# Secure by default: six domains and every API Scope: any project that has a public surface, an API, a database, messaging, a cloud function or a UI. Applies at design, scaffolding, implementation and review. A request that breaks one of these gets flagged, not silently done. What only a provider dashboard can set (spend cap, WAF, budget alert) is never claimed done: write it as a manual step in the project's deploy notes. `/guardrails` audits all of it and fixes what the user accepts. ## Every API and every access - Default deny. Authentication and authorization checked server-side on every route, function, RPC and webhook, never only at the entry point. - Webhooks verify a signature. CORS is an allowlist, never `*` with credentials. - Keys are least privilege and server-side. Responses carry only needed fields. - Validate every input at the boundary. Rate limit every unauthenticated or costly route. - Passwords hashed with argon2id (bcrypt or scrypt otherwise), never stored or compared in clear, never logged, never a literal in code or config. Delegated auth (Supabase, Firebase, Clerk) keeps them out of your tables. Reset tokens hashed, single-use, expiring. ## 1. Hosting - Rate limit per IP and per account on login, signup, reset, send and upload. - CDN and firewall (WAF, DDoS protection) in front of the origin. - Hard spend cap if the host offers one. Otherwise a budget alert plus a written kill-switch step. ## 2. Injection - Raw escapes (`$queryRawUnsafe`, `knex.raw`, `text()`, `.raw()`) take bound values only; dynamic SQL in a function goes through `format()` with `%I` / `%L` and `USING`. - A filter object never comes straight from the request: allowlist the fields, cast the values. No shell command carries input into a DB tool. ## 3. Exposure (what the browser can see) - No data in the browser console, no source map in production, no debug flag in a committed config. - Hydrated state, `data-*` attributes, hidden fields and shipped HTML comments carry no token, hash, key or secret. ## 4. Supabase - RLS enabled on every table, in the migration that creates it. - Policies limited to the owner: `(select auth.uid())` per operation, role `authenticated`. No `using (true)` on writes, no anon write. - No `service_role` or secret key client-side: not in a bundle, not in a `NEXT_PUBLIC_`, `VITE_` or `PUBLIC_` variable. - Views `security_invoker`. `security definer` functions pin `search_path` and revoke execute from anon. Buckets private by default. ## 5. SMS and email - Prior consent recorded per contact: who, when, channel, source, wording. No send without a consent row; check the suppression list before each send. - Every email has an unsubscribe link and `List-Unsubscribe`. Every marketing SMS says STOP, and a STOP reply is processed and stored automatically. ## 6. Cloud functions - No function re-triggers itself: never write to the resource that fires it, never invoke itself. If unavoidable, guard with an idempotency flag. - Max instances (or reserved concurrency) and a timeout on every function. - Budget alert wired to an automatic stop beyond the budget.