly four segments, `profiles|quarantine`, two + uuids, `avatar.webp|upload`. + +--- + +## 2. RPCs + +Every function is `security definer`, `set search_path = ''`, authorisation +before lookup, EXECUTE revoked from `public` / `anon` / `authenticated` and +granted to the one role that calls it. Business refusals raise SQLSTATE +`P0001` with the closed code as the message (PostgREST answers 400 with +`{"code":"P0001","message":""}`); authorisation refusals raise +`42501` (403). + +### 2.1 Browser (`authenticated`) + +| RPC | Effect | Refusals (message) | +|---|---|---| +| `begin_avatar_upload(declared_mime text, declared_size integer) returns jsonb` | locks the caller's `profiles` row (`for update`); checks the type and the size; rate: at most 10 rows created by the caller in the last hour, every status counted; global ceiling: `sum(declared_size)` of non-deleted rows below `private.storage_ceiling()` (10 GiB); supersedes the caller's `pending_upload` / `uploaded` rows (→ `deleted`); inserts the row; returns `{"asset_id", "bucket_id", "quarantine_key"}` | `unsupported_type`, `too_large`, `rate_limited`, `storage_full` | +| `confirm_asset_upload(asset_id uuid) returns void` | own `pending_upload` row with a `storage.objects` row at `(bucket_id, quarantine_key)` whose `metadata->>'size'` is within the cap → `uploaded` | `not_found` (unknown or not own), `invalid_state` (not pending), `upload_missing` (no object yet), `too_large` (object over the cap: the row is deleted) | +| `remove_avatar() returns integer` | every `profile_avatar` row of the caller in `pending_upload` / `uploaded` / `clean` → `deleted`; returns the count; logs `asset.avatar_removed` | none (0 rows is fine) | + +`auth.uid() is null` → `42501` on all three. + +### 2.2 Worker (`service_role`) + +| RPC | Effect | +|---|---| +| `claim_avatar_jobs(max_jobs integer) returns table (asset_id, owner_id, bucket_id, object_key, quarantine_key, lock_token, attempts)` | first rejects (`processing_error`) every `uploaded` row whose lease expired with `attempts >= 3`; then claims `uploaded` rows with `locked_at is null or locked_at < now() - 10 min` and `attempts < 3`, oldest first, `for update skip locked`, at most `max_jobs` (capped at 10): `locked_at = now()`, `attempts + 1`, fresh `lock_token`. VOLATILE (a STABLE function would run read-only through PostgREST) | +| `complete_avatar_job(asset_id uuid, lock_token uuid, byte_size integer, sha256 text) returns void` | guard: `status = 'uploaded'` and the token matches, else `invalid_state`. In one transaction: the owner's previous `clean` avatar → `deleted` (trigger enqueues its object 48 h later), the row → `clean` with `byte_size` / `sha256`, lease cleared; logs `asset.avatar_set` (actor null = worker, target = owner) | +| `reject_avatar_job(asset_id uuid, lock_token uuid, reason text) returns void` | same guard; `reason` in the closed set else `invalid_reason`; → `rejected`; logs `asset.rejected` with the reason | +| `mark_quarantine_purged(asset_id uuid) returns void` | `clean` row → `quarantine_key = null` (after the worker deleted the quarantine object); other statuses: no-op | +| `claim_purges(max_items integer) returns table (purge_id, bucket_id, object_name)` | queue rows with `not_before <= now()` and no live lease (`locked_at` null or older than 10 min), `for update skip locked`, at most `max_items` (capped at 100); sets `locked_at` | +| `ack_purge(purge_id uuid) returns void` | deletes the queue row (a missing object counted as success by the worker) | +| `claim_quarantine_leftovers(older_than_seconds integer, max_items integer) returns table (bucket_id, object_name, asset_id)` | `storage.objects` under `quarantine/` in `avatars`, created before `now() - older_than`, whose row is not `pending_upload` / `uploaded` (anti-join on `quarantine_key`); `asset_id` is the matching row when one exists (the worker calls `mark_quarantine_purged` for a `clean` one) | +| `expire_pending_uploads(max_age_seconds integer) returns integer` | `pending_upload` rows older than the age → `deleted` (trigger enqueues their keys); returns the count | + +The three stale-task guards together: a superseded or removed row is +`deleted` (never `uploaded`, so no `complete`); a `complete` from an expired +lease carries a stale `lock_token` and is refused even while the row is +still `uploaded`; the purge of an old key never touches a newer row's +object (keys embed the asset id). + +### 2.3 `storage.objects` policies (bucket `avatars`) + +| Policy | Command | Expression | +|---|---|---| +| `avatars_read` | SELECT, `authenticated` | `bucket_id = 'avatars' and private.can_read_avatar_object((select auth.uid()), name)` = a `clean` row of the caller with `object_key = name` | +| `avatars_upload` | INSERT, `authenticated` | `bucket_id = 'avatars' and private.can_upload_avatar_object((select auth.uid()), name)` = a `pending_upload` row of the caller with `quarantine_key = name` | + +No UPDATE / DELETE policy exists for any API role. The pgTAP census asserts +that every policy on `storage.objects` pins exactly one bucket literal and +counts them: 2 on `avatars`, 1 on `anatomical-sheet-assets`, 0 elsewhere, +total 3. + +### 2.4 Purge queue (`private.object_purge_queue`) + +`(id, bucket_id, object_name, not_before, enqueued_at, locked_at, attempts)`, +unique on `(bucket_id, object_name)` (a second enqueue keeps the earliest +`not_before`). Fed by triggers on `assets`: + +| Transition | `object_key` | `quarantine_key` | +|---|---|---| +| → `deleted` | `now() + 48 h` | `now() + 1 h` | +| → `rejected` | `now() + 1 h` (a clean object may exist after a PUT before a 3rd expired lease) | `now() + 1 h` | +| row DELETE (account cascade) | `now() + 48 h` | `now() + 1 h` | + +A `clean` row's `object_key` is never enqueued (test). The 48 h grace is the +backup invariant of §5. + +--- + +## 3. The worker (`crates/worker`, container `faunosteo_worker`) + +### 3.1 Process model + +One static musl binary, two roles in one container: + +- `faunosteo-worker run`: the keyed parent. Holds `SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY`, + talks to PostgREST and the Storage API over HTTP, never decodes a pixel. +- `faunosteo-worker decode`: the child spawned per job by the parent with an + empty environment and piped stdin/stdout (R0 sandbox unchanged: `Threads: + 1`, no core dump, `RLIMIT_AS` 512 MiB, `RLIMIT_CPU` 10 s / 12 s, seccomp + allowlist, 5 MiB input, 512 KiB output, 20 s deadline). It sees no key, + no file, no network. + +The parent checks the child's output at container level only +(`webp_check`: RIFF structure, chunk allowlist, 512 × 512 canvas, no +metadata chunk), hashes it and uploads it. + +### 3.2 Configuration (environment of the parent only) + +| Variable | Required | Default | Meaning | +|---|---|---|---| +| `SUPABASE_URL` | yes | | origin of the stack (`http://supabase_kong_faunosteo:8000` from the Supabase compose network, `http://127.0.0.1:54321` natively) | +| `SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY` | yes | | the service key; never printed; the JWT `exp` claim, when the key is a JWT, is logged at start and warned about 30 days ahead | +| `WORKER_ID` | no | `worker-` | tag of every log line | +| `WORKER_POLL_SECONDS` | no | `2` | idle interval between claims | +| `WORKER_SWEEP_SECONDS` | no | `600` | interval of the sweeper | +| `WORKER_QUARANTINE_GRACE_SECONDS` | no | `10800` | age before a quarantine leftover is deleted (above the 2 h validity of a signed upload URL) | +| `WORKER_PENDING_MAX_AGE_SECONDS` | no | `86400` | age before a never-confirmed `pending_upload` row is expired | +| `WORKER_ONCE` | no | unset | `1` = one claim pass and one sweep, then exit (tests) | + +`faunosteo-worker run --check` prints the resolved configuration without +any secret value. Exit 0 when the worker could start (libwebp ≥ 1.6.0, both +required variables set, URL parseable) or when no worker variable is set at +all (an unconfigured image is a valid artifact check, `scripts/check-all.sh`); +a partial or invalid configuration exits 2 naming the variable, a too-old +libwebp exits 18. + +### 3.3 HTTP endpoints used (service key: `apikey` and `Authorization: Bearer`) + +| Call | Request | +|---|---| +| RPC | `POST /rest/v1/rpc/`, JSON body, `Content-Type: application/json`, `Prefer: return=representation` | +| download quarantine | `GET /storage/v1/object//`, body read with a 5 MiB + 1 cap; a body over the cap (impossible through the bucket cap and `confirm_asset_upload`, kept as a guard) is a content refusal: the row is rejected `decode_failed` and the worker logs `download_overflow` | +| upload clean | `POST /storage/v1/object//`, `Content-Type: image/webp`, `x-upsert: true` (idempotent on retry) | +| delete object | `DELETE /storage/v1/object//` (a missing object counts as done: HTTP 404, or the HTTP 400 with `statusCode` 404 this Storage API version answers) | + +Every call: 30 s global timeout, 5 s connect timeout, no redirect follow, +`http_status_as_error(false)` so each status is classified by the caller. +Keys are validated (§1.4) before any URL is built. + +### 3.4 One job + +```text +claim_avatar_jobs(1) stage claim deadline 35 s +GET quarantine stage download 35 s 404 → reject decode_failed (bytes never landed; the row said uploaded) +spawn decode child, feed bytes stage decode 25 s + Produced(webp) → POST clean (upsert) → complete_avatar_job(asset, token, size, sha256) + stage upload 35 s, stage commit 35 s + → DELETE quarantine → mark_quarantine_purged (best effort: the sweeper finishes it) + Rejected{code} → reject_avatar_job(asset, token, code) code ∈ unsupported_type | decode_failed | dimensions | resource_limit→decode_failed + Signalled / Timeout / OutputOverflow / Failed + → reject_avatar_job(asset, token, 'processing_error') (logged with signal number / detail) + Broken{code} → log level=error event=child_broken, leave the lease (the row is retried, 3rd lease rejects), stop the loop with exit code 20 +complete refused (invalid_state: superseded, removed, stale lease) + → log, delete nothing: the purge queue owns every object of a terminal row +``` + +Every network failure in a stage leaves the row to its lease (re-claimed +after 10 min, rejected `processing_error` on the 3rd expiry). A stage that +exceeds its deadline makes the watchdog thread exit the process (code 21); +Docker's restart policy brings it back. + +### 3.5 Sweeper (every `WORKER_SWEEP_SECONDS`, and once at start) + +1. `expire_pending_uploads(WORKER_PENDING_MAX_AGE_SECONDS)`. +2. `claim_purges(100)` → DELETE each object (404 = done) → `ack_purge`. +3. `claim_quarantine_leftovers(WORKER_QUARANTINE_GRACE_SECONDS, 100)` → + DELETE each object → `mark_quarantine_purged(asset_id)` when present. + +Those are the only deletions the worker ever makes: a key it did not get +from the queue or the leftover query is never deleted. + +### 3.6 Logs + +One JSON object per line on stdout, fields from an allowlist only: `ts`, +`level`, `event`, `worker_id`, `asset_id`, `stage`, `code`, `signal`, +`http_status`, `duration_ms`, `count`, `detail` (worker-authored text only). +The child's stderr is child-controlled: it is logged under `child_stderr` +JSON-escaped and truncated to 200 bytes, never raw. No key, no URL with a +token, no user content. + +--- + +## 4. Client flow (browser, anon key + user JWT) + +1. Pick: ``. + The first bytes are sniffed (`FF D8 FF`, PNG signature, `RIFF….WEBP`); + anything else, SVG included, is refused with `unsupported_type` before + any decode. `File.size` over 20 MiB → `too_large`. +2. Transport: `createImageBitmap` → canvas with the longest side at 1024 px + → `toBlob('image/jpeg', 0.9)`; over 5 MiB after that → `too_large`. + The preview shows that blob. Nothing uploaded yet. +3. "Enregistrer la photo": `begin_avatar_upload('image/jpeg', blob.size)` → + `storage.from('avatars').upload(quarantine_key, blob, { upsert: false, + contentType: 'image/jpeg' })` → `confirm_asset_upload(asset_id)`. +4. Poll the own row every 1 s, 30 s at most: `clean` → download + `object_key` (`storage.from('avatars').download`), keep a blob URL in the + auth store; `rejected` → message per code; still `uploaded` after 30 s → + "processing, come back later" (the next mount polls again). +5. "Supprimer la photo": confirmation dialog → `remove_avatar()` → monogram. + +Closed failure kinds the UI phrases (`AssetFailure.kind`): `too_large`, +`unsupported_type`, `rate_limited`, `storage_full`, `upload_missing`, +`invalid_state`, `not_found`, `network`, `unknown`; rejection codes of a row: +`unsupported_type`, `decode_failed`, `dimensions`, `processing_error`. + +No signed URL, no bearer token: the download runs under the SELECT policy +and stops at the row flip (D7). The production CSP already allows `blob:` +images; `connect-src` must name the Supabase origin (DEPLOY.md). + +--- + +## 5. Operations + +### 5.1 Reconciliation (read-only, operator) + +```sql +-- objects without a row (any status) and rows whose object is missing +select o.bucket_id, o.name from storage.objects o + where o.bucket_id = 'avatars' + and not exists (select 1 from public.assets a where a.object_key = o.name or a.quarantine_key = o.name); +select a.id, a.object_key from public.assets a + where a.status = 'clean' + and not exists (select 1 from storage.objects o where o.bucket_id = a.bucket_id and o.name = a.object_key); +``` + +Deletions stay row-driven (queue and leftover sweep); the query only reports. + +### 5.2 Backups (self-hosted, file backend) + +Order: database dump first (whole instance, `storage` schema included), +files second, within 48 h of each other. With the 48 h purge grace every +`clean` row of the dump still has its object in the file snapshot (the +invariant the restore checks with the second query above). Restore: stop +the worker, restore the database, restore the volume, run the +reconciliation, start the worker. Tooling (restic, retention, drill) is the +deployment runbook's (plan Step 27). + +### 5.3 Managed migration + +Same migrations (`supabase db push`); rows (`auth.users`, `public`), then the +objects driven by the rows (`clean` rows and confirmed sheet assets: +download, verify sha256, upload at the same key, verify), write freeze while +copying (worker stopped), reconciliation on the destination, switch +`SUPABASE_URL` and the keys of the app and the worker. + +--- + +## 6. Development + +```bash +pnpm db:start # local stack (migrations + seed) +pnpm worker:image # faunosteo_worker:dev +docker run --rm --read-only --cap-drop ALL --security-opt no-new-privileges:true \ + --network supabase_network_faunosteo \ + -e SUPABASE_URL=http://supabase_kong_faunosteo:8000 \ + -e SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY="$(pnpm -s supabase status -o env | sed -n 's/^SERVICE_ROLE_KEY="\(.*\)"/\1/p')" \ + faunosteo_worker:dev run +pnpm --filter @faunosteo/supabase test:e2e # real-stack end-to-end (needs the worker above) +pnpm e2e:avatar # scripts/avatar-e2e.sh: the three lines above in one, worker started with a 5 s sweep and no quarantine grace +``` + +`docker compose --profile worker up worker` runs the same container from +`docker-compose.yml` with `.env.worker` (`SUPABASE_URL`, +`SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY`, `WORKER_ID`; `chmod 600`, never in the app +`.env`, never in a backup of env files). diff --git a/package.json b/package.json index 4b081f2a..54651bfd 100644 --- a/package.json +++ b/package.json @@ -37,7 +37,8 @@ "wasm:build": "bash scripts/wasm-build.sh", "wasm:build:docker": "bash docker/rust-run.sh bash scripts/wasm-build.sh", "worker:test": "docker build -f crates/worker/Dockerfile --target test -t faunosteo_worker:test .", - "worker:image": "docker build -f crates/worker/Dockerfile -t faunosteo_worker:dev ." + "worker:image": "docker build -f crates/worker/Dockerfile -t faunosteo_worker:dev .", + "e2e:avatar": "bash scripts/avatar-e2e.sh" }, "devDependencies": { "pnpm": "10.13.1", diff --git a/packages/supabase/tests/e2e/avatar-flow.e2e.ts b/packages/supabase/tests/e2e/avatar-flow.e2e.ts new file mode 100644 index 00000000..f59b7b05 --- /dev/null +++ b/packages/supabase/tests/e2e/avatar-flow.e2e.ts @@ -0,0 +1,331 @@ +/** + * Avatar flow against the real local stack and the worker container + * (docs/development/STORAGE.md §4, §3; STEP8_FILES_ANALYSIS IV.2 "integration" + * and "real-stack e2e"). Run through `pnpm e2e:avatar` (scripts/avatar-e2e.sh), + * which starts the worker with a 5 s sweep and a 0 s quarantine grace. + * + * Environment: SUPABASE_URL, SUPABASE_ANON_KEY, SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY + * (the service key is used for inspection only: listing objects and shifting + * the purge clock through psql in the database container). + */ +import { createHash } from 'node:crypto' +import { execFileSync } from 'node:child_process' +import { deflateSync } from 'node:zlib' +import { createClient, type SupabaseClient } from '@supabase/supabase-js' +import { + beginAvatarUpload, + confirmAssetUpload, + downloadAvatar, + fetchOwnAvatarState, + removeAvatar, + uploadToQuarantine, + type AssetRow, + type Database, +} from '../../src' + +const URL_ = process.env.SUPABASE_URL +const ANON = process.env.SUPABASE_ANON_KEY +const SERVICE = process.env.SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY +const DB_CONTAINER = process.env.AVATAR_E2E_DB_CONTAINER ?? 'supabase_db_faunosteo' +const PASSWORD = 'LocalDev-only-password-1' +const BOB = 'bob@faunosteo.local' +const WORKER_WAIT_MS = 60_000 + +type Client = SupabaseClient + +function anonClient(): Client { + return createClient(URL_ ?? '', ANON ?? '', { + auth: { persistSession: false, autoRefreshToken: false }, + }) +} + +async function signedIn(email: string): Promise { + const client = anonClient() + const { error } = await client.auth.signInWithPassword({ email, password: PASSWORD }) + if (error) throw new Error(`sign-in ${email}: ${error.message}`) + return client +} + +function serviceClient(): Client { + return createClient(URL_ ?? '', SERVICE ?? '', { + auth: { persistSession: false, autoRefreshToken: false }, + }) +} + +// --- fixtures --------------------------------------------------------------- + +const CRC_TABLE = new Uint32Array(256).map((_, n) => { + let c = n + for (let k = 0; k < 8; k++) c = c & 1 ? 0xedb88320 ^ (c >>> 1) : c >>> 1 + return c >>> 0 +}) + +function crc32(bytes: Uint8Array): number { + let c = 0xffffffff + for (const b of bytes) c = CRC_TABLE[(c ^ b) & 0xff] ^ (c >>> 8) + return (c ^ 0xffffffff) >>> 0 +} + +function chunk(type: string, payload: Uint8Array): Uint8Array { + const out = new Uint8Array(12 + payload.length) + const view = new DataView(out.buffer) + view.setUint32(0, payload.length) + out.set(Buffer.from(type, 'ascii'), 4) + out.set(payload, 8) + const crc = crc32(out.subarray(4, 8 + payload.length)) + view.setUint32(8 + payload.length, crc) + return out +} + +/** A valid RGBA PNG gradient of the given size (no dependency, like the worker's fixtures). */ +function png(width: number, height: number): Uint8Array { + const raw = new Uint8Array(height * (1 + width * 4)) + for (let y = 0; y < height; y++) { + const row = y * (1 + width * 4) + raw[row] = 0 + for (let x = 0; x < width; x++) { + const i = row + 1 + x * 4 + raw[i] = (x * 255) / width + raw[i + 1] = (y * 255) / height + raw[i + 2] = 128 + raw[i + 3] = 255 + } + } + const ihdr = new Uint8Array(13) + const view = new DataView(ihdr.buffer) + view.setUint32(0, width) + view.setUint32(4, height) + ihdr.set([8, 6, 0, 0, 0], 8) + return Buffer.concat([ + Buffer.from([0x89, 0x50, 0x4e, 0x47, 0x0d, 0x0a, 0x1a, 0x0a]), + chunk('IHDR', ihdr), + chunk('IDAT', deflateSync(raw)), + chunk('IEND', new Uint8Array(0)), + ]) +} + +const asBlob = (bytes: Uint8Array, type: string) => new Blob([Uint8Array.from(bytes)], { type }) + +// --- helpers ---------------------------------------------------------------- + +async function waitFor( + read: () => Promise, + timeoutMs: number, + label: string, +): Promise { + const started = Date.now() + for (;;) { + const value = await read() + if (value !== null) return value + if (Date.now() - started > timeoutMs) throw new Error(`timeout: ${label}`) + await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 1000)) + } +} + +async function ownRow(client: Client, userId: string, assetId: string): Promise { + const { data, error } = await client + .from('assets') + .select('id, owner_id, kind, bucket_id, object_key, status, declared_mime, declared_size, byte_size, sha256, rejection_reason, created_at, updated_at') + .eq('owner_id', userId) + .eq('id', assetId) + .maybeSingle() + if (error) throw new Error(error.message) + return data +} + +/** Row once the worker has settled it (clean or rejected). */ +function settled(client: Client, userId: string, assetId: string) { + return waitFor( + async () => { + const row = await ownRow(client, userId, assetId) + return row && (row.status === 'clean' || row.status === 'rejected') ? row : null + }, + WORKER_WAIT_MS, + `worker verdict on ${assetId}`, + ) +} + +/** Upload one blob end to end and return the settled row. */ +async function uploadAndSettle( + client: Client, + userId: string, + blob: Blob, + declaredMime: 'image/jpeg' | 'image/png' | 'image/webp', +): Promise { + const ticket = await beginAvatarUpload(client, { declaredMime, declaredSize: blob.size }) + await uploadToQuarantine(client, { ...ticket, blob }) + await confirmAssetUpload(client, ticket.assetId) + return settled(client, userId, ticket.assetId) +} + +/** True when the service role can still download the object (it bypasses the policies). */ +async function objectExists(service: Client, bucket: string, key: string): Promise { + const { data, error } = await service.storage.from(bucket).download(key) + return !error && data !== null && data.size > 0 +} + +function psql(sql: string): string { + return execFileSync('docker', [ + 'exec', DB_CONTAINER, 'psql', '-U', 'postgres', '-d', 'postgres', '-Atc', sql, + ]).toString().trim() +} + +/** Moves every due date of the purge queue to now (the grace is 48 h / 1 h in production). */ +function expeditePurges(): void { + psql('update private.object_purge_queue set not_before = now() where not_before > now()') +} + +/** Purge entries still queued for an account (served entries are acked, hence deleted). */ +function queuedPurges(userId: string): number { + return Number(psql(`select count(*) from private.object_purge_queue where object_name like '%/${userId}/%'`)) +} + +async function downloadFails(client: Client, key: string): Promise { + const { data, error } = await client.storage.from('avatars').download(key) + return Boolean(error) || data === null +} + +function sha256(bytes: Uint8Array): string { + return createHash('sha256').update(bytes).digest('hex') +} + +// --- suite ------------------------------------------------------------------ + +const configured = Boolean(URL_ && ANON && SERVICE) + +describe.skipIf(!configured)('avatar flow on the real stack', () => { + const service = serviceClient() + let alice: Client + let aliceId: string + let bob: Client + + beforeAll(async () => { + // A fresh account per run keeps the seeded accounts clean and the per-hour rate out of reach. + const email = `e2e-avatar-${Date.now()}@faunosteo.local` + const created = await service.auth.admin.createUser({ + email, + password: PASSWORD, + email_confirm: true, + user_metadata: { display_name: 'E2E Avatar', locale: 'fr' }, + }) + if (created.error || !created.data.user) throw new Error(`createUser: ${created.error?.message}`) + aliceId = created.data.user.id + alice = await signedIn(email) + bob = await signedIn(BOB) + }) + + afterAll(async () => { + if (aliceId) await service.auth.admin.deleteUser(aliceId) + }) + + it('cleans a valid upload, and only the owner can download the result', async () => { + const source = png(640, 480) + const row = await uploadAndSettle(alice, aliceId, asBlob(source, 'image/png'), 'image/png') + expect(row.status).toBe('clean') + const blob = await downloadAvatar(alice, row.object_key) + const bytes = new Uint8Array(await blob.arrayBuffer()) + expect(Buffer.from(bytes.subarray(0, 4)).toString('ascii')).toBe('RIFF') + expect(Buffer.from(bytes.subarray(8, 12)).toString('ascii')).toBe('WEBP') + expect(row.byte_size).toBe(bytes.length) + expect(row.sha256).toBe(sha256(bytes)) + expect(bytes.length).toBeLessThan(512 * 1024) + + const quarantineKey = `quarantine/${aliceId}/${row.id}/upload` + expect(await downloadFails(alice, quarantineKey)).toBe(true) + expect(await downloadFails(bob, row.object_key)).toBe(true) + expect(await downloadFails(anonClient(), row.object_key)).toBe(true) + const bobRows = await bob.from('assets').select('id').eq('owner_id', aliceId) + expect(bobRows.data).toEqual([]) + const direct = await alice.storage.from('avatars').upload(row.object_key, asBlob(source, 'image/png'), { + upsert: false, + contentType: 'image/png', + }) + expect(direct.error).not.toBeNull() + // The worker deleted the quarantine object once the row was clean. + await waitFor( + async () => ((await objectExists(service, 'avatars', quarantineKey)) ? null : true), + 30_000, + 'quarantine object deleted', + ) + }) + + it('replaces the photo and purges the previous object after its grace', async () => { + const before = await fetchOwnAvatarState(alice, aliceId) + const previous = before.clean + expect(previous).not.toBeNull() + const row = await uploadAndSettle(alice, aliceId, asBlob(png(300, 700), 'image/png'), 'image/png') + expect(row.status).toBe('clean') + const state = await fetchOwnAvatarState(alice, aliceId) + expect(state.clean?.id).toBe(row.id) + expect(await downloadFails(alice, previous!.object_key)).toBe(true) + expect(await objectExists(service, 'avatars', previous!.object_key)).toBe(true) + expeditePurges() + await waitFor( + async () => ((await objectExists(service, 'avatars', previous!.object_key)) ? null : true), + 30_000, + 'replaced object purged after its grace', + ) + }) + + it('sweeps bytes landed through a still-valid signed upload URL after the row moved on', async () => { + const stale = await beginAvatarUpload(alice, { declaredMime: 'image/png', declaredSize: 1000 }) + const signed = await alice.storage.from('avatars').createSignedUploadUrl(stale.quarantineKey) + expect(signed.error).toBeNull() + // A new pick supersedes the row; the signed URL is still valid for two hours. + const fresh = await beginAvatarUpload(alice, { declaredMime: 'image/png', declaredSize: 1000 }) + expect(fresh.assetId).not.toBe(stale.assetId) + const late = await alice.storage + .from('avatars') + .uploadToSignedUrl(stale.quarantineKey, signed.data!.token, asBlob(png(100, 100), 'image/png'), { + contentType: 'image/png', + }) + // Either the API refused the late upload, or the sweeper removes the leftover. + if (!late.error) { + await waitFor( + async () => ((await objectExists(service, 'avatars', stale.quarantineKey)) ? null : true), + 30_000, + 'late quarantine bytes swept', + ) + } + const staleRow = await ownRow(alice, aliceId, stale.assetId) + expect(staleRow?.status).toBe('deleted') + expect(await downloadFails(alice, stale.quarantineKey)).toBe(true) + }) + + it('rejects hostile and corrupted uploads with closed codes', async () => { + const html = Buffer.from('') + const htmlRow = await uploadAndSettle(alice, aliceId, asBlob(html, 'image/jpeg'), 'image/jpeg') + expect(htmlRow.status).toBe('rejected') + expect(htmlRow.rejection_reason).toBe('unsupported_type') + + const truncated = png(200, 200).subarray(0, 80) + const truncatedRow = await uploadAndSettle(alice, aliceId, asBlob(truncated, 'image/png'), 'image/png') + expect(truncatedRow.status).toBe('rejected') + expect(truncatedRow.rejection_reason).toBe('decode_failed') + + const tinyRow = await uploadAndSettle(alice, aliceId, asBlob(png(32, 32), 'image/png'), 'image/png') + expect(tinyRow.status).toBe('rejected') + expect(tinyRow.rejection_reason).toBe('dimensions') + }) + + it('removes the photo, cuts the download at once and empties the objects after the grace', async () => { + const row = await uploadAndSettle(alice, aliceId, asBlob(png(512, 512), 'image/png'), 'image/png') + expect(row.status).toBe('clean') + expect(await removeAvatar(alice)).toBeGreaterThanOrEqual(1) + expect(await downloadFails(alice, row.object_key)).toBe(true) + const state = await fetchOwnAvatarState(alice, aliceId) + expect(state.clean).toBeNull() + expeditePurges() + await waitFor( + async () => { + const listed = await service.storage.from('avatars').list(`profiles/${aliceId}`, { limit: 100 }) + const remaining = (listed.data ?? []).length + return remaining === 0 ? true : null + }, + 30_000, + 'every object of the account purged', + ) + // Every served entry was acked, a missing object counting as purged. + await waitFor(async () => (queuedPurges(aliceId) === 0 ? true : null), 30_000, 'purge queue drained') + }) +}) diff --git a/packages/supabase/vitest.e2e.config.ts b/packages/supabase/vitest.e2e.config.ts new file mode 100644 index 00000000..2e15d6cd --- /dev/null +++ b/packages/supabase/vitest.e2e.config.ts @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +import { defineConfig } from 'vitest/config' + +/** + * Real-stack end-to-end suite (tests/e2e/*.e2e.ts): needs the local Supabase + * stack and the worker container (scripts/avatar-e2e.sh starts both sides). + * Kept out of the default `test:run` include on purpose. + */ +export default defineConfig({ + test: { + environment: 'node', + globals: true, + include: ['tests/e2e/**/*.e2e.ts'], + fileParallelism: false, + testTimeout: 120_000, + hookTimeout: 120_000, + }, +}) diff --git a/scripts/avatar-e2e.sh b/scripts/avatar-e2e.sh new file mode 100755 index 00000000..f981546d --- /dev/null +++ b/scripts/avatar-e2e.sh @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env bash +# Real-stack end-to-end run of the avatar flow (docs/development/STORAGE.md §6): +# starts the worker container against the local Supabase stack with a fast sweep +# and no quarantine grace, runs packages/supabase/tests/e2e, stops the container. +# Needs: `pnpm db:start` done, Docker, the worker image (`pnpm worker:image`, +# built here when absent). The keys come from `supabase status`; the service key +# reaches the container through a 600-mode temporary env file, never the command line. +set -euo pipefail + +cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." + +network="${SUPABASE_NETWORK:-supabase_network_faunosteo}" +kong="${SUPABASE_INTERNAL_URL:-http://supabase_kong_faunosteo:8000}" +image="${WORKER_IMAGE:-faunosteo_worker:dev}" +name="faunosteo_worker_e2e" + +status="$(node_modules/.bin/supabase status -o env 2>/dev/null)" \ + || { echo "avatar-e2e: the local stack is not running (pnpm db:start)" >&2; exit 1; } +value() { printf '%s\n' "$status" | sed -n "s/^$1=\"\(.*\)\"$/\1/p"; } +api_url="$(value API_URL)" +anon_key="$(value ANON_KEY)" +service_key="$(value SERVICE_ROLE_KEY)" +[ -n "$api_url" ] && [ -n "$anon_key" ] && [ -n "$service_key" ] \ + || { echo "avatar-e2e: could not read the keys from supabase status" >&2; exit 1; } + +if ! docker image inspect "$image" >/dev/null 2>&1; then + echo "== building $image" + docker build -f crates/worker/Dockerfile -t "$image" . +fi + +env_file="$(mktemp)" +chmod 600 "$env_file" +cleanup() { + echo "== worker log (last lines)" + docker logs --tail 40 "$name" 2>/dev/null || true + docker rm -f "$name" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true + rm -f "$env_file" +} +trap cleanup EXIT +{ + echo "SUPABASE_URL=$kong" + echo "SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY=$service_key" + echo "WORKER_ID=e2e" + echo "WORKER_POLL_SECONDS=1" + echo "WORKER_SWEEP_SECONDS=5" + echo "WORKER_QUARANTINE_GRACE_SECONDS=0" +} > "$env_file" + +docker rm -f "$name" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true +echo "== starting $name on $network" +docker run -d --name "$name" --read-only --cap-drop ALL \ + --security-opt no-new-privileges:true --memory 512m --cpus 1 --pids-limit 64 \ + --network "$network" --env-file "$env_file" "$image" run >/dev/null + +echo "== e2e suite" +SUPABASE_URL="$api_url" SUPABASE_ANON_KEY="$anon_key" SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY="$service_key" \ + pnpm --filter @faunosteo/supabase test:e2e