Decisions

Design/architecture choices. Caveman + English.

BDR-001 — Installer rewritten bash, not POSIX sh

2026-05-27. install.sh used #!/bin/sh but [ "$1" == "x" ] (bashism) → breaks on dash. Switched shebang to #!/usr/bin/env bash + set -euo pipefail. Repo targets apt-get systems, bash always present. Alternative (stay POSIX, use =) rejected — bash gives brace expansion + arrays if needed later. Status: done.

BDR-002 — Installer paths relative to SCRIPT_DIR

2026-05-27. Old script mixed /tmp/config/bash/... (never populated) and relative bash/.... server + osx branches referenced nonexistent /tmp/config → silent fail. Now compute SCRIPT_DIR once, all paths relative to it. Works from any cwd. Status: done.

BDR-003 — apt-get guarded by command -v

2026-05-27. apt-get ran unconditionally even for osx target → fails on macOS. Wrapped in if command -v apt-get. osx skips system packages. Status: done.

BDR-004 — remote-install.sh bootstrap: clone ~/config, idempotent pull

2026-05-27. Added curl|bash bootstrap. Clones repo to $HOME/config (env-overridable REPO_URL/CLONE_DIR/BRANCH), pulls if exists, ensures git first, then bash install.sh. Alt rejected: temp-dir + tarball download (no git dep) — kept git path, simpler + repo needs git anyway. Risk noted: curl|bash runs unreviewed remote code (archetype pain point); mitigated by HTTPS + pinned branch + manual fallback in README, not eliminated. Status: done.

BDR-005 — Remote desktop via gnome-remote-desktop --system, not xrdp

2026-06-23. Target machine = Wayland-only GNOME (Shell asserts XDG_SESSION_TYPE=wayland). xrdp's Xorg backend can't satisfy it → session dies instantly on login. Chose gnome-remote-desktop system "Remote Login" (GNOME-native, Wayland, RDP 3389, TLS, fresh GDM session). Auth 2-layer: shared gate creds (set-credentials) → per-user GDM PAM; gate creds required else mstsc 0x904 (BLK-004). Implemented install.sh setup_remote_desktop + ensure_rdp_credentials. Connection confirmed live. Alts rejected: (a) force Xorg GDM + xrdp — sacrifices Wayland desktop, fragile; (b) VNC (wayvnc) — RDP preferred (mstsc native on Win client, TLS); (c) g-r-d user "Desktop Sharing" mode — shares existing local session, wanted independent headless login. See LRN-004, BLK-004. Status: done.

2026-06-24. New etc/profile.d/disk-usage-warning.sh (POSIX sh, bold-red warn when / or /home ≥85%) deployed via sudo install -D -m 0644 to /etc/profile.d/ from install_disk_warning(), gated in the apt-get Linux block (see LRN-005). Alt rejected: per-user append to ~/.bashrc — wanted the warn for EVERY login account on the box, not just the installing user, so system-wide profile.d won. Known limit: login-shell scope only (non-login terminals miss it). Status: done.

2026-06-24. Wired dtach session-resume into ~/.profile (login scope = once per SSH) as a guarded SOURCE case $- in *i*) [ -x ~/.local/bin/dtach-router ] && . … ;;, NOT ~/.bashrc (every interactive shell → menu pops on each tab/subshell). Matches "à la connexion SSH" intent. install.sh wire_dtach_profile() idempotent: awk strips prior block (marker-delimited managed block # >>> claude-dtach >>> + legacy DT=$(dt ls)…fi execute block) then re-appends marker block. cc/d aliases live in bashrc-linux (sourced by .profile BEFORE the router runs → available). Alts rejected: (a) source from .bashrc (router's own header suggests it) — fires too often for login-only intent; (b) keep execute + string-parse — broke the return-based guard (LRN-006) + fragile parse. Supersedes the old execute+string-parse block. Status: SUPERSEDED by BDR-009 — done in repo; live ~/.profile re-migrated this session.

BDR-008 — config repo licensed GPL-3.0-or-later (copyleft)

2026-06-25. Added LICENSE (verbatim GPLv3 copied from /usr/share/common-licenses/GPL-3) + README ## License (GPL-3.0-or-later — see LICENSE, © 2026 Bastien Chanot). User said "full opensource" → read as strong COPYLEFT (code + all derivatives stay open), not permissive. SPDX: GPL-3.0-or-later; "or-later" grant asserted in README per FSF convention, LICENSE holds plain GPLv3 text. Alts rejected: MIT / Apache-2.0 (permissive — allow CLOSED derivatives, weaker open guarantee); Unlicense (public domain, no copyleft). Repo private (CLAUDE.md Public=no) so license optional, but user wanted one set. Reversible: swap LICENSE + README line if "full opensource" meant permissive. Status: done in repo (committed: LICENSE 40c6524, README License 00d88f7).

2026-06-25. Reversed BDR-007. Root cause: user works in VS Code Remote-SSH; its Linux integrated terminals are NON-login interactive shells → read ~/.bashrc, never ~/.profile → login-scoped wiring (BDR-007) silently never fired (LRN-008). Now source dtach-router from bashrc-linux via case $- in *i*) … . dtach-router; fires in EVERY interactive shell (covers VS Code, plain SSH via ~/.profile→~/.bashrc, tmux, new tabs). install.sh wire_dtach_profile() → unwire_dtach_profile(): strips any stale ~/.profile block (marker + legacy) so plain SSH login (sources ~/.bashrc via ~/.profile) doesn't prompt twice. Trade-off ACCEPTED (user chose "simplest"): menu shows in each new terminal tab when sessions exist, not once-per-connection — the exact noise BDR-007 avoided, now tolerated for VS Code reliability. Alts rejected: (a) once-per-connection sentinel keyed to SSH_CONNECTION/VSCODE_IPC_HOOK_CLI in $XDG_RUNTIME_DIR — more code, user declined; (b) VS Code terminal.integrated args:["-l"] — not carried by dotfiles, same per-tab firing. Supersedes BDR-007. Status: done in repo; live needs ./install.sh re-run.

BDR-010 — /tmp on disk (mask tmp.mount), swap rejected

2026-09-22. Ubuntu 26.04 mounts /tmp tmpfs size=50% RAM (7.4G of 14G here). Agents fill it → RAM halved + ENOSPC → shells break. Chose systemctl mask tmp.mount + /etc/tmpfiles.d/tmp.conf (D /tmp 10d, /var/tmp line kept). Offered [y/N] end of install.sh (offer_tmp_on_disk), TTY-guarded, idempotent, effective next reboot (never umount live). Alts rejected: (a) add/grow swap — cap + ENOSPC stay, thrash instead of OOM; (b) bigger tmpfs size= — still RAM; (c) TMPDIR=/var/tmp in bashrc — leaky (services, IDE spawns, cron). Status: done in repo, live apply = user (EVAL-002).

BDR-011 — SSH memory guard = old-server rules (ssh drop-in + earlyoom), systemd-oomd untouched

2026-09-22. Restored from NAS RECOVERY/40-systeme/etc: ssh.service.d/override.conf (MemoryMin=256M, OOMScoreAdjust=-1000) + earlyoom -r 60 -m 10 -s 10 --avoid '^(sshd|systemd|systemd-logind|dbus-daemon|containerd)$' --prefer '^(java|node|pnpm|esbuild)$'. MemoryMin covers sshd cgroup only (logind puts sessions in user.slice) → real guard = OOMScoreAdjust + earlyoom (kills ONE largest proc, shell survives). systemd-oomd (Ubuntu default ManagedOOMMemoryPressure=kill 50% on user@.service, kills WHOLE session cgroup) left as-is: zero kills in journal (fresh install), unproven as shell-killer. offer_ssh_memory_guard, [y/N], idempotent, ssh restart keeps sessions (KillMode=process). Alt rejected: drop-in only — kernel/oomd may still kill whole session. Status: done in repo, live apply = user.

BDR-012 — cloudpex site values in /etc/cloudpex.conf, prompted by installer

2026-09-22. User: no IP/user in script. Chose key=value /etc/cloudpex.conf root:root 0600 written by cloudpex/install.sh prompts (HOST, SHARE, SMB_USER, MNT, SMB_VERS; regex-validated, re-ask on bad input so main install.sh never aborts; keep-existing [Y/n]; skipped without TTY). Script parses lines (sed -n s/^KEY=//p), never sources → no code exec as root from config. Alt rejected: sed placeholders into deployed script — config + code mixed, every re-run overwrites values. Status: done in repo.

BDR-013 — security baseline always-on in install.sh: fail2ban (all-ports), unattended-upgrades, sshd limits

2026-09-22. User: "fail2ban and the like, systematically". Chose no-prompt Linux-block steps: (1) fail2ban sshd jail backend = systemd + banaction = %(banaction_allports)s → SSH port irrelevant (old server banned 22 while sshd on 337, LRN-012); ignoreip = loopback + RFC1918 static (no LAN detection; trade-off: compromised LAN host never banned); 5/10m/1h from RECOVERY doc 01. (2) 20auto-upgrades file instead of interactive dpkg-reconfigure. (3) sshd drop-in limited to PermitRootLogin/MaxAuthTries/LoginGraceTime, sshd -t gated, rejected file removed + install continues. Declined by user: auditd rules, ufw whitelist (site-specific ports, lockout risk → would be an offer, not systematic). Not included by design: PasswordAuthentication no / AllowUsers / X11Forwarding no (lockout or workflow risk). Status: done in repo (feature/security-baseline), live apply = user.

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