`permissions.ask` gates nothing under `defaultMode: auto` (LRN-146,
verified live), so the ten rules that left the static tiers had no cover
left: rsync / kill -9 / killall / pkill out of deny, and python3 -c /
python -c / xargs / sed / cp / mv out of ask.
autoMode.soft_deny (7 rules) takes over what an explicit instruction
should be able to clear: writes outside the working directory,
rsync --delete, SIGKILL and kill-by-name, in-place edits spanning more
than one file, directory moves, and inline interpreters or xargs that
delete or write outside the cwd. Intent clears a soft block for the
current turn only, stated as a rule since no setting expresses it.
autoMode.hard_deny (3 rules) takes the classes no command pattern can
express: secret exfiltration, production deployment, and disarming the
guardrails. Adding a restriction stays allowed, removing one does not.
permissions.deny gains ten .env reader rules (sed awk cut tr sort uniq
diff od xxd strings). Six of those tools sat in permissions.allow, so
reading a .env through them triggered nothing.
autoMode.environment named another project, its FTP deploy target and its
customer data, inside the file link.sh:21 symlinks to
~/.claude/settings.json, where it reached every repo and contradicted
this one's Gitea remote. Rewritten machine-generic; the project facts
moved to that project's gitignored .claude/settings.local.json. All three
lists now open with "$defaults", which the original omitted, so the
built-in classifier entries are inherited rather than replaced.
doctor.sh check_automode backstops both defects. SETTINGS.md documents
the block and a tier-choice table. README no longer claims the ask tier
makes every mcp__magic__* call require a live confirmation.
Startup emitted 15 warnings: "Write(**/.env) is not matched by file
permission checks — only Edit(path) rules are."
Write(path) rules never matched. The 5 secret-file write bans were dead
config — .env, secrets/**, *.pem, *.key were freely writable. Converting
to Edit() makes them enforced: permissions.md:242 "Edit rules apply to all
built-in tools that edit files", and :244 prescribes exactly this ("add an
Edit deny rule for paths no tool may change").
- settings.json: Write(...) -> Edit(...) on the 5 patterns.
- Mirror the 9 secret patterns Read denied but Edit did not: *.p12, *.pfx,
id_rsa*, id_ed25519*, .ssh/**, credentials, credentials.json,
.aws/credentials, .azure/**. Read/Edit parity now 14/14. Claude could
previously overwrite an SSH private key or ~/.aws/credentials.
- New read-allowed/write-denied class: lockfiles (*.lock,
package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, go.sum) + node_modules/**. Reading
aids diagnosis; hand-editing is always wrong — the package manager
regenerates them via Bash, which Edit deny does not block.
- templates/settings/SETTINGS.md taught the broken Write() pattern; fixed
at the source so /onboard stops propagating it.
Rule syntax has no negation and deny beats allow, so deny globs cannot
carry exceptions — see the .env.example conflict noted in the follow-up.
Bastien Chanot