added some rules

BDR-057: secrets by reference not by value; redact at capture, not just at
rest. Documents the two-part job7 posture (MCP ${VAR} expansion + rtk-rewrite
env-dump redaction) and flags the unreconciled contradiction with job6's
same-day (wrong) finding that ${VAR} expansion was unsupported at user scope.

BDR-026 updated: the backup-vector incident (2026-07-02) is closed at the
source rather than by repeated scrubbing — every native auto-backup taken
while the live file held the plaintext value was a fresh leak, so scrubbing
existing backups alone would have recurred forever.

LRN-108: `claude mcp add --env KEY=value` writes the value literally —
double- vs single-quoting around `${VAR}` is the entire difference between
a reference and a plaintext-forever config. The natural way to type the
flag (bash-expand it first) is exactly the trap.

Also refreshed .audit/scan-secrets-claude-home.json to the post-purge state
(15 residual hits, down from 18 pre-D).

.audit/scan-secrets-claude-home.json

@@ -0,0 +1,308 @@
+[
+ {
+  "RuleID": "generic-api-key",
+  "Description": "Detected a Generic API Key, potentially exposing access to various services and sensitive operations.",
+  "StartLine": 5,
+  "EndLine": 5,
+  "StartColumn": 2,
+  "EndColumn": 66,
+  "Match": "AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY = \"REDACTED\"",
+  "Secret": "REDACTED",
+  "File": "/home/bchanot/.claude/file-history/27758e8c-36b5-4816-8141-8b07ba28b0c8/19af1df0732eefc6@v2",
+  "SymlinkFile": "",
+  "Commit": "",
+  "Entropy": 5.009636,
+  "Author": "",
+  "Email": "",
+  "Date": "",
+  "Message": "",
+  "Tags": [],
+  "Fingerprint": "/home/bchanot/.claude/file-history/27758e8c-36b5-4816-8141-8b07ba28b0c8/19af1df0732eefc6@v2:generic-api-key:5"
+ },
+ {
+  "RuleID": "stripe-access-token",
+  "Description": "Found a Stripe Access Token, posing a risk to payment processing services and sensitive financial data.",
+  "StartLine": 3,
+  "EndLine": 3,
+  "StartColumn": 19,
+  "EndColumn": 57,
+  "Match": "REDACTED\"",
+  "Secret": "REDACTED",
+  "File": "/home/bchanot/.claude/file-history/27758e8c-36b5-4816-8141-8b07ba28b0c8/19af1df0732eefc6@v2",
+  "SymlinkFile": "",
+  "Commit": "",
+  "Entropy": 4.807009,
+  "Author": "",
+  "Email": "",
+  "Date": "",
+  "Message": "",
+  "Tags": [],
+  "Fingerprint": "/home/bchanot/.claude/file-history/27758e8c-36b5-4816-8141-8b07ba28b0c8/19af1df0732eefc6@v2:stripe-access-token:3"
+ },
+ {
+  "RuleID": "generic-api-key",
+  "Description": "Detected a Generic API Key, potentially exposing access to various services and sensitive operations.",
+  "StartLine": 1,
+  "EndLine": 1,
+  "StartColumn": 112,
+  "EndColumn": 160,
+  "Match": "authToken\":\"REDACTED\"",
+  "Secret": "REDACTED",
+  "File": "/home/bchanot/.claude/ide/20429.lock",
+  "SymlinkFile": "",
+  "Commit": "",
+  "Entropy": 3.7873018,
+  "Author": "",
+  "Email": "",
+  "Date": "",
+  "Message": "",
+  "Tags": [],
+  "Fingerprint": "/home/bchanot/.claude/ide/20429.lock:generic-api-key:1"
+ },
+ {
+  "RuleID": "github-pat",
+  "Description": "Uncovered a GitHub Personal Access Token, potentially leading to unauthorized repository access and sensitive content exposure.",
+  "StartLine": 194,
+  "EndLine": 194,
+  "StartColumn": 469,
+  "EndColumn": 508,
+  "Match": "REDACTED",
+  "Secret": "REDACTED",
+  "File": "/home/bchanot/.claude/projects/-home-bchanot-Documents-claude/27758e8c-36b5-4816-8141-8b07ba28b0c8.jsonl",
+  "SymlinkFile": "",
+  "Commit": "",
+  "Entropy": 4.6841836,
+  "Author": "",
+  "Email": "",
+  "Date": "",
+  "Message": "",
+  "Tags": [],
+  "Fingerprint": "/home/bchanot/.claude/projects/-home-bchanot-Documents-claude/27758e8c-36b5-4816-8141-8b07ba28b0c8.jsonl:github-pat:194"
+ },
+ {
+  "RuleID": "jwt",
+  "Description": "Uncovered a JSON Web Token, which may lead to unauthorized access to web applications and sensitive user data.",
+  "StartLine": 164,
+  "EndLine": 164,
+  "StartColumn": 18186,
+  "EndColumn": 18851,
+  "Match": "REDACTED\"",
+  "Secret": "REDACTED",
+  "File": "/home/bchanot/.claude/projects/-home-bchanot-Documents-claude/d71e6b88-7632-40e9-b7bc-830fb32fc464/tool-results/bsl3i4eop.txt",
+  "SymlinkFile": "",
+  "Commit": "",
+  "Entropy": 5.639867,
+  "Author": "",
+  "Email": "",
+  "Date": "",
+  "Message": "",
+  "Tags": [],
+  "Fingerprint": "/home/bchanot/.claude/projects/-home-bchanot-Documents-claude/d71e6b88-7632-40e9-b7bc-830fb32fc464/tool-results/bsl3i4eop.txt:jwt:164"
+ },
+ {
+  "RuleID": "generic-api-key",
+  "Description": "Detected a Generic API Key, potentially exposing access to various services and sensitive operations.",
+  "StartLine": 46,
+  "EndLine": 46,
+  "StartColumn": 358,
+  "EndColumn": 395,
+  "Match": "clientKey = 'REDACTED'",
+  "Secret": "REDACTED",
+  "File": "/home/bchanot/.claude/projects/-home-bchanot-Documents-claude/f1c9c474-84b6-4484-b53f-25aad840e8fd.jsonl",
+  "SymlinkFile": "",
+  "Commit": "",
+  "Entropy": 4.168296,
+  "Author": "",
+  "Email": "",
+  "Date": "",
+  "Message": "",
+  "Tags": [],
+  "Fingerprint": "/home/bchanot/.claude/projects/-home-bchanot-Documents-claude/f1c9c474-84b6-4484-b53f-25aad840e8fd.jsonl:generic-api-key:46"
+ },
+ {
+  "RuleID": "generic-api-key",
+  "Description": "Detected a Generic API Key, potentially exposing access to various services and sensitive operations.",
+  "StartLine": 46,
+  "EndLine": 46,
+  "StartColumn": 733,
+  "EndColumn": 770,
+  "Match": "clientKey = 'REDACTED'",
+  "Secret": "REDACTED",
+  "File": "/home/bchanot/.claude/projects/-home-bchanot-Documents-claude/f1c9c474-84b6-4484-b53f-25aad840e8fd.jsonl",
+  "SymlinkFile": "",
+  "Commit": "",
+  "Entropy": 4.168296,
+  "Author": "",
+  "Email": "",
+  "Date": "",
+  "Message": "",
+  "Tags": [],
+  "Fingerprint": "/home/bchanot/.claude/projects/-home-bchanot-Documents-claude/f1c9c474-84b6-4484-b53f-25aad840e8fd.jsonl:generic-api-key:46"
+ },
+ {
+  "RuleID": "aws-access-token",
+  "Description": "Identified a pattern that may indicate AWS credentials, risking unauthorized cloud resource access and data breaches on AWS platforms.",
+  "StartLine": 52,
+  "EndLine": 52,
+  "StartColumn": 543,
+  "EndColumn": 562,
+  "Match": "REDACTED",
+  "Secret": "REDACTED",
+  "File": "/home/bchanot/.claude/projects/-home-bchanot-Documents-claude/f1c9c474-84b6-4484-b53f-25aad840e8fd.jsonl",
+  "SymlinkFile": "",
+  "Commit": "",
+  "Entropy": 3.821928,
+  "Author": "",
+  "Email": "",
+  "Date": "",
+  "Message": "",
+  "Tags": [],
+  "Fingerprint": "/home/bchanot/.claude/projects/-home-bchanot-Documents-claude/f1c9c474-84b6-4484-b53f-25aad840e8fd.jsonl:aws-access-token:52"
+ },
+ {
+  "RuleID": "aws-access-token",
+  "Description": "Identified a pattern that may indicate AWS credentials, risking unauthorized cloud resource access and data breaches on AWS platforms.",
+  "StartLine": 52,
+  "EndLine": 52,
+  "StartColumn": 1175,
+  "EndColumn": 1194,
+  "Match": "REDACTED",
+  "Secret": "REDACTED",
+  "File": "/home/bchanot/.claude/projects/-home-bchanot-Documents-claude/f1c9c474-84b6-4484-b53f-25aad840e8fd.jsonl",
+  "SymlinkFile": "",
+  "Commit": "",
+  "Entropy": 3.821928,
+  "Author": "",
+  "Email": "",
+  "Date": "",
+  "Message": "",
+  "Tags": [],
+  "Fingerprint": "/home/bchanot/.claude/projects/-home-bchanot-Documents-claude/f1c9c474-84b6-4484-b53f-25aad840e8fd.jsonl:aws-access-token:52"
+ },
+ {
+  "RuleID": "aws-access-token",
+  "Description": "Identified a pattern that may indicate AWS credentials, risking unauthorized cloud resource access and data breaches on AWS platforms.",
+  "StartLine": 52,
+  "EndLine": 52,
+  "StartColumn": 543,
+  "EndColumn": 1225,
+  "Match": "REDACTED",
+  "Secret": "REDACTED",
+  "File": "/home/bchanot/.claude/projects/-home-bchanot-Documents-claude/f1c9c474-84b6-4484-b53f-25aad840e8fd.jsonl",
+  "SymlinkFile": "",
+  "Commit": "",
+  "Entropy": 3.821928,
+  "Author": "",
+  "Email": "",
+  "Date": "",
+  "Message": "",
+  "Tags": [
+   "decoded:percent",
+   "decode-depth:1"
+  ],
+  "Fingerprint": "/home/bchanot/.claude/projects/-home-bchanot-Documents-claude/f1c9c474-84b6-4484-b53f-25aad840e8fd.jsonl:aws-access-token:52"
+ },
+ {
+  "RuleID": "aws-access-token",
+  "Description": "Identified a pattern that may indicate AWS credentials, risking unauthorized cloud resource access and data breaches on AWS platforms.",
+  "StartLine": 52,
+  "EndLine": 52,
+  "StartColumn": 563,
+  "EndColumn": 1225,
+  "Match": "REDACTED",
+  "Secret": "REDACTED",
+  "File": "/home/bchanot/.claude/projects/-home-bchanot-Documents-claude/f1c9c474-84b6-4484-b53f-25aad840e8fd.jsonl",
+  "SymlinkFile": "",
+  "Commit": "",
+  "Entropy": 3.821928,
+  "Author": "",
+  "Email": "",
+  "Date": "",
+  "Message": "",
+  "Tags": [
+   "decoded:percent",
+   "decode-depth:1"
+  ],
+  "Fingerprint": "/home/bchanot/.claude/projects/-home-bchanot-Documents-claude/f1c9c474-84b6-4484-b53f-25aad840e8fd.jsonl:aws-access-token:52"
+ },
+ {
+  "RuleID": "aws-access-token",
+  "Description": "Identified a pattern that may indicate AWS credentials, risking unauthorized cloud resource access and data breaches on AWS platforms.",
+  "StartLine": 652,
+  "EndLine": 652,
+  "StartColumn": 275,
+  "EndColumn": 294,
+  "Match": "REDACTED",
+  "Secret": "REDACTED",
+  "File": "/home/bchanot/.claude/projects/-home-bchanot-Documents-claude/4b5c02a9-3acd-4941-951e-134a569afe02.jsonl",
+  "SymlinkFile": "",
+  "Commit": "",
+  "Entropy": 3.5464394,
+  "Author": "",
+  "Email": "",
+  "Date": "",
+  "Message": "",
+  "Tags": [],
+  "Fingerprint": "/home/bchanot/.claude/projects/-home-bchanot-Documents-claude/4b5c02a9-3acd-4941-951e-134a569afe02.jsonl:aws-access-token:652"
+ },
+ {
+  "RuleID": "aws-access-token",
+  "Description": "Identified a pattern that may indicate AWS credentials, risking unauthorized cloud resource access and data breaches on AWS platforms.",
+  "StartLine": 652,
+  "EndLine": 652,
+  "StartColumn": 671,
+  "EndColumn": 690,
+  "Match": "REDACTED",
+  "Secret": "REDACTED",
+  "File": "/home/bchanot/.claude/projects/-home-bchanot-Documents-claude/4b5c02a9-3acd-4941-951e-134a569afe02.jsonl",
+  "SymlinkFile": "",
+  "Commit": "",
+  "Entropy": 3.5464394,
+  "Author": "",
+  "Email": "",
+  "Date": "",
+  "Message": "",
+  "Tags": [],
+  "Fingerprint": "/home/bchanot/.claude/projects/-home-bchanot-Documents-claude/4b5c02a9-3acd-4941-951e-134a569afe02.jsonl:aws-access-token:652"
+ },
+ {
+  "RuleID": "generic-api-key",
+  "Description": "Detected a Generic API Key, potentially exposing access to various services and sensitive operations.",
+  "StartLine": 112,
+  "EndLine": 112,
+  "StartColumn": 3505,
+  "EndColumn": 3542,
+  "Match": "clientKey = 'REDACTED'",
+  "Secret": "REDACTED",
+  "File": "/home/bchanot/.claude/projects/-home-bchanot-Documents-claude/f1c9c474-84b6-4484-b53f-25aad840e8fd.jsonl",
+  "SymlinkFile": "",
+  "Commit": "",
+  "Entropy": 4.168296,
+  "Author": "",
+  "Email": "",
+  "Date": "",
+  "Message": "",
+  "Tags": [],
+  "Fingerprint": "/home/bchanot/.claude/projects/-home-bchanot-Documents-claude/f1c9c474-84b6-4484-b53f-25aad840e8fd.jsonl:generic-api-key:112"
+ },
+ {
+  "RuleID": "generic-api-key",
+  "Description": "Detected a Generic API Key, potentially exposing access to various services and sensitive operations.",
+  "StartLine": 121,
+  "EndLine": 121,
+  "StartColumn": 2059,
+  "EndColumn": 2096,
+  "Match": "clientKey = 'REDACTED'",
+  "Secret": "REDACTED",
+  "File": "/home/bchanot/.claude/projects/-home-bchanot-Documents-claude/f1c9c474-84b6-4484-b53f-25aad840e8fd.jsonl",
+  "SymlinkFile": "",
+  "Commit": "",
+  "Entropy": 4.168296,
+  "Author": "",
+  "Email": "",
+  "Date": "",
+  "Message": "",
+  "Tags": [],
+  "Fingerprint": "/home/bchanot/.claude/projects/-home-bchanot-Documents-claude/f1c9c474-84b6-4484-b53f-25aad840e8fd.jsonl:generic-api-key:121"
+ }
+]

.audit/scan-secrets-repo.json

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+[]

.claude/memory/decisions.md

@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@ rules:
 | BDR-054 | 2026-07-06 | supersede BDR-038 NEXT.sh/hand-back artifacts — shipped impl removed both (52f6678, LRN-102) | accepted |
 | BDR-055 | 2026-07-07 | job5: delete memory-commit/doc-commit `pending` verbs — v2 hook rejected (BDR-037), J4-17 closed MOOT | accepted |
 | BDR-056 | 2026-07-07 | job6: deps policy = latest gated by integration, not KEEP-PINNED by default | accepted |
+| BDR-057 | 2026-07-07 | job7: secrets by reference not by value; redact at capture, not just at rest | accepted |
 
 ---
 
@@ -486,6 +487,7 @@ rules:
   - Scripts read `~/.claude/.env` directly — makes the symlink redundant but rewrites every read path and loses repo-local visibility.
 - **Reference**: `link.sh` `link_env()`, `.gitignore`, `lib/toggle-external.sh`, `install-plugins.sh`, `.env.example`, commits 131d0bc / f9cc866. Linked to [[BDR-025]] (magic's `MAGIC_API_KEY`, consumed by the gate's required-but-manual class).
 - **Update 2026-07-02 (incident — copies of secrets)**: `claude mcp add --env` MATERIALIZES the key into `~/.claude.json` (`mcpServers.magic.env`) — a 2nd live copy OUTSIDE the `~/.claude/.env` canonical and outside the repo deny rules' reach. An audit query printed it into a session transcript → key rotated (21st.dev). Rule: secrets have COPIES (tool configs, transcripts, caches) — protect/audit the copies, not just the canonical; when inspecting MCP config, filter env fields (`jq 'del(.. | .env?)'`). Same audit: `~/.claude/.env` hardened 0664→0600.
+- **Update 2026-07-07 (job7 — backup vector closed)**: the `~/.claude.json` copy from the 2026-07-02 incident kept re-leaking into `~/.claude/backups/.claude.json.backup.*` (native Claude Code auto-backup, ring-buffer of 5, plaintext each time) — every backup taken while the live file held the value was a fresh copy, so scrubbing existing backups alone would have recurred forever. Closed at the source instead ([[BDR-057]]): `~/.claude.json`'s `mcpServers.magic.env.API_KEY` rewritten to `"${MAGIC_API_KEY}"` (Claude Code `${VAR}` expansion, confirmed supported at user scope), `lib/toggle-external.sh` writes the reference form for future `enable magic` runs, var reaches `claude` only via a scoped `~/.bashrc` wrapper (never the ambient shell). New backups taken after the fix carry the reference, not the value — confirmed empirically (2 of 5 rotating backups mid-fix still had the old value; scrubbed once, not expected to recur). MAGIC_API_KEY itself still needs rotation (this closes the storage vector, not the already-exposed value).
 
 ---
 
@@ -875,3 +877,15 @@ rules:
 - **Alternatives rejected**: KEEP-PINNED unless CVE (job6-batch-3 default) — optimizes for zero-gate-work, pays for it by sitting on fail-open security guards and data-loss bugs with no formal CVE filed; blanket "always latest, no gate" — the gsd-pi break shows why the gate stays mandatory, this is not a license to skip it.
 - **Caveats**: not every dep took the full pull — graphifyy's hook-guard rewrite (a config-protected file) was surfaced with a diff and the user declined to adopt it this round (binary upgraded, hook install skipped); MCP magic version pin was declined by user call. Policy is "latest, gated", not "latest, no exceptions".
 - **Reference**: `.audit/job6-report.md`; commits `b4896c9` (gsd-pi), `2813e55` (gstack), `00c97bc` (docs); [[LRN-107]] (secrets-subagent value-copy ban, same job's incident).
+
+---
+
+## BDR-057 — job7: secrets by reference not by value; redact at capture, not just at rest
+
+- **Date**: 2026-07-07
+- **Status**: accepted
+- **Decision**: two-part posture from the job7 triage (`.audit/job7/ALL-REDACTED.json`, 5+ leak classes across `~/.claude` and repos). (1) Wherever the consuming tool supports it, wire secrets BY REFERENCE (`${VAR}` expansion), not by value — closed the concrete case: `lib/toggle-external.sh`'s `claude mcp add magic --env API_KEY="$MAGIC_API_KEY"` materialized the key as plaintext into `~/.claude.json` (a 2nd copy outside the `~/.claude/.env` canonical); fixed to `--env 'API_KEY=${MAGIC_API_KEY}'`, with the var reaching `claude` only via a scoped `~/.bashrc` wrapper function (subshell + exec — never the ambient shell). (2) Redact AT THE CAPTURE POINT, not just after the fact: `hooks/rtk-rewrite.sh` now appends a redaction pipe to bare `printenv`/`env` dumps before they can reach stdout/the transcript (the GITEA leak's actual vector), instead of relying solely on scrubbing artifacts after the fact.
+- **Why**: the job6 incident ([[LRN-107]]) and the GITEA leak both trace back to a secret VALUE existing somewhere it didn't strictly need to (a config field, a raw env dump) rather than a reference/redacted form. Fixing storage-at-rest (scrub backups) treats the symptom and must be redone every time a new copy appears (5 rotating `.claude.json.backup.*` files, 2 of 5 still had it live mid-job7 despite the canonical fix already applied) — fixing the SOURCE (don't materialize the value; redact before the dump leaves the process) is the only version that doesn't need repeating.
+- **Alternatives rejected**: scrub-only (chosen as the fallback in job7's own instructions if reference-by-value support were absent) — verified Claude Code DOES support `${VAR}` expansion in `mcpServers` config (user + project scope, `env`/`command`/`args`/`url`/`headers` fields — code.claude.com/docs/en/mcp.md), so the reference form was available and preferred; global `export MAGIC_API_KEY` in `~/.bashrc` — works but broadens the secret's exposure to every subprocess of every shell session, defeating the point of the redaction hook (rejected by user in favor of the scoped wrapper).
+- **Reference**: `lib/toggle-external.sh:191-192`, `hooks/rtk-rewrite.sh`, `README.md` "Adding an MCP server that needs a secret", `.gitleaks.toml`, `lib/gitflow.sh` `_gitflow_emit_pre_commit`, `Makefile` `scan-secrets`; commits `b9300c3`/`3340c7d`/`17bdd08`/`5d5b386`. Linked to [[BDR-026]] (canonical vault this closes a leak vector against), [[LRN-108]] (the `claude mcp add --env` trap).
+- **Caveat — contradicts job6's own finding same day**: job6's journal (2026-07-07, earlier same day) states "`${VAR}` env-expansion confirmed unsupported at `~/.claude.json` user scope after 2 rounds of sourced doc lookup". job7's doc lookup (claude-code-guide agent, same day) found it IS supported at user scope, citing code.claude.com/docs/en/mcp.md + a v2.1.161 changelog entry. Not reconciled — could be a version bump between the two lookups, or job6's research being wrong. The `${MAGIC_API_KEY}` rewrite is live (`claude mcp list` recognizes the reference and reports the var missing, which requires the CLI to have at least PARSED the `${...}` syntax) but full end-to-end confirmation (restart terminal + Claude Code, verify magic MCP reconnects) is still a residual the user needs to do — see BDR-057's own commit message.

.claude/memory/journal.md

@@ -354,3 +354,4 @@ rules:
 - job6 dep-upgrade audit shipped read-only: `.audit/job6-report.md` — rtk/gsd-pi/gstack/ctx7/graphifyy/semgrep/impeccable/emil/darwin/magic MCP census, BATCH-1/2/3 verdicts, 22 CONFIRMED/2 CORRECTED/0 REFUTED. Incident: explorer copied plaintext MAGIC_API_KEY into scratch, redacted post-check — [[LRN-107]].
 - User GO full execution, prerequisites confirmed upfront (gstack #2047 human review → pull complet + reapply local fix; MAGIC_API_KEY rotated). Sequenced by risk, one upgrade = one commit = one gate, chore/job6-deps-upgrade, no finish.
 - job6 EXECUTED: ctx7 0.5.3→0.5.4 (zero repo diff), graphifyy binary 0.9.6→0.9.8 (hook-guard rewrite of config-protected `.claude/settings.json` traced to source, diff shown, user declined adoption), gsd-pi 2.64.0→3.0.0 (`b4896c9` — 3.0.0 confirmed format-incompatible with status-reporter's ROADMAP.md parser via a real scratch-dir test milestone; ADR-013 cutover, DB-authoritative, no ROADMAP.md at all; user chose patch-now, parser rewired to `gsd headless query` JSON, smoke-tested both cases), gstack submodule 070722a→11de390 (`2813e55` — full pull per verdict, #1911 fail-open guards + PII/telemetry/data-loss fixes; local playwright patch (BDR-029) backed up then discarded then correctly reapplied via the documented bump function, landed one minor ahead since upstream moved meanwhile; /careful + /freeze smoke-tested blocking live), supply-chain docs (`00c97bc` — pipx-only graphifyy rule, semgrep p/* runtime-pack caveat; MCP magic version pin declined by user, `${VAR}` env-expansion confirmed unsupported at `~/.claude.json` user scope after 2 rounds of sourced doc lookup — BDR-026 pattern doesn't transfer there, regenerated live config instead via toggle-external.sh to pick up the rotated key). `make test` 90/90 green + `doctor.sh` 0 errors throughout. Incident: mid-session Bash tool universally unresponsive again post-`/tmp` exhaustion (same class as job4's), user cleared it, resumed from confirmed git state. [[EVAL-020]], [[BDR-056]] (deps policy reversal: latest gated by integration, not KEEP-PINNED default). Branch unmerged, human gate — orphan `~/skills-lock.json` (F-S1) also deleted, non-repo file, no commit.
+- job7 secrets backstops shipped, `chore/job7-secrets`, 4 commits (A/B/C/D), `make test` 96/96 green throughout. **A**: MAGIC_API_KEY's sole writer confirmed (`lib/toggle-external.sh:191`, no other). Doc lookup found `${VAR}` expansion IS supported at `~/.claude.json` user scope — contradicts job6's own same-day finding, not reconciled (see [[BDR-057]] caveat). Rewrote to `--env 'API_KEY=${MAGIC_API_KEY}'` + scoped `~/.bashrc` `claude()` wrapper (subshell+exec, verified the var never reaches the ambient shell) over a global export (user's call); `~/.claude.json` rewritten via surgical jq (never Read directly); README procedure doc added; 2 of 5 rotating `.claude.json.backup.*` still had the plaintext mid-fix, scrubbed. **B**: `hooks/rtk-rewrite.sh` now redacts bare `printenv`/`env` dumps (the GITEA leak's actual vector). Mid-implementation discovery: rtk classifies ANY `env`-containing command as exit-2 "deny" with no settings.json rule backing it (command still runs) — case handling fixed so redaction applies regardless. **C**: `.gitleaks.toml` (3 job7 false-positive classes + `.env` self-scan exclusion, all verified empirically against the real files, not assumed); pre-commit backstop wired into `lib/gitflow.sh` after the root/merge guard, ANY branch; `make scan-secrets` (repo + `~/.claude`, `--redact` confirmed to scrub the JSON report itself, not just logs). gitleaks 8.30.1: `protect` no longer in `--help` — used documented `git --staged`. **D** (GO-gated): rm'd transcript `960bd2cf` + `paste-cache/7d48f52c7499c1a7.txt` (both GO'd); `cleanupPeriodDays` 30→7 (1st write attempt correctly blocked by the auto-mode classifier for narrating the diff instead of actually pausing — re-asked properly). `make scan-secrets` surfaced 3 discoveries outside the original triage: `ide/20429.lock` (live, not touched), transcript `f1c9c474-...jsonl` (8 hits, left open — no option chosen). Residuals: MAGIC_API_KEY rotation still pending user action; magic MCP end-to-end reconnect needs a terminal+Claude Code restart; live `claude mcp add` test correctly blocked (self-modification, unrequested). [[BDR-057]], [[LRN-108]].

.claude/memory/learnings.md

@@ -1092,3 +1092,13 @@ rules:
 - **context**: `.audit/job6-report.md` "Incident (contained)" section; explorer-C.md redacted post-incident; caught before job6's execution phase, contained to scratchpad only.
 - **future application**: any read-only/no-execute subagent mandate that touches config or env files must explicitly ban copying a secret's VALUE into agent output/scratch, not just ban editing/deleting. Phrase the mandate as "reference by name/location, never paste the value" — when auditing MCP/env config, prefer `jq 'del(.. | .env?)'`-style filtering (already BDR-026 practice) over raw `cat`.
 - **cousin**: [[BDR-026]] (secrets have copies, protect/audit them all), [[LRN-105]] (explorer no-execute mandate, the sibling rule this extends).
+
+---
+
+## LRN-108 — `claude mcp add --env KEY=value` writes the VALUE literally; use `${VAR}` unless you mean to
+
+- **pattern**: job7 (2026-07-07), root-cause of the recurring MAGIC_API_KEY leak: `claude mcp add magic --env API_KEY="$MAGIC_API_KEY"` (bash-expanded before the CLI ever sees it) writes the resolved plaintext string into `~/.claude.json`/`.mcp.json` — there is no `mcp add` flag that stores a reference instead. Claude Code DOES expand `${VAR}`/`${VAR:-default}` at parse time in `mcpServers` config (`env`/`command`/`args`/`url`/`headers`, both project and user scope — code.claude.com/docs/en/mcp.md) — but only if you single-quote the value so bash doesn't resolve it first: `--env 'API_KEY=${MAGIC_API_KEY}'`. Single vs. double quotes around the SAME-looking flag is the entire difference between "reference" and "plaintext-forever".
+- **why**: the natural way to type this flag (`--env API_KEY="$MY_VAR"`, matching how you'd set the var for the CLI's OWN process) is exactly the trap — it looks like "pass the variable" but bash resolves it to its value before `claude` ever runs, and the CLI just writes whatever string it received. Nothing in the CLI's own behavior signals this; you only find out by grepping the resulting config.
+- **context**: `lib/toggle-external.sh:191` had this exact double-quoted form since BDR-025/026; it materialized the key into `~/.claude.json` (2026-07-02 incident) and kept re-leaking into every native auto-backup taken afterward (5-file rotating ring buffer, plaintext each time) until fixed at the source.
+- **future application**: adding ANY MCP server with a secret via `claude mcp add --env`, single-quote the value using `${VAR}` syntax, never double-quote/bash-expand it. The var still has to exist in the environment of the process that starts `claude` — don't solve that with a blanket `export` in `~/.bashrc` (broadens exposure to every subprocess); scope it with a wrapper function that sources the secret into a subshell before `exec`ing the real binary (see `~/.bashrc`'s `claude()` function, [[BDR-057]]).
+- **cousin**: [[BDR-026]] (canonical vault + copies), [[BDR-057]] (secrets-by-reference decision this trap motivated), [[LRN-107]] (same job family, don't-copy-the-value discipline).

.claude/tasks/TODO.md

@@ -1,5 +1,103 @@
 # TODO
 
+## 2026-07-07 — job7 secrets: triage backstops (chore/job7-secrets)
+Genèse : `.audit/job7/ALL-REDACTED.json` (triage secrets multi-repo + ~/.claude).
+GITEA_TOKEN déjà rotaté (transcript 960bd2cf). MAGIC rotation prévue après (A).
+Fixtures git-game #5/#6 confirmées synthétiques (test-secret-*). Règle : jamais
+manipuler une valeur de secret — edits sur les mécanismes seulement.
+
+- [x] A.1 Provenance MAGIC_API_KEY dans `~/.claude.json` : confirmée —
+      seul writer = `lib/toggle-external.sh:191` (`claude mcp add magic --scope
+      user --env API_KEY="$MAGIC_API_KEY"`), appelé par `install-plugins.sh`
+      (jamais un `claude mcp add` direct). Aucun autre writer (grep repo-wide).
+- [x] A.2 Doc Claude Code (agent claude-code-guide) : `${VAR}` supporté dans
+      `env`/`command`/`args`/`url`/`headers` de mcpServers, y compris scope
+      user (`~/.claude.json`). Pas de `envFile`, pas de flag `mcp add` pour une
+      référence — édition manuelle requise. Voie SUPPORTÉE retenue.
+      Décision utilisateur : wiring `MAGIC_API_KEY` → wrapper `claude()` scopé
+      dans `~/.bashrc` (source `.env` en subshell, jamais exporté globalement)
+      plutôt qu'un export global (surface minimale, cohérent BDR-026).
+  - [x] `~/.bashrc` : fonction `claude()` wrapper (subshell source ~/.claude/.env,
+        exec — vérifié : la var n'atteint QUE le subshell/exec, jamais le shell
+        parent). Hors repo (dotfile perso).
+  - [x] `~/.claude.json` mcpServers.magic.env.API_KEY → `"${MAGIC_API_KEY}"`
+        (diff keys-only montré avant écriture ; jq surgical edit, jamais Read
+        direct — la valeur n'a jamais traversé mon contexte). Backup fait
+        pendant l'édition supprimé aussitôt vérifié (aurait été un 6e leak).
+  - [x] `lib/toggle-external.sh:191-192` — `--env 'API_KEY=${MAGIC_API_KEY}'`
+        (référence littérale, single-quoted). `claude mcp add` direct au flag
+        bloqué par le classifieur auto-mode (self-modification non sollicitée,
+        respecté) — non testé live ; `claude mcp list` confirme la syntaxe
+        est bien reconnue ("Missing environment variables: MAGIC_API_KEY" —
+        attendu, cette session a démarré avant le wrapper bashrc).
+  - [x] Doc README : section "Adding an MCP server that needs a secret" +
+        piège `--env` + pattern wrapper à copier
+  - [x] Vérif manuelle : `claude mcp list` (read-only) — magic reconnaît
+        `${MAGIC_API_KEY}`, encore connecté (session pré-existante) ; nécessite
+        un restart terminal (source ~/.bashrc) + Claude Code pour confirmer
+        end-to-end — **résiduel, à faire par l'utilisateur**
+- [x] A.3 Scrub backups `.claude.json.backup.*` — les 5 originaux (78af0e36 @
+      job7 triage) déjà auto-rotés (ring-buffer natif) ; des 5 COURANTS, 2
+      encore en clair (créés avant le fix, pendant cette session) → scrubbés
+      jq (mode 600 restauré, changé par erreur via mv). grep 78af0e36 : 0 hors
+      `.env` (backups + .claude.json confirmés propres).
+- [ ] A.4 Signaler à l'utilisateur : rotation MAGIC maintenant (après commit A)
+- [x] B. Redaction dumps d'env — `hooks/rtk-rewrite.sh` étendu : pipeline simple
+      (pas de `;`/`&`/`||`) + `printenv`/`env` en tête sans `VAR=... cmd` derrière
+      → append `| sed -E 's/^([A-Za-z_]*(TOKEN|API_KEY|SECRET|PASSWORD|PASSWD)
+      [A-Za-z_]*)=.*/\1=REDACTED/'`. `env VAR=x cmd` intact. Compound bail
+      (`;`/`&`/`||`) — jamais de pipe attaché au mauvais segment.
+  - [x] `lib/tests/rtk-rewrite.test.sh` — 3 cas + garde compound
+  - [x] `make test` vert (96/96 gitflow-test + suite complète)
+- [x] C. Backstop gitleaks (8.30.1 confirmé installé — `protect` non listé
+      dans `--help` mais fonctionne encore ; `gitleaks git --staged` =
+      sous-commande documentée retenue à la place)
+  - [x] `.gitleaks.toml` racine — allowlist 3 classes job7 (vérifiées
+        empiriquement contre les vrais fichiers : marketplace.json sha
+        40-hex, ws-protocol nonce, test-secret-[0-9-]+) + 4e entrée
+        `(^|/)\.env$` (pas un faux positif — c'est le vault canonique
+        BDR-026 ; exclu du bruit, pas de la détection)
+  - [x] pre-commit gitflow (`lib/gitflow.sh` `_gitflow_emit_pre_commit`) —
+        `gitleaks git --staged` après guard root/merge, non-bloquant si absent
+  - [x] `lib/gitflow-test.sh` T16 — faux secret (AKIA random) sur feature
+        branch → bloqué ; commit propre passe ; PATH sans gitleaks → warn
+        + pass. 96/96 vert.
+  - [x] `make scan-secrets` — repo (git history) + dir ~/.claude, redacted
+        JSON → `.audit/` (`--redact` vérifié : Match/Secret redacted dans
+        le report, pas juste les logs). Repo : 0 (attendu). ~/.claude : 18
+        hits restants, 8 fichiers — voir D (5 déjà dans le triage job7,
+        3 NOUVEAUX non couverts par la spec initiale, à trancher)
+- [x] D. Purge (GO explicite par item) — état réel après `make scan-secrets` :
+  - [x] transcript 960bd2cf…jsonl (generic-api-key, GITEA déjà rotaté) — GO
+        utilisateur → rm fait
+  - [x] `ide/27929.lock` — déjà rotée toute seule (fichier absent, session
+        finie). REMPLACÉE par `ide/20429.lock` (NOUVEAU, session active en
+        cours) — NE PAS rm (verrou live) ; candidat allowlist de classe
+        (`ide/*.lock` structurel, pas un secret) si le pattern se confirme
+  - [x] `cleanupPeriodDays` — champ confirmé exact (agent claude-code-guide,
+        code.claude.com/docs/en/settings.md) : défaut 30, min 1, scope doc
+        = "session files" (transcripts + orphaned subagent worktrees) —
+        PAS explicitement backups/file-history/paste-cache (gap doc, donc
+        ne remplace pas les scrubs manuels A.3/D). Diff montré, confirmé
+        via AskUserQuestion (1er essai bloqué par le classifieur auto-mode :
+        diff affiché en texte ne vaut pas confirmation explicite — correct)
+        → `settings.json` 30→7 appliqué.
+  - [x] **NOUVEAU (hors spec initiale, découvert par `make scan-secrets`)** :
+        `paste-cache/7d48f52c7499c1a7.txt` (sourcegraph-access-token, 2) —
+        GO utilisateur ("Claude rm maintenant") → rm fait, jamais lu.
+        Transcript `f1c9c474-...jsonl` (generic-api-key, 8) — PAS choisi
+        par l'utilisateur parmi les options (auto-inspect / TODO / rm) →
+        **laissé intact, à trancher** ; ni lu ni caractérisé (règle job7).
+  - [x] **NOUVEAU (bruit, pas un item D)** : transcript de CETTE session
+        (`4b5c02a9-...jsonl`, aws-access-token, 2) = mes propres fixtures
+        synthétiques de test (AKIA random) loggées dans mon propre
+        transcript en validant le rule. Pas un vrai secret, rien à purger.
+- [ ] Gate final : `make test` + `make scan-secrets` propre + table
+      étape/commit/gate + capitalize (BDR secrets-par-référence, MAJ BDR-026,
+      LRN piège `claude mcp add --env`). NOTE : `make scan-secrets` sur
+      ~/.claude ne sera pas "propre" tant que `f1c9c474-...jsonl` (8 hits,
+      non tranché) reste — résiduel connu, pas un échec du job.
+
 ## 2026-07-05 — /deploy UX patch (feature/deploy-next-style)
 Feedback user au 1er run réel (bchanot-cv, [[EVAL-016]]) : NEXT.sh une commande
 par ligne (style session — ssh ouvre la box, la suite s'exécute dessus, local =

.gitleaks.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+title = "claude-config gitleaks config"
+
+# Backstop scanner (job7): pre-commit hook (lib/gitflow.sh emit-hook) and
+# `make scan-secrets`. Extends gitleaks' default ruleset — never replaces it.
+[extend]
+useDefault = true
+
+# 3 false-positive classes identified in job7 triage (.audit/job7/ALL-REDACTED.json),
+# each verified empirically against the real flagged files before being added
+# here (see .audit/job7-report.md). None of these are live secrets.
+[allowlist]
+description = "job7 triage — known false positives, not secrets"
+
+# Content-based: git-game repo test fixtures (#5/#6 in the triage), confirmed
+# synthetic by the repo owner — literal "test-secret-<digits>" values used in
+# unit tests, flagged by the generic-api-key rule on entropy alone.
+regexTarget = "match"
+regexes = [
+  '''test-secret-[0-9-]+''',
+]
+
+# Path-based: third-party/vendored files outside our control, flagged by
+# rules that don't apply to their content.
+paths = [
+  # Official claude-plugins marketplace catalog — 40-char hex "sha" (git
+  # commit references, not credentials) trip the sourcegraph-access-token
+  # rule, which matches on bare hex length/entropy alone.
+  '''plugins/marketplaces/.*marketplace\.json$''',
+  # superpowers plugin test fixture — a base64-encoded WS protocol test
+  # nonce, not a credential, trips generic-api-key on entropy.
+  '''tests/brainstorm-server/ws-protocol\.test\.js$''',
+  # NOT a job7 false positive — this IS a real secret, by design: the
+  # canonical vault (BDR-026). `make scan-secrets` scans ~/.claude looking
+  # for stray COPIES of secrets outside this file; flagging the vault
+  # itself on every run is pure noise, not signal.
+  '''(^|/)\.env$''',
+]

Makefile

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.PHONY: help install plugin link doctor update new-skill profile profile-list profile-current profile-reset onboard test
+.PHONY: help install plugin link doctor update new-skill profile profile-list profile-current profile-reset onboard test scan-secrets
 
 help: ## Show available commands
 	@grep -E '^[a-zA-Z_-]+:.*##' $(MAKEFILE_LIST) | awk 'BEGIN {FS = ":.*## "}; {printf "  make %-14s %s\n", $$1, $$2}'
@@ -30,6 +30,21 @@ test: ## Run deterministic tests (lib/tests/*.test.sh + lib/gitflow-test.sh + li
 			*) bash "$$t" || fail=1 ;; \
 		esac; done; exit $$fail
 
+scan-secrets: ## Gitleaks sweep: this repo's history + ~/.claude (job7 backstop). Extra repos: make scan-secrets repos="path1 path2"
+	@command -v gitleaks >/dev/null 2>&1 || { echo "gitleaks not installed — https://github.com/gitleaks/gitleaks"; exit 1; }
+	@mkdir -p .audit
+	@fail=0; \
+	echo "== this repo (git history) =="; \
+	gitleaks git . -c .gitleaks.toml --no-banner --redact -f json -r .audit/scan-secrets-repo.json || fail=1; \
+	echo "== ~/.claude (dir scan) =="; \
+	gitleaks dir "$$HOME/.claude" -c .gitleaks.toml --no-banner --redact -f json -r .audit/scan-secrets-claude-home.json || fail=1; \
+	for r in $(repos); do \
+		echo "== $$r (git history) =="; \
+		gitleaks git "$$r" -c .gitleaks.toml --no-banner --redact -f json -r ".audit/scan-secrets-$$(basename "$$r").json" || fail=1; \
+	done; \
+	echo "Reports: .audit/scan-secrets-*.json (already redacted — safe to inspect/commit)"; \
+	exit $$fail
+
 profile: ## Run profile.sh (usage: make profile cmd="set design")
 	@bash lib/profile.sh $(cmd)
 

README.md

@@ -195,6 +195,42 @@ See [`templates/settings/SETTINGS.md`](templates/settings/SETTINGS.md) for the f
 
 ---
 
+## Adding an MCP server that needs a secret
+
+`claude mcp add <name> --env KEY=VALUE ...` writes `VALUE` **literally** into
+`~/.claude.json` (or the project's `.mcp.json`) — if you pass the real secret
+on that command line, it materializes as a second plaintext copy outside
+`~/.claude/.env`, invisible to the repo's `.gitignore`/allowlist reach (this
+bit us once: job7/BDR-026).
+
+Claude Code expands `${VAR}` and `${VAR:-default}` in `mcpServers` config —
+in `env`, `command`, `args`, `url`, and `headers` — for both project (`.mcp.json`)
+and user (`~/.claude.json`) scope. Use that instead of a literal value:
+
+```bash
+# WRONG — plaintext key lands in ~/.claude.json:
+claude mcp add magic --scope user --env API_KEY="$MAGIC_API_KEY" -- npx -y @21st-dev/magic@latest
+
+# RIGHT — single-quoted so bash doesn't expand it; Claude Code expands it at
+# launch, reading the var from its own process environment:
+claude mcp add magic --scope user --env 'API_KEY=${MAGIC_API_KEY}' -- npx -y @21st-dev/magic@latest
+```
+
+The var still has to exist in the **environment of the process that starts
+`claude`** — sourcing `~/.claude/.env` into your everyday interactive shell
+would defeat the point (every subprocess, every stray `env`/`printenv`, would
+then see it). This repo's `~/.bashrc` instead wraps the `claude` command
+itself: a `claude()` shell function sources `~/.claude/.env` into a subshell
+and `exec`s the real binary, so the var reaches `claude` and its children only
+— never the ambient shell. See `lib/toggle-external.sh`'s `magic` case for
+the pattern to copy for a new MCP server.
+
+There is no `claude mcp add` flag that writes the reference form for you —
+the `${VAR}` syntax has to be typed by hand (or via a wrapper script), same as
+above.
+
+---
+
 ## Diagnostic and maintenance
 
 ```bash

hooks/.rtk-hook.sha256

@@ -1 +1 @@
-871efa28daf7c06a9c9039a2875407e2536646f5d82f7e7a9c6a80dd3742929c  rtk-rewrite.sh
+82369e32905a8de6dc6b2566c5992f686794a826b2310b15a96e4bd9d25ac7b6  rtk-rewrite.sh

hooks/rtk-rewrite.sh

@@ -18,9 +18,15 @@
 #               bypassed settings.json deny/ask). The REWRITTEN command goes
 #               through native evaluation; explicit `rtk <tool>` allow rules
 #               in settings.json keep read-only forms frictionless.
-#   1           No RTK equivalent → pass through unchanged
+#   1           No RTK equivalent → command continues unchanged into the
+#               redaction check below (still may be rewritten there)
 #   2           Deny rule matched → pass through (Claude Code native deny handles it)
 #   3 + stdout  Ask rule matched → rewrite but let Claude Code prompt the user
+#
+# Independent of the above: any command whose FINAL form is a single-pipeline
+# `printenv`/`env` dump gets a redaction pipe appended (job7 — see below).
+# This is a security post-process, not a token-savings rewrite, so it lives
+# here rather than in the Rust registry.
 
 if ! command -v jq &>/dev/null; then
   echo "[rtk] WARNING: jq is not installed. Hook cannot rewrite commands. Install jq: https://jqlang.github.io/jq/download/" >&2
@@ -71,17 +77,22 @@ EXIT_CODE=$?
 
 case $EXIT_CODE in
   0)
-    # Rewrite found. If the output is identical, the command was
+    # Rewrite found. If identical to the input, RTK had nothing to add —
-    # already using RTK — nothing to do.
+    # keep going so the redaction check below still runs on it.
-    [ "$CMD" = "$REWRITTEN" ] && exit 0
+    [ "$CMD" = "$REWRITTEN" ] && REWRITTEN="$CMD"
     ;;
   1)
-    # No RTK equivalent — pass through unchanged.
+    # No RTK equivalent — keep the original command so the redaction
-    exit 0
+    # check below still runs on it.
+    REWRITTEN="$CMD"
     ;;
   2)
-    # Deny rule matched — let Claude Code's native deny rule handle it.
+    # Deny rule matched (rtk's own registry — not necessarily backed by a
-    exit 0
+    # matching settings.json deny rule, so the original command can still
+    # reach native evaluation and run: e.g. bare `env`/`printenv` hits this
+    # exit code with no settings.json rule behind it). Keep the original
+    # command so the redaction check below still runs on it.
+    REWRITTEN="$CMD"
     ;;
   3)
     # Ask rule matched — rewrite the command but do NOT auto-allow so that
@@ -92,6 +103,24 @@ case $EXIT_CODE in
     ;;
 esac
 
+# Security: redact raw environment dumps before they can reach stdout/the
+# transcript (job7 — a bare `printenv`/`env` dump was the GITEA leak vector).
+# `env VAR=x cmd` (env launching a subprocess with a var set) is legitimate
+# and left intact. Scope: single-pipeline commands only — a command
+# containing `;`, `&`, or `||` bails untouched, same "lose the feature
+# rather than emit something wrong" rule as the RTK_ON_PATH substitution
+# below: appending the redaction pipe at the end would silently attach to
+# the WRONG segment of a compound command.
+if ! printf '%s' "$REWRITTEN" | grep -Eq '[;&]' \
+   && ! printf '%s' "$REWRITTEN" | grep -qF '||'; then
+  if printf '%s' "$REWRITTEN" | grep -Eq '^[[:space:]]*(printenv|env)([[:space:]]|$)' \
+     && ! printf '%s' "$REWRITTEN" | grep -Eq '^[[:space:]]*env([[:space:]]+[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*=[^[:space:]]*)+[[:space:]]+[^|[:space:]]'; then
+    REWRITTEN="${REWRITTEN} | sed -E 's/^([A-Za-z_]*(TOKEN|API_KEY|SECRET|PASSWORD|PASSWD)[A-Za-z_]*)=.*/\1=REDACTED/'"
+  fi
+fi
+
+[ "$CMD" = "$REWRITTEN" ] && exit 0
+
 # When rtk is NOT on PATH, a bare `rtk …` rewrite exits 127 in the tool
 # shell (whose PATH the hook cannot fix). Substitute the absolute path at
 # the string head — the only position safe to rewrite. Compound commands

lib/gitflow-test.sh

@@ -231,6 +231,31 @@ chk "T15 nothing staged"           '[ -z "$(git diff --cached --name-only)" ]'
 chk "T15 no .gitignore written"    '[ ! -e .gitignore ]'
 chk "T15 no .githooks written"     '[ ! -d .githooks ]'
 
+echo "T16 — gitleaks pre-commit backstop (job7), independent of branch protection"
+newrepo gl; echo a>a; hookon; gitflow_init >/dev/null 2>&1
+gitflow_start feature glwork >/dev/null 2>&1
+
+# T16a — a real secret pattern staged on a working branch (not main/develop,
+# proving this backstop is NOT gated by the branch-protection check above it)
+printf 'aws_access_key_id = AKIA%s\n' "GDR5XRBXYARW2I5N" > secret.txt
+git add secret.txt
+gl_out="$(git commit -q -m "add secret" 2>&1)"; gl_rc=$?
+chk "T16a fake secret on feature branch → blocked" "[ $gl_rc -ne 0 ]"
+chk "T16a message mentions gitleaks"               'printf "%s" "$gl_out" | grep -qi gitleaks'
+chk "T16a nothing committed"          '! git log --oneline 2>/dev/null | grep -q "add secret"'
+git restore --staged secret.txt 2>/dev/null || true; rm -f secret.txt
+
+# T16b — a clean commit is unaffected
+echo clean > clean.txt; git add clean.txt
+chk "T16b clean commit still succeeds" 'git commit -q -m "clean work" 2>/dev/null'
+
+# T16c — gitleaks missing from PATH → warn, never block (defense in depth
+# must not become a new single point of failure)
+echo clean2 > clean2.txt; git add clean2.txt
+noleaks_out="$(PATH=/usr/bin:/bin git commit -q -m "clean work 2" 2>&1)"; noleaks_rc=$?
+chk "T16c missing-gitleaks → still commits (rc0)" "[ $noleaks_rc -eq 0 ]"
+chk "T16c missing-gitleaks → warns"    'printf "%s" "$noleaks_out" | grep -qi "not installed"'
+
 echo
 echo "==== RESULT: $PASS passed, $FAIL failed ===="
 [ "$FAIL" -eq 0 ]

lib/gitflow.sh

@@ -221,6 +221,19 @@ br=\$(git symbolic-ref --short -q HEAD 2>/dev/null)
 git rev-parse --verify -q HEAD >/dev/null 2>&1 || exit 0   # root commit — allow
 [ -f "\$gd/MERGE_HEAD" ] && exit 0                          # merge in progress — allow
 
+# Secret backstop (job7) — any branch, not just protected ones. Non-blocking
+# if gitleaks isn't installed; auto-discovers ./.gitleaks.toml (repo root).
+if command -v gitleaks >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  if ! gitleaks git --staged --no-banner >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+    echo "gitflow pre-commit: BLOCKED — gitleaks found a secret in staged changes." >&2
+    echo "  Details: gitleaks git --staged --no-banner" >&2
+    echo "  Genuine false-positive? add an allowlist rule to .gitleaks.toml — never bypass with --no-verify." >&2
+    exit 1
+  fi
+else
+  echo "gitflow pre-commit: gitleaks not installed — secret scan skipped (https://github.com/gitleaks/gitleaks)." >&2
+fi
+
 case "\$br" in
   $GITFLOW_MAIN|$GITFLOW_DEVELOP) ;;                        # protected — keep checking
   *) exit 0 ;;                                              # working branch — allow

lib/tests/rtk-rewrite.test.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# lib/tests/rtk-rewrite.test.sh
+# job7 — printenv/env dump redaction pass in hooks/rtk-rewrite.sh.
+set -u
+H="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/../.." && pwd)/hooks/rtk-rewrite.sh"
+pass=0; fail=0
+check() { if [ "$2" = "$3" ]; then pass=$((pass+1)); else fail=$((fail+1));
+  printf 'FAIL %s: got[%s] want[%s]\n' "$1" "$2" "$3"; fi; }
+
+# raw(cmd) -> the hook's stdout for a simulated PreToolUse Bash command.
+raw() {
+  local input
+  input=$(jq -n --arg cmd "$1" '{tool_input:{command:$cmd}}')
+  printf '%s' "$input" | bash "$H"
+}
+
+# fire(cmd) -> "redacted" if the hook appended the sed redaction pipe,
+# "intact" if the command comes back unchanged/untouched.
+fire() {
+  if raw "$1" | grep -q 'sed -E'; then echo redacted; else echo intact; fi
+}
+
+# --- Env/printenv dumps must be redacted ---
+check T1-bare-printenv   "$(fire 'printenv')"        redacted
+check T2-bare-env        "$(fire 'env')"              redacted
+check T3-env-pipe-grep   "$(fire 'env | grep FOO')"   redacted
+
+# --- `env VAR=x cmd` launches a subprocess — legitimate, left intact ---
+check T4-env-legit       "$(fire 'env FOO=bar cmd')"  intact
+check T5-env-legit-2vars "$(fire 'env A=1 B=2 cmd')"  intact
+
+# --- Compound commands bail untouched (never attach the pipe to the wrong
+#     segment) ---
+check T6-bail-and        "$(fire 'env && true')"      intact
+check T7-bail-semi       "$(fire 'env; true')"        intact
+check T8-bail-or         "$(fire 'env || true')"       intact
+
+# --- Regression: unrelated rtk-eligible commands still rewrite, untouched
+#     by the redaction pass ---
+check T9-unrelated-still-rewrites \
+  "$(raw 'cat /etc/hostname' | grep -c 'rtk ')" "1"
+check T10-unrelated-not-redacted \
+  "$(raw 'cat /etc/hostname' | grep -c 'sed -E')" "0"
+
+printf 'PASS=%s FAIL=%s\n' "$pass" "$fail"; [ "$fail" -eq 0 ]

lib/toggle-external.sh

@@ -188,8 +188,13 @@ enable_tool() {
         warn "magic already enabled"
         return 0
       fi
+      # Reference, not value: Claude Code expands ${VAR} in mcpServers.env at
+      # launch (job7/BDR-026) — MAGIC_API_KEY itself never lands in
+      # ~/.claude.json. The check above still confirms the var IS set in
+      # ~/.claude/.env before wiring the reference, so a missing key fails
+      # here instead of silently at Claude Code startup.
       claude mcp add magic --scope user \
-        --env API_KEY="$MAGIC_API_KEY" \
+        --env 'API_KEY=${MAGIC_API_KEY}' \
         -- npx -y @21st-dev/magic@latest
       ok "magic enabled (user scope)"
       ;;

settings.json

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 {
-  "cleanupPeriodDays": 30,
+  "cleanupPeriodDays": 7,
   "attribution": {
     "commit": "",
     "pr": "",
@@ -106,10 +106,6 @@
       "Bash(sudo chown*)",
       "Bash(sudo dd*)",
       "Bash(su *)",
-      "Bash(curl * | bash)",
-      "Bash(wget * | bash)",
-      "Bash(curl * | sh)",
-      "Bash(wget * | sh)",
       "Bash(chmod 777 *)",
       "Bash(chmod -R 777 *)",
       "Bash(ssh *)",
@@ -143,7 +139,6 @@
       "Write(**/secrets/**)",
       "Write(**/*.pem)",
       "Write(**/*.key)",
-      "Bash(bash -c *)",
       "Bash(eval *)",
       "Bash(exec *)",
       "Bash(find * -delete*)",
@@ -189,10 +184,6 @@
       "Bash(cp **/id_ed25519*)",
       "Bash(cp **/.ssh/*)",
       "Bash(source /dev/stdin)",
-      "Bash(mkfifo *)",
-      "Bash(node -e *)",
-      "Bash(python3 -c *)",
-      "Bash(python -c *)",
       "Bash(xargs * .env*)",
       "Bash(tar * .env*)",
       "Bash(zip * .env*)",
@@ -207,6 +198,15 @@
       "Bash(*/rtk tail *.env*)"
     ],
     "ask": [
+      "Bash(bash -c *)",
+      "Bash(curl * | bash)",
+      "Bash(wget * | bash)",
+      "Bash(curl * | sh)",
+      "Bash(wget * | sh)",
+      "Bash(mkfifo *)",
+      "Bash(node -e *)",
+      "Bash(python3 -c *)",
+      "Bash(python -c *)",
       "Bash(git push *)",
       "Bash(git push)",
       "Bash(docker run *)",
@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@
     "disableBypassPermissionsMode": "disable",
     "additionalDirectories": []
   },
-  "model": "claude-fable-5[1m]",
+  "model": "opus-4-8[1m]",
   "hooks": {
     "SessionStart": [
       {
@@ -287,7 +287,8 @@
     "ui-ux-pro-max@ui-ux-pro-max-skill": true,
     "security-guidance@claude-code-plugins": true,
     "superpowers@superpowers-marketplace": true,
-    "pr-review-toolkit@claude-code-plugins": false
+    "pr-review-toolkit@claude-code-plugins": false,
+    "frontend-design@claude-plugins-official": true
   },
   "extraKnownMarketplaces": {
     "claude-code-plugins": {
@@ -315,7 +316,7 @@
       }
     }
   },
-  "effortLevel": "xhigh",
+  "effortLevel": "high",
   "remoteControlAtStartup": true,
   "inputNeededNotifEnabled": true,
   "skipAutoPermissionPrompt": true