Commit Graph
82 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
bchanot 9c038fd22b chore(hooks): retire the design-toolchain reminder hook
59 fires, 0 Reads of web-building.md (2026-10-31); the path rule and the
CLAUDE.global.md pointer carry design routing. Hook, its test and its
UserPromptSubmit entry removed; doctrine-citers T7c becomes T8i on a
synthetic one-line fixture (quoted label kept whole).
2026-11-13 10:13:04 +01:00
bchanot 12c3534be0 chore(settings): drop the 6 dead deny entries 2026-11-12 15:17:32 +01:00
bchanot 47438f4900 feat(settings): skillOverrides turns the claude.ai-synced skills off
Listing cost measured on full 2026-11-09: 32.2k to 28.5k headless. A project re-enables one with "on" in its settings.local.json.
2026-11-09 14:36:01 +01:00
bchanot c5bd0f8312 fix(gitflow): pre-commit exempts only .claude memory, tasks, audits, deploy
Any .claude/** set passed on main/develop, rules and settings included, and a git mv hid its source. The hook now allowlists the side-car dirs and lists with --no-renames; both hook copies regenerated, citers reworded.
2026-11-06 17:13:58 +01:00
bchanot 97c6afcbc8 fix(settings): deny rtk read with a flag before a root .env
rtk read -n .env matched no deny and rtk passed it through. Bench R3-R7 prove the two new rules and that the */ twins already cover flagged forms. Bench hardened: checked mktemp, mandatory dir.
2026-11-06 16:43:45 +01:00
bchanot 5a080b8267 chore(settings): dark theme, switchModelsOnFlag moved by /config 2026-11-06 13:15:28 +01:00
bchanot 42e37cbe85 chore(settings): wire extract-guard and its soft_deny line 2026-11-05 00:24:46 +01:00
bchanot e11d1f8a62 fix(settings): the gate hard_deny also names loading an unrelated skill to open the write guard 2026-11-02 20:00:18 +01:00
bchanot 6899a7282b feat(settings): merge-gate and shell-form ask rules, flag-form and awk denies, rtk read twins, code-limits hook, gate hard_deny, static blind-spot soft_deny 2026-11-02 18:44:24 +01:00
bchanot f5b720bae7 feat(settings): SLASH_COMMAND_TOOL_CHAR_BUDGET=50000: 0 name-only skills on full under the corrected parse (+4.5k tokens est.) 2026-11-02 01:56:47 +01:00
bchanot 908c3cf39f feat(settings): SLASH_COMMAND_TOOL_CHAR_BUDGET=40000: 0 name-only skills on full (+2.5k tokens est.), measured 2026-11-02 01:54:07 +01:00
bchanot c4f3f0b17b feat(memory): autoMemoryEnabled false; doctor warns on leftover auto-memory files 2026-10-29 13:10:44 +01:00
bchanot 776a417c5c chore(settings): switchModelsOnFlag on; security-guidance stays enabled 2026-10-28 19:18:41 +01:00
bchanot e7d800f053 feat(hooks): InstructionsLoaded logger, the proof channel for path rules 2026-10-26 17:44:17 +01:00
bchanot ac23cc6d2e fix(settings): deny forms that actually match root mounts and refspec deletes 2026-10-23 19:31:26 +02:00
bchanot d3635b6c33 chore(model-router): dialog decisions and session model opus
deploy apply→verify and the release-executor row, written by the router's first-use dialog; settings.json model claude-fable-5-1[1m] → opus (BLK-032 policy, point 1).
2026-10-21 16:11:53 +02:00
bchanot a2ac0189f7 feat(gitflow): push-guard hook denies Claude's git push in manual-push mode
Run B of manual-push mode (BDR-111). With `gitflow.autopush false`
nothing stops Claude from typing `git push` itself: the `ask` tier is
inert under auto mode. This adds the mechanical block the user chose.

- hooks/push-guard.sh (PreToolUse, matcher Bash|Monitor, timeout 10):
  detects a push in the command text (strict, quote-stripped loose and
  alias patterns; backslash-newline folded in bash, BSD sed/grep only),
  reads gitflow.autopush in the payload cwd and in every literal -C/cd
  dir the command names (global config counts outside a repo), denies
  with the documented JSON form and a reason that tells the user to run
  the command with `!`. Unparseable value = manual (fail closed); once
  a push is detected an EXIT trap emits a static deny on any internal
  error. jq missing = one stderr warning, allow (sibling-hook policy).
- settings.json: hook wiring; 18 deny entries closing the write forms
  of the human-only toggle (any `git … config` spelling, section
  removal/rename, `-c`, config env overrides, direct edits of git config
  files); one soft_deny on pushing in manual mode in any form, with no
  per-turn clearance; the routing-around rule names hook refusals.
- hooks/session-start.sh: `🔒 push : manual (autopush=false) — ! git push`
  banner line when the key reads false (padding in bytes).
- lib/tests/push-guard.test.sh: 61 checks (push forms, over-blocks,
  invalid value, global key, fail-closed trap, no-jq, wiring, banner).

Known limits are listed in the hook header; the soft_deny rule is the
backstop. Run C (skills that push on their own) and run D (fail-closed
readers everywhere) follow. Do not enable manual mode at work before C.
2026-10-07 12:24:35 +02:00
bastien 29f4dc7ab4 feat(settings): soft-deny global npm installs until the user names the package
The literal deny patterns miss spellings such as `npm i <pkg> -g`.
The classifier entry covers every form and asks for a vetting summary
(publisher, age, downloads, install scripts, advisories) first.
2026-09-30 19:23:27 +02:00
bastien 3dad33e475 fix(settings): deny the npm global-install aliases
The deny list matched `npm install -g` only; `npm i -g` and the
`--global` spellings went through.
2026-09-30 14:26:56 +02:00
bastien 45ae0d1217 feat(effort): session default high, env-var warning, live effort in statusline 2026-09-28 18:52:36 +02:00
bastien ddea411491 chore(config): superpowers citers by bare name, routing map, docs, settings
Every superpowers-prefixed skill call in ship-feature, init-project, tour,
deploy, audit-delta, plugin-advisor and lib/analyze-before-plan now names
the vendored skill directly. finishing-a-development-branch is described
as the upstream skill this config does not vendor (gitflow finish is the
integration path). CLAUDE.global.md Skill routing maps the four
non-vendored skills the vendored text still references. settings.json
loses the plugin key and its marketplace block; README, USAGE,
plugin-advisor and the profile skill describe superpowers as vendored
skills, always on, zero plugin cost. CHANGELOG entry with a known
residual.
2026-09-28 14:54:53 +02:00
bastien 4c86d6dc70 chore(config): security-guidance Stop review off, plugins off, routing and docs
settings.json: ENABLE_STOP_REVIEW=0 (the plugin's own switch: no more
Opus call on every turn that changes code, 0 findings in 6 days, 1
recorded false positive; the regex layer and the commit/push agentic
review stay on), brightdata-plugin@synced false (keyless-useless, its MCP
skill would hijack WebFetch/WebSearch), frontend-design official plugin
entry gone (uninstalled: byte-identical to the managed copy).

CLAUDE.global.md routes Ship/PR to ship-feature (gstack ship takes
origin/HEAD = main as base), drops ship/context-save from the gstack-off
list and 21st-ui-review from the design review line (trio is max-only).
deploy's table no longer points at land-and-deploy/setup-deploy.
plugin-advisor.md describes security-guidance's real mechanics. CHANGELOG
Unreleased entry with a Known residual section.
2026-09-28 11:49:01 +02:00
bastien 27f201d4aa feat(guardrails): refusal ends the attempt; doctrine-citers census; make test suite=
Root causes of the 2026-09-24 errors turned into mechanisms (BDR-100). hard_deny 'Routing around a guardrail': a refused command is never rerun through a wrapper, alias, heredoc, Makefile target, env file, other shell or other agent; the same clause in 14 agents and in the doctrine's sub-agent rule. make test suite=<file> runs one suite hermetically so the denied env-prefix form is never needed by hand. lib/tests/doctrine-citers.test.sh: every CLAUDE.md "Section" / § Label citation across skills, agents, lib, rules and hooks must resolve to a heading or bold label (flip-tested); its first run fixed rest-api-node.md. Doctrine 'After code changes' step 4: a changed rule, heading, label or threshold → grep every citer in the same commit.
2026-09-24 20:58:25 +02:00
bastien 128e40616b chore(config): feedbackDrafts off; ignore the app-managed skills/synced mirror
settings.json: the user's hand-edit (feedbackDrafts: off) committed as is. .gitignore: skills/synced/ and its .bucket-* marker are Claude Code's mirror of the claude.ai synced skills (UUID bucket, manifest.json, Anthropic stock skills incl. 117 ISO xsd schemas), rewritten at each sync — same treatment as the graphify and impeccable machine-owned copies (BDR-028, LRN-154).
2026-09-24 13:36:02 +02:00
bastien 68c9df354b feat(gitflow): remove the origin copy of a branch once its merge is verified
`gitflow_delete` now ends with `_gitflow_delete_remote`: after the local
copy is gone, the remote tip is read with `ls-remote --exit-code`, checked
against develop/main with the same ancestor test, and only then removed
with `push origin --delete`. Same contract as the pushes (BDR-095): best
effort, warn never fail. No origin, `GITFLOW_NO_PUSH=1` or
`gitflow.autopush false` skip it; an unreachable origin or a remote tip
holding commits the bases lack keeps the remote branch, loudly. A base is
never targeted, by construction and by an explicit guard.

The static deny on hand `git push --delete` stays: it matches the Bash
tool's command string, the lib is the sanctioned path. Prose (hard_deny,
environment), doctrine, gitflow SKILL (table, op, warning row),
SETTINGS.md and CHANGELOG updated. T24: 9 checks (finish removes the
copy, bases untouched, unmerged remote tip kept, never pushed silent,
unreachable origin loud, autopush opt-out). 161/163, the 2 failures are
the pre-existing T16a (gitleaks absent on this host).
2026-09-24 11:50:16 +02:00
bastien 32d8f981df feat(gitflow): delete a branch only after a verified merge, main/develop undeletable
Since BDR-095 `start` sets an auto-pushed upstream, so `git branch -d`
checked "merged into origin/<branch>" (always true, the post-commit hook
keeps it in sync) instead of "merged into develop". T22a proves it: an
unmerged feature with its upstream in sync is deleted by `-d` alone.

- `gitflow_delete` is the single delete path (finish + CLI `delete`):
  refuses main/develop (rc 6) and any branch that is not an ancestor of
  develop or main (rc 5, `gitflow_merged_into_base`, fail closed when
  neither base exists), then `-d` as a second layer. CLI `merged`, `hooks`.
- Fourth generated hook `reference-transaction`: in the `prepared` call,
  a deletion of refs/heads/main or refs/heads/develop exits 1, whatever
  issued it (branch -d/-D, update-ref -d, rename, script, sub-agent).
  `git config gitflow.protect false` opts a foreign clone out.
- `GITFLOW_HOOKS` is the one hook list: write/emit/reconcile, T19d and
  doctor.sh (`gitflow.sh hooks`) read it. `.githooks/` and `githooks/`
  regenerated with the fourth hook.
- settings.json: static deny on hand `git branch -d/--delete/-dr/-rd` and
  on renames of main/develop; hard_deny "Branch deletion by hand"; the
  Disarming entry covers all four hooks and `gitflow.*` config; the
  protected-branches environment line states the rule.
- Doctrine (CLAUDE.global.md gitflow section), gitflow SKILL (`delete`
  op, rc 5/6 rows, common mistake), guard-bash spec T8w flips to deny,
  SETTINGS.md, README, CHANGELOG.
- Tests: T22 (12) lib guard incl. the premise proof, T23 (11) hook;
  T19 covers the fourth hook. 152/154, the 2 failures are the
  pre-existing T16a (gitleaks absent on this host).
2026-09-24 11:35:01 +02:00
bastien f608d34c3e feat(gitflow): hooks in every repo, no per-project step
Global: `make link` generates githooks/ from lib/gitflow.sh and sets git's
global core.hooksPath to ~/.claude/githooks, so every repo on the machine
runs the pre-commit protection and the post-commit / post-merge push, even
one that never ran gitflow init. A repo's own local core.hooksPath still
wins, so hooks/session-start.sh calls `gitflow reconcile-hooks` once per
session and rewrites a .githooks/ that lags the lib (LRN-114 automated);
the pre-commit exemption now covers .githooks/** next to .claude/**.

Per-repo opt-outs for a foreign clone: `git config gitflow.protect false`
(branch model) and `git config gitflow.autopush false` (push). Both, and
the GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL= / GIT_CONFIG= env bypass, are static deny rules.

`make test` and the two suites that commit on main export
GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL=/dev/null so the machine's global hooks never fire in
throwaway repos. doctor gains "Git hooks" (global setting, githooks/ equal
to the emitters) and "Scratchpad" (warn when TMPDIR sits on a tmpfs with
usrquota: systemd caps each user at 80% of it, which killed two shells
today, BLK-021). Tests: T18h, T19d, T20 (reconcile), T21 (whitelist and
protect opt-out); this repo's own stale .githooks/ refreshed.
2026-09-22 16:34:27 +02:00
bastien 9da5d8d52c feat(guardrails): push every commit, static deny for destructive tools, brief carries no user authority
Layer C of the plan written after the 2026-09-21 wipe (BDR-095): a reviewer
sub-agent traced `lftp mirror --delete` against a local file:// tree, the
prose tiers named neither lftp nor a local trace, the brief had authorized
it, and four days of commits had never left the machine.

- gitflow: `start` pushes the branch with its upstream, merge targets are
  pushed after each merge, and `init`/`install-hook` write post-commit and
  post-merge hooks that push every commit as it lands (warn, never block;
  GITFLOW_NO_PUSH=1 for throwaway repos). T18 + T19 (installed == emitted).
- hooks/unpushed-guard.sh on SessionStart and Stop: branch ahead of its
  upstream, no upstream, or no origin. Non-blocking systemMessage.
- settings.json: static deny for transfer and mirror tools, rsync --delete,
  xargs rm, pipe-to-shell, chmod/chown -R, sudo/doas/pkexec, disk tools,
  chattr, docker volume drops/prune/--privileged/socket/-v /:, git history
  destruction, --no-verify and core.hooksPath; new hard_deny "destructive
  tool against a local path, brief carries no user authority"; soft_deny
  reworded + discarding uncommitted work; environment records the incident.
- CLAUDE.global.md "Destructive tools & data loss"; the four report-only
  agents trace by reading, never by running, whatever the brief says.
- lib/tests/guard-bash.test.sh: executable spec of the PreToolUse guard
  (214 cases). The hook itself is not shipped (BLK-022); the spec skips.
2026-09-22 07:43:12 +02:00
bastien 7c05f75eab feat(21st): replace the magic MCP with the @21st-dev CLI + skill pack
Upstream supersedes `@21st-dev/magic` with `@21st-dev/cli` (bin `21st`):
same endpoint, `21st login` in place of an API key, no MCP process loaded
into every session.

- install-plugins.sh Step 8.7: `npm i -g @21st-dev/cli` (pinned in
  plugins.lock.json), staged `21st skills install`, TTY-only login offer,
  pack disabled by default. update-all.sh 7.4 refreshes both.
- The documented `21st install-skill` cannot be used: the installer refuses
  to follow a symlink on the target path and `~/.claude/skills` is one. The
  install runs under a throwaway HOME and the result moves into
  skills-external/21st-* (gitignored), symlinked on demand.
- toggle-external.sh manages `21st` as a pack (names globbed from
  skills-external/21st-*, parked under plain names). `magic` is gone.
- The 5 design skills join design/web/web-full/full and MANAGED_EXTERNALS;
  21st-registry and 21st-design-sync stay parked. MANAGED_MCPS is now empty
  and profile.sh's dead magic branches are removed.
- Design gate: GATE-BLOCK gains `21st` (required-manual, magic's old slot)
  and `21st-ui-build`; PATH repair extended to the npm global bin.
- settings.json: the 4 mcp__magic__* ask entries go; the outward-facing
  21st verbs land in autoMode.soft_deny, the tier that holds under auto
  mode (LRN-153).
- Docs: README, CLAUDE.global.md, design-gate.md, profile SKILL.md,
  .env.example, .gitleaks.toml, link.sh. BDR-093, LRN-158.

Tests: profile-set-managed 17/17, make test green except 2 pre-existing
gitflow FAILs (gitleaks binary absent on this host), shellcheck clean.
2026-09-22 02:53:31 +00:00
Bastien Chanot 5eccc3f1c4 feat(automode): docker and node framed by the classifier, ask rules retired 2026-09-16 22:03:23 +02:00
Bastien Chanot 823ce42225 chore(config): default model fable 5.1 2026-09-16 21:58:18 +02:00
Bastien Chanot 3b0167c6cb feat(settings): rebuild destructive-command cover in autoMode, scope the classifier environment
`permissions.ask` gates nothing under `defaultMode: auto` (LRN-146,
verified live), so the ten rules that left the static tiers had no cover
left: rsync / kill -9 / killall / pkill out of deny, and python3 -c /
python -c / xargs / sed / cp / mv out of ask.

autoMode.soft_deny (7 rules) takes over what an explicit instruction
should be able to clear: writes outside the working directory,
rsync --delete, SIGKILL and kill-by-name, in-place edits spanning more
than one file, directory moves, and inline interpreters or xargs that
delete or write outside the cwd. Intent clears a soft block for the
current turn only, stated as a rule since no setting expresses it.

autoMode.hard_deny (3 rules) takes the classes no command pattern can
express: secret exfiltration, production deployment, and disarming the
guardrails. Adding a restriction stays allowed, removing one does not.

permissions.deny gains ten .env reader rules (sed awk cut tr sort uniq
diff od xxd strings). Six of those tools sat in permissions.allow, so
reading a .env through them triggered nothing.

autoMode.environment named another project, its FTP deploy target and its
customer data, inside the file link.sh:21 symlinks to
~/.claude/settings.json, where it reached every repo and contradicted
this one's Gitea remote. Rewritten machine-generic; the project facts
moved to that project's gitignored .claude/settings.local.json. All three
lists now open with "$defaults", which the original omitted, so the
built-in classifier entries are inherited rather than replaced.

doctor.sh check_automode backstops both defects. SETTINGS.md documents
the block and a tier-choice table. README no longer claims the ask tier
makes every mcp__magic__* call require a live confirmation.
2026-09-15 19:44:24 +02:00
Bastien Chanot ea9e5c1dab feat(hooks): ring terminal on turn end via Stop hook
Notification matcher covers input-needed events only; end of turn had no
signal but idle_prompt, ~60s late. Wire notify-attention.sh on Stop too,
branching on hook_event_name for the message. Signal only: returns
terminalSequence + suppressOutput, never blocks (guard vs BDR-083).

Header documents both client-side prerequisites found in BLK-020.
2026-09-03 00:28:40 +02:00
Bastien Chanot 6c04ada6a8 chore(settings): default model opus[1m] (was claude-fable-5[1m]) 2026-09-01 15:32:25 +02:00
Bastien Chanot 1d7faa32b5 chore(hooks): notify-attention — bell + OSC 777 toast when Claude needs input
Notification hook (permission_prompt|idle_prompt|agent_needs_input|
elicitation_*) returns BEL x2 + OSC 777 via the terminalSequence JSON
field (hooks have no controlling TTY). Client side over Remote-SSH:
VS Code accessibility.signals.terminalBell sound:on for the beep,
wenbopan.vscode-terminal-osc-notifier extension for the Windows toast.
2026-09-01 15:32:18 +02:00
Bastien Chanot b7026e4bda feat(ctx7): coverage extension — fast-libs single source + reminder hook + executor briefs (BDR-078)
- lib/fast-libs.sh: detect/cache-status verbs, JS+Python manifests,
  7-day cache freshness, LC_ALL=C sort — replaces 3 hardcoded lists
  (ship-feature 0c, init-project 5c, onboard 3.5)
- hooks/ctx7-reminder.sh: once-per-session UserPromptSubmit nudge when
  the project carries fast-libs and .ctx7-cache/ is missing/stale
- find-docs: before-writing-code trigger + cache-first rule; dist is
  machine-owned (gitignored) so the durable patch lives in
  install-plugins.sh STEP ctx7 (idempotent, grep-guarded)
- feater/bugfixer briefs: fast-lib docs rule (fresh cache read, else
  2-topic ctx7 fetch, else NOTES cache miss + proceed)
- tests: lib/tests/fast-libs.test.sh (11 checks); shellcheck + full
  make test green (review-guards 5/0)
2026-07-20 10:45:06 +02:00
Bastien Chanot 354ff2644f feat(agents): pin dispatched judgment agents to opus — Fable = inline reflection only (BDR-076)
Reverses the BDR-066 rejected alternative (opus pins on audit agents):
session default is now Fable, so inherit burned Fable quota on every
dispatched audit/challenge. analyzer, plan-challenger, seo/geo/
validator-analyzer pinned model: opus; onboard's 6 general-purpose
audit dispatches carry model="opus"; tour Phase B repointed.
interviewer + client-handover-writer stay unpinned (inline-load only,
a pin there is inert). settings.json default: claude-fable-5[1m].
Census flipped: model-routing §3 + new §11 (61 pass), loops-light 35,
full make test green.
2026-07-19 17:38:55 +02:00
Bastien Chanot 0e1b89c71a chore(hooks): remove config-protection edit-block guardrail
Full removal per user request: the PreToolUse hook that blocked model
Edit/Write on quality-gate files (settings.json, gitflow.sh, .githooks,
doctor.sh, hooks, lib/tests, lint configs) plus its one-shot sentinel.

- delete hooks/config-protection.sh
- delete lib/tests/config-protection.test.sh
- deregister the hook from settings.json (rtk-rewrite PreToolUse kept)
- drop the README mention

Residual protection unchanged: gitflow pre-commit guard + Gitea branch
protection still block direct code commits to main/develop.
2026-07-17 21:56:32 +02:00
Bastien Chanot 07ca738b3f fix(settings): Write() deny rules inert — convert to Edit(), close write gaps
Startup emitted 15 warnings: "Write(**/.env) is not matched by file
permission checks — only Edit(path) rules are."

Write(path) rules never matched. The 5 secret-file write bans were dead
config — .env, secrets/**, *.pem, *.key were freely writable. Converting
to Edit() makes them enforced: permissions.md:242 "Edit rules apply to all
built-in tools that edit files", and :244 prescribes exactly this ("add an
Edit deny rule for paths no tool may change").

- settings.json: Write(...) -> Edit(...) on the 5 patterns.
- Mirror the 9 secret patterns Read denied but Edit did not: *.p12, *.pfx,
  id_rsa*, id_ed25519*, .ssh/**, credentials, credentials.json,
  .aws/credentials, .azure/**. Read/Edit parity now 14/14. Claude could
  previously overwrite an SSH private key or ~/.aws/credentials.
- New read-allowed/write-denied class: lockfiles (*.lock,
  package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, go.sum) + node_modules/**. Reading
  aids diagnosis; hand-editing is always wrong — the package manager
  regenerates them via Bash, which Edit deny does not block.
- templates/settings/SETTINGS.md taught the broken Write() pattern; fixed
  at the source so /onboard stops propagating it.

Rule syntax has no negation and deny beats allow, so deny globs cannot
carry exceptions — see the .env.example conflict noted in the follow-up.
2026-07-16 14:45:26 +02:00
Bastien Chanot 5842119d2a added audit folder 2026-07-14 17:21:00 +02:00
Bastien Chanot e4ba8edc16 adde changed settings 2026-07-08 01:29:06 +02:00
Bastien Chanot bb7f25adc1 chore(perms): explicit ask-gate for all magic MCP tools (job8 A)
Empty allowlist stays empty for mcp__magic__* (deny-by-default,
no auto-exec ever). All 4 tools now explicit in permissions.ask
so confirmation is guaranteed regardless of default-mode fallthrough,
instead of relying on undocumented absence. No wildcard.
2026-07-07 19:23:33 +02:00
Bastien Chanot e9241d5d7c added some rules 2026-07-07 13:17:23 +02:00
Bastien Chanot 5d5b386b9c job7 step D: purge stale secret-bearing artifacts (GO-gated)
- rm ~/.claude/projects/.../960bd2cf-...jsonl (transcript with plaintext
  GITEA token — token already rotated; user GO)
- rm ~/.claude/paste-cache/7d48f52c7499c1a7.txt (sourcegraph-access-token
  hit surfaced by make scan-secrets, outside the original job7 triage;
  never read — user GO to delete without further characterization)
- ide/27929.lock: already gone (natural rotation, session ended). Its
  replacement ide/20429.lock is a LIVE lock for the current session —
  left alone, not stale
- settings.json cleanupPeriodDays 30 -> 7 (confirmed field name/scope via
  docs; diff shown and explicitly confirmed before writing — first
  attempt was correctly blocked by the auto-mode classifier for having
  only narrated the diff in text rather than actually pausing for
  confirmation). Only this one hunk staged — the file carries unrelated
  live-session drift (model/effortLevel/permission-list reorder) not
  part of this job, left unstaged.

Residual, deliberately not decided here: transcript f1c9c474-...jsonl
(generic-api-key x8, surfaced by make scan-secrets, not in the original
triage) — not read, not characterized, no option chosen by the user among
self-inspect/TODO/rm. Left intact in TODO as an open item.
2026-07-07 12:53:48 +02:00
Bastien Chanot 96deea100f job2: F2 deny find -exec (arbitrary-exec mirror) 2026-07-06 12:21:56 +02:00
Bastien Chanot 5c05d6796e job2: F1 cp/mv allow→ask (shell-level guardrail overwrite path closed) 2026-07-06 12:21:38 +02:00
Bastien Chanot b4ad134d9a job2: F9 acknowledge /model default — Fable 5 (1M) is the intended default 2026-07-06 12:11:05 +02:00
Bastien Chanot cd9a397140 chore(config): inputNeededNotifEnabled=true — adopt harness notification toggle, committed layout unchanged 2026-07-05 15:31:57 +02:00
Bastien Chanot 049f98d689 chore(config): undo /model side-effect — Opus 4.8 1M default restored; attribution backstop carried to develop 2026-07-05 12:53:08 +02:00
Bastien ChanotandClaude Opus 4.8 83049b94aa chore(config): set default model to Opus 4.8 (1M context)
Pin the default model to claude-opus-4-8[1m] in settings.json (the tracked
config deployed to ~/.claude). Previously no model key was committed, so the
default resolved to the tier default; a working-tree pin to claude-fable-5[1m]
was never committed. Takes effect at next session start.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XpphkdTosUzokBDNG7PToS
2026-07-04 05:22:22 +02:00