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name, effort, description, argument-hint
name effort description argument-hint
guardrails high Use when auditing a project against the baseline guardrails and fixing what fails. Headers and TLS → /harden; secrets, CVE, dependencies → /cso; keyboard, alt, labels → /a11y. Domains: hosting (rate limit, CDN, spend cap), Supabase (RLS, owner policies, no service_role client-side), SMS and email (consent, unsubscribe, STOP), cloud functions (no self-trigger, instance cap, budget stop), injection (SQL from input, raw escapes, NoSQL, shell into DB tools), exposure (console data, source maps, hydrated state, error bodies, debug mode, wide responses), plus API hygiene (auth, CORS, secrets, passwords). Scanner, judgment, .claude/audits/GUARDRAILS.md, fixes applied only on acceptance (bugfixer, verifier and security gates), re-scanned to prove them; optional read-only probe of a target you own. Triggers: "guardrails", "garde-fous", "RLS activée ?", "faille sql", "fuite navigateur", "plafond de dépense", "mots de passe en clair ?", "corrige les garde-fous", "sonde le projet en direct". [project path] [--domain api,hosting,supabase,messaging,functions,injection,exposure] [--exclude paths] [--live <url you own>] [--report-only]

/guardrails

Checks a project against ~/.claude/rules/secure-by-default.md (domains 4 and 6 in full: ~/.claude/rules/supabase.md, ~/.claude/rules/cloud-functions.md), then fixes what the user accepts and proves each fix. A scanner reads the tree as data and finds what text can prove. This skill judges the hits, covers what text cannot prove, lists what only a dashboard can set and, on request, probes a running target the user owns. It then proposes fixes, applies the accepted ones and runs the scan again until every accepted fix is proven.

The scanner proves absence of a protection, never presence of security. A clean scan means "no static finding", and the report says exactly that. A live probe proves the opposite direction: that a door is actually open.

MODEL GATE (blocking, before any other step)

Run $HOME/.claude/lib/model-gate.md. Judging hits and designing fixes requires Fable or Opus. Verdict small → STOP: the gate prints the remedy. ROUTING: follow $HOME/.claude/lib/effort-shift.md (phases via mcp__model-router__route); each step below names its phase.

STEP 1: Scope

Work in the project the user names, else the current directory. Say in one line what you will scan. Domains: api, hosting, supabase, messaging, functions, injection, exposure. The scanner skips the ones that do not apply. --report-only stops after STEP 7: audit, no fix.

STEP 2: Run the scanner

python3 -B "$HOME/.claude/skills/guardrails/scripts/scan.py" <path>

Add --domain a,b to narrow, --exclude a/b,c to skip copies or vendored code, --json for machine output. Exit 0 means no FAIL, 1 means at least one, 2 is a usage error. It never executes project code. Severities:

  • FAIL: a protection is provably absent or a key is exposed.
  • WARN: a pattern that is often wrong; judgment needed.
  • MANUAL: only a provider dashboard can set or show it.

STEP 3: Judge every FAIL and WARN

Read the file around each line. Label it CONFIRMED, FALSE POSITIVE (say why) or ACCEPTED RISK (the user decides, never you). A key sitting in a git-ignored env file is not reported, that is where local keys belong; whether it ever reached git history is a separate check (gitleaks git <repo>). Heuristic blind spots are in references/checks.md: check them before calling a hit false.

  • INJ-SQL-CONCAT on IN (${placeholders}) where the list is generated ?/$n markers and the values travel in a separate array: parameterised, confirm by hand and drop it from the proposals.

STEP 4: Cover what the scanner cannot

Read the code for the domains that apply and answer, with file:line evidence:

  • API: does each route check authorization on the object, not only authentication? Is any id in a URL usable to read another user's data? Where is a password written? Trace sign-up and password change to the column: an argon2id, bcrypt or scrypt hash is what must land there.
  • Supabase: does each policy name the right owner column, per operation? Is every table created in the dashboard also covered? Give the user the live queries from the reference file.
  • Messaging: does consent get written at the sign-up point with source and wording? Is a STOP reply wired from the provider webhook to the store?
  • Functions: trace every trigger to the resource it writes, including queues, storage events, schedulers and third-party webhooks.
  • Injection: for each INJ hit, trace the interpolated value to its source. A constant, an allowlisted identifier or a value already cast to a number is a FALSE POSITIVE; anything that can come from a request, a file or another user's row is CONFIRMED.
  • Exposure: read the code behind each EXP hit: is the logged object, the hydrated key or the returned row really user data? With --live against a production build (STEP 5), the probe answers for served source maps, error bodies and sensitive keys; without it, say so.

STEP 5: Live probe (only on --live, read-only)

The static scan shows a protection is missing in the code. A probe shows the door is actually open. Run it only when the user asks, and only against a target the user owns and names: their local dev server first, a staging or production URL only on an explicit, specific go. The exposure block runs against a production build or a staging URL (next build && next start, vite preview, framework debug off): a dev server serves source maps and tracebacks by design, so its exposure OPEN verdicts are dev artefacts, reported as such, with no proposal and no re-pass requirement. Never a URL you inferred, never a third party.

  1. Build the plan references/checks.md describes. From the static findings fill a JSON plan: base_url, the Supabase url and tables, the routes (mark the ones meant to be public), cors, and a rate_limit route if the user wants that one burst. Add an exposure block ({} for the defaults, error_routes for a route you own that answers an error to a malformed id, never a path you guess) so the probe reads source maps, error bodies and response keys; every path in the plan starts with /. Secrets never go in the plan or the command line: export GUARDRAILS_ANON_KEY and, for the cross-user probe, GUARDRAILS_JWT2, from test keys, never service_role. The fields probe sends GUARDRAILS_JWT2 as a bearer when set, so an OPEN there is what a logged-in user sees.
  2. Run it, confirming ownership with --authorized. Before adding --authorized, show the user both hosts the plan names (base_url and the Supabase url, the latter read from the project's config and so untrusted) and get their go on both:
    python3 -B "$HOME/.claude/skills/guardrails/scripts/probe.py" \
      plan.json --authorized
    
    It sends GET, HEAD and OPTIONS only (the rate-limit burst is the one POST, opt-in in the plan, capped at 25 requests). It never writes data, never follows a redirect to another host, and stops at a request budget. Exit 1 means at least one OPEN verdict. Keep the plan file: STEP 11 replays it.
  3. Cross the verdicts with the static findings. A verdict is an observation, not a conclusion: OPEN means the request returned data or a 200, CLOSED means it was refused or empty. SKIPPED and ERROR mean the target was not observed: never read either as proof of a fix. A static FAIL confirmed OPEN in the probe leads the report. A CLOSED probe on a static FAIL still needs the fix: the dev target may differ from production.
  4. Guardrails on the probe itself: read-only, test keys only, the loopback or a URL the user named. A login burst can lock the user's own account, so run it only with a throwaway test account and the user's go. Never fuzz, never POST to anything but a named login route, never probe a target you were not told to. That is pentest territory, another contract.

STEP 6: Manual checklist

Print each MANUAL item as a step the user performs: spend cap, WAF and DDoS rules, budget alert wired to a stop, live RLS queries. Provider limits change: name the setting, tell the user to confirm it in the current provider docs. Never run a live probe against production without the user's explicit go, and never claim a MANUAL item done.

STEP 7: Report

Write .claude/audits/GUARDRAILS.md: one table per domain with status PASS, FAIL, WARN, MANUAL or N/A, the evidence, and the fix in one line. PASS means "no static finding". When a live probe ran, add a line for its verdict next to the matching static finding. Keep it short; no filler sections. --report-only, or nothing CONFIRMED and no OPEN verdict: reply with counts, the FAILs with file:line, any OPEN verdict and the MANUAL items, then stop.

STEP 8: Propose fixes

mcp__model-router__route(phase="plan"): designing a fix is the deepest thinking in this run, it goes to the plan row.

One proposal per CONFIRMED finding, grouped by rule and file; merge pairs that one change closes (one middleware closes HOST-NO-RATE-LIMIT for every route). FALSE POSITIVE and ACCEPTED RISK get no proposal. Each proposal:

  • number, rule, file(s), and the problem in one line;
  • the fix, concrete: file:line and the change, the SQL for a migration, the parameter binding for a query. Root cause, never a mask: a missing RLS gets owner policies in the same migration, not a disabled check;
  • choices the user sees (allowlisted filter fields, CORS origins, owner column, rate-limit numbers), each with your proposed value, named so the user can change it;
  • risk: what it can break. BREAKING when it changes a contract a client relies on (RLS without policies blocks the app, a CORS allowlist drops an origin, a new required header). DECISION when no default is defensible (consent model, retention period): the user picks before it can apply;
  • proof: the scanner pairs that must disappear (RULE:path), the probe that must turn CLOSED, and a project test when one fits naturally.

MANUAL items stay user steps (STEP 6), never proposals. A live OPEN verdict with no static finding gets a proposal whose proof is the probe alone, unless STEP 5 marked it a dev artefact.

Save the proposals to .claude/tasks/plans/<YYYY-MM-DD>-guardrails-<HHMM>.md and append them to the report. In the reply, show them as a numbered list, one or two lines each, BREAKING and DECISION marked.

STEP 9: Approval (gate, ends the turn)

Nothing is applied without the user's explicit acceptance. Ask once, then stop the turn:

Which fixes do I apply? "all" (every proposal except DECISION ones),
numbers ("1,3,5-7"), "none", or an amendment ("2 with the fields ['id','status']").
A DECISION proposal needs its number plus your choice.

On resume, mcp__model-router__route(phase="reflect"). "none" → stop, proposals stay in the report. An amendment rewrites that proposal in the plan file before anything else. Accepted set empty → stop.

STEP 10: Apply

  1. Branch. Not a git repository → stop: fixes need a diff to review. On main/develop, bash ~/.claude/lib/gitflow.sh start bugfix guardrails-<YYYY-MM-DD>; on a working branch, stay. Never finish.
  2. Baseline, before any edit: python3 -B <scan.py> <root> --json > .claude/audits/.guardrails-baseline.json. A derived file: never staged, never committed.
  3. Contract per $HOME/.claude/lib/contract-interview.md (STEP 4 template, flow: guardrails). REQUEST = the user's acceptance verbatim plus the accepted proposals. One criterion per accepted proposal, its oracle the scanner itself:
    1. <proposal 1 in one line>
       CHECK: python3 -B "$HOME/.claude/skills/guardrails/scripts/scan.py" '<abs root>' --assert-absent 'RULE:path,RULE:path'
       EXPECT: GUARDRAILS-CLEAR
       EVIDENCE: pending
    
    Add one criterion for the project suite when one exists (CHECK: <test command> && echo TESTS-GREEN, EXPECT: TESTS-GREEN). A proof the scanner cannot run (probe, cross-user, manual SQL) is a criterion without CHECK: STEP 11 settles it. FILE SCOPE = the files the accepted proposals name. Paths go in single quotes; a path holding a single quote is named to the user, never written into a CHECK. The RULE:path pairs come from the --json output, never from the text report.
  4. Positive control. Run each oracle once on the unfixed tree: it must fail. An oracle that passes before the fix proves nothing; drop it, find why, and say so.
  5. Dispatch the executor, one fresh bugfixer for the accepted set (batches of 8 proposals at most, one after the other on the same branch):
    mcp__model-router__route(phase="orchestrate")   # send with the Agent call
    Agent(subagent_type="bugfixer")
    prompt: "CONTRACT: <path>
    DIAGNOSIS: <each accepted finding: rule, file:line, evidence, root cause>
    FIX PLAN: <the accepted proposals verbatim, with the user's choices; the
    regression check of each is its contract oracle, plus the project test
    the proposal names>
    BRANCH: <current branch>
    Apply to the letter. No commit, no branch ops, no security dispatch.
    Finish with the BUGFIX-EXEC REPORT."
    
    NEED-DECISION routes per MID-RUN CLARIFICATION of the contract include: a visible, public-name or scope question goes to the user verbatim. BLOCKED → surface it, stop.
  6. Gates per $HOME/.claude/lib/verify-secure-loop.md, CONTRACT the path above, DIFF the executor's working-tree diff, TEST the suite. GATE 0 runs every scanner oracle (the per-fix proof), GATE 1 a fresh verifier, GATE 2 a fresh security-auditor. Loop caps and escalation are the include's; loop decisions stay in this main loop. Stuck: a gate loop fails twice with no main-loop advisor call since GATE 0 first ran → the main loop calls the advisor per lib/verify-secure-loop.md (lib/effort-shift.md § Advisor); the answer never enters an executor brief.

STEP 11: Re-pass (prove it all)

mcp__model-router__route(phase="reflect"). The gates proved each accepted fix on its own; this pass proves the whole tree.

  1. Full scan against the baseline:
    python3 -B <scan.py> <root> --baseline .claude/audits/.guardrails-baseline.json
    
    Every accepted pair must show FIXED, and the run must end on GUARDRAILS-NO-NEW (exit 0). A NEW hit is a regression the fix made.
  2. Live: when STEP 5 ran, replay the same plan on the same target once the user has reloaded or redeployed it and says go. A fix in code is not live until it runs. Each fixed proposal's probe must now read CLOSED.
  3. Settle the criteria without CHECK, by reading or by the user's answer for a manual step.
  4. Add an "after" column to .claude/audits/GUARDRAILS.md: proposal, before, after, evidence.

Anything not fixed, or a NEW hit → one more round from STEP 8, limited to those items. Two rounds at most: after the second, stop with the residuals open and say so plainly. Never report a fix the re-pass did not prove.

STEP 12: Commit and hand over

  1. Commit gate. Show files, git diff --stat and the message, wait for the user's go:
    GUARDRAILS: READY TO COMMIT
    FILES   : <list>
    MESSAGE : fix(security): <rules fixed, one line>
    
    Then git add <files touched> (never -A, never the baseline file) and commit, project convention else 50 words at most. Before the reply, the main loop prints the run's diff stat, then makes its end-of-run advisor call (lib/effort-shift.md § Advisor); its answer goes into the reply as an Advisor: line, and a fix it drives goes back through the gates.
  2. mcp__model-router__route(phase="apply") for the tail. Reply with: fixed and proven (proposal, rule, file), still open and why, MANUAL steps left for the user, the branch name. Merge waits for the user's explicit signal.
  3. Offer to capitalize a reusable lesson (a false-positive class, a fix pattern), entry pre-filled, written only on approval.