3.1 KiB
3.1 KiB
Secure by default: six domains and every API
Scope: any project that has a public surface, an API, a database, messaging,
a cloud function or a UI. Applies at design, scaffolding, implementation and
review. A request that breaks one of these gets flagged, not silently done.
What only a provider dashboard can set (spend cap, WAF, budget alert) is
never claimed done: write it as a manual step in the project's deploy notes.
/guardrails audits all of it and fixes what the user accepts.
Every API and every access
- Default deny. Authentication and authorization checked server-side on every route, function, RPC and webhook, never only at the entry point.
- Webhooks verify a signature. CORS is an allowlist, never
*with credentials. - Keys are least privilege and server-side. Responses carry only needed fields.
- Validate every input at the boundary. Rate limit every unauthenticated or costly route.
- Passwords hashed with argon2id (bcrypt or scrypt otherwise), never stored or compared in clear, never logged, never a literal in code or config. Delegated auth (Supabase, Firebase, Clerk) keeps them out of your tables. Reset tokens hashed, single-use, expiring.
1. Hosting
- Rate limit per IP and per account on login, signup, reset, send and upload.
- CDN and firewall (WAF, DDoS protection) in front of the origin.
- Hard spend cap if the host offers one. Otherwise a budget alert plus a written kill-switch step.
2. Injection
- Raw escapes (
$queryRawUnsafe,knex.raw,text(),.raw()) take bound values only; dynamic SQL in a function goes throughformat()with%I/%LandUSING. - A filter object never comes straight from the request: allowlist the fields, cast the values. No shell command carries input into a DB tool.
3. Exposure (what the browser can see)
- No data in the browser console, no source map in production, no debug flag in a committed config.
- Hydrated state,
data-*attributes, hidden fields and shipped HTML comments carry no token, hash, key or secret.
4. Supabase
- RLS enabled on every table, in the migration that creates it.
- Policies limited to the owner:
(select auth.uid())per operation, roleauthenticated. Nousing (true)on writes, no anon write. - No
service_roleor secret key client-side: not in a bundle, not in aNEXT_PUBLIC_,VITE_orPUBLIC_variable. - Views
security_invoker.security definerfunctions pinsearch_pathand revoke execute from anon. Buckets private by default.
5. SMS and email
- Prior consent recorded per contact: who, when, channel, source, wording. No send without a consent row; check the suppression list before each send.
- Every email has an unsubscribe link and
List-Unsubscribe. Every marketing SMS says STOP, and a STOP reply is processed and stored automatically.
6. Cloud functions
- No function re-triggers itself: never write to the resource that fires it, never invoke itself. If unavoidable, guard with an idempotency flag.
- Max instances (or reserved concurrency) and a timeout on every function.
- Budget alert wired to an automatic stop beyond the budget.