Files
claude/.gitleaks.toml
T
bastien 7c05f75eab feat(21st): replace the magic MCP with the @21st-dev CLI + skill pack
Upstream supersedes `@21st-dev/magic` with `@21st-dev/cli` (bin `21st`):
same endpoint, `21st login` in place of an API key, no MCP process loaded
into every session.

- install-plugins.sh Step 8.7: `npm i -g @21st-dev/cli` (pinned in
  plugins.lock.json), staged `21st skills install`, TTY-only login offer,
  pack disabled by default. update-all.sh 7.4 refreshes both.
- The documented `21st install-skill` cannot be used: the installer refuses
  to follow a symlink on the target path and `~/.claude/skills` is one. The
  install runs under a throwaway HOME and the result moves into
  skills-external/21st-* (gitignored), symlinked on demand.
- toggle-external.sh manages `21st` as a pack (names globbed from
  skills-external/21st-*, parked under plain names). `magic` is gone.
- The 5 design skills join design/web/web-full/full and MANAGED_EXTERNALS;
  21st-registry and 21st-design-sync stay parked. MANAGED_MCPS is now empty
  and profile.sh's dead magic branches are removed.
- Design gate: GATE-BLOCK gains `21st` (required-manual, magic's old slot)
  and `21st-ui-build`; PATH repair extended to the npm global bin.
- settings.json: the 4 mcp__magic__* ask entries go; the outward-facing
  21st verbs land in autoMode.soft_deny, the tier that holds under auto
  mode (LRN-153).
- Docs: README, CLAUDE.global.md, design-gate.md, profile SKILL.md,
  .env.example, .gitleaks.toml, link.sh. BDR-093, LRN-158.

Tests: profile-set-managed 17/17, make test green except 2 pre-existing
gitflow FAILs (gitleaks binary absent on this host), shellcheck clean.
2026-09-22 02:53:31 +00:00

88 lines
3.9 KiB
TOML

title = "claude-config gitleaks config"
# Backstop scanner (job7): pre-commit hook (lib/gitflow.sh emit-hook) and
# `make scan-secrets`. Extends gitleaks' default ruleset — never replaces it.
[extend]
useDefault = true
# 3 false-positive classes identified in job7 triage (.audit/job7/ALL-REDACTED.json),
# each verified empirically against the real flagged files before being added
# here (see .audit/job7-report.md). None of these are live secrets.
[[allowlists]]
description = "job7 triage — known false positives, not secrets"
# Content-based: git-game repo test fixtures (#5/#6 in the triage), confirmed
# synthetic by the repo owner — literal "test-secret-<digits>" values used in
# unit tests, flagged by the generic-api-key rule on entropy alone.
regexTarget = "match"
regexes = [
'''test-secret-[0-9-]+''',
]
# Path-based: third-party/vendored files outside our control, flagged by
# rules that don't apply to their content.
paths = [
# Official claude-plugins marketplace catalog — 40-char hex "sha" (git
# commit references, not credentials) trip the sourcegraph-access-token
# rule, which matches on bare hex length/entropy alone.
'''plugins/marketplaces/.*marketplace\.json$''',
# superpowers plugin test fixture — a base64-encoded WS protocol test
# nonce, not a credential, trips generic-api-key on entropy.
'''tests/brainstorm-server/ws-protocol\.test\.js$''',
# NOT a job7 false positive — this IS a real secret, by design: the
# canonical vault (BDR-026). `make scan-secrets` scans ~/.claude looking
# for stray COPIES of secrets outside this file; flagging the vault
# itself on every run is pure noise, not signal.
'''(^|/)\.env$''',
# seo-data OAuth token store — legitimate local secret (like ~/.claude/.env),
# 0600, outside git. Allowlisted so `make scan-secrets` doesn't flag the vault.
'''(^|/)\.claude/seo-data/tokens\.json$''',
]
# ── secrets-triage 2026-07-14 — 4 FP classes, each verified empirically
# (unredacted re-scan piped in-memory, values masked; see
# .gstack/security-reports/2026-07-14-secrets-triage.json). None are secrets.
# Transcripts and file-history are deliberately NOT path-allowlisted — that is
# where real leaks land (BDR-057).
# Bare 40-hex = git commit SHA (plugin-catalog pins, commit refs quoted in
# transcripts) tripping sourcegraph-access-token, which matches naked hex.
# Real sourcegraph tokens keep their sgp_ prefix → still detected.
[[allowlists]]
description = "bare 40-hex git commit SHAs (sourcegraph-access-token misfire)"
regexTarget = "secret"
regexes = ['''^[0-9a-f]{40}$''']
# Synthetic AWS key fabricated by lib/gitflow-test.sh:240 to exercise the
# pre-commit secret guard; test output lands in session transcripts.
[[allowlists]]
description = "gitflow-test synthetic AWS fixture (deliberately fake)"
regexTarget = "secret"
regexes = ['''AKIAGDR5XRBXYARW2I5N''']
# Public-by-design or expired URL credentials + documentation placeholders.
[[allowlists]]
description = "presigned-URL key ids, GitHub image JWTs, doc placeholders"
regexTarget = "line"
regexes = [
'''X-Amz-Credential=AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}''',
'''private-user-images\.githubusercontent\.com/[^"]*\?jwt=''',
# Docs/test example — base64 of the "the ..." ASCII sample text, never a key.
# (The MAGIC_API_KEY=abc123 placeholder that sat here went with the magic
# MCP, removed 2026-09-22 when 21st.dev moved to a CLI with no API key.)
'''clientKey = 'dGhlIH[A-Za-z0-9+/=]*'''',
]
# Prose in transcripts near the word "tokens" — dictionary phrases flagged by
# generic-api-key on entropy alone (e.g. a design discussion of publish/reject
# token pairs). Exact literals only; transcripts stay fully scanned otherwise.
[[allowlists]]
description = "prose false positives in transcripts"
stopwords = ['''publish/reject''']
# Ephemeral machine-local IDE auth locks (rotate per IDE session, never leave
# the machine).
[[allowlists]]
description = "Claude Code IDE lock files"
paths = ['''(^|/)ide/[0-9]+\.lock$''']