22 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
bchanot 6022b9dfb9 docs(doctrine): end-of-run lines name the diff stat and the gate path; release hold is a recommendation 2026-11-17 18:44:18 +01:00
bchanot f48343e2d7 docs(doctrine): advisor stuck trigger in gate skills, end-of-run call in code flows 2026-11-17 18:08:37 +01:00
bchanot 40a993c3e0 fix(docs): interviewer and guardrails cite rule files by absolute ~/.claude/rules path 2026-10-31 14:38:11 +01:00
bchanot 664d1ea839 feat(rules): Supabase and cloud-functions bodies become path rules, one always-on line each 2026-10-29 13:03:31 +01:00
bchanot 633faa293d docs(guardrails): IN() placeholder list is flagged, not ignored 2026-10-21 00:18:24 +02:00
bchanot 5a98c2c095 fix(guardrails): probe fails closed on budget, redirects and unread bodies; rules lose five false positives and gain seven misses
The probe trusted the plan's Supabase url, followed redirects for free,
crashed on deep JSON and stopped at the first unconfirmed map candidate.
Rules now scope hydrated state to the export chunk, silence dev configs,
UI-suffixed data attributes, GraphQL types and metadata keys, and catch
Go raw strings, triple-quoted f-strings, sql.raw, empty select() and
multi-line hidden inputs; text output is sanitised; per-variant locks.
2026-10-21 00:13:32 +02:00
bchanot 274396da6e docs(guardrails): checks.md injection precedence and row order, spec grammar 2026-10-19 12:20:56 +02:00
bchanot 63a88bc91d fix(guardrails): CONCAT before RAW, probe row newline kept, malformed urls handled, sa.text matched 2026-10-19 12:17:56 +02:00
bchanot 9275e0d82b fix(guardrails): Ruby where interpolation stays FAIL under CONCAT, PHP shell variables always count 2026-10-19 11:59:40 +02:00
bchanot c0fdbec3c1 fix(guardrails): probe map and fields verdicts fail closed, console rule sees public/, raw escape WARN, argv silent, plan validation 2026-10-19 11:56:25 +02:00
bchanot 5643e9dbd4 fix(guardrails): bound DATA_ATTR, SCRIPT_SRC, TRACE_MARKERS and the comment blankers, SENSITIVE_KEY aligned with the spec, 5xx map SKIPPED, base64 inline maps only, RecursionError and supabase shape guarded, large .map head read 2026-10-19 01:19:40 +02:00
bchanot fe0b229efc docs(guardrails): injection and exposure in the skill, the rule catalogue, the probe plan and secure-by-default; a11y handed to /a11y 2026-10-19 00:50:34 +02:00
bchanot 811077da2b fix(guardrails): probe reads inline maps anywhere in the body, SKIPPED on an oversize map, validation never raises, bounded trace marker, .map guess from the path 2026-10-19 00:45:25 +02:00
bchanot 8b6472b8c4 feat(guardrails): exposure probe (source maps served or inline, error bodies, sensitive keys) that fails closed; every plan path validated; fetch keeps error bodies 2026-10-19 00:42:13 +02:00
bchanot 6e79d182e3 feat(a11y): standalone scanner on the shared engine (A11Y-CLEAR / A11Y-NO-NEW); guardrails drops the a11y domain 2026-10-19 00:40:26 +02:00
bchanot b4ef6ae359 fix(guardrails): bounded comment/env patterns, multi-line errorhandler guard, WIDE mutants 2026-10-19 00:38:21 +02:00
bchanot d46201c561 feat(guardrails): exposure domain (EXP-*): console data, source maps (config, public dir, large files), hydrated state, shipped comments, data attributes, error bodies in routes, debug mode, wide responses 2026-10-19 00:34:57 +02:00
bchanot 7500a618fe feat(guardrails): injection domain (INJ-*): per-language SQL concat and raw escapes, dynamic EXECUTE, PostgREST, NoSQL, shell into DB tools; shared code_files/hits/dedupe helpers 2026-10-19 00:32:06 +02:00
bchanot 988038cce3 refactor(guardrails): extract the scan engine into scanner.py, scan.py keeps the catalogue 2026-10-19 00:30:03 +02:00
bchanot 73c25d759e feat(guardrails): propose, apply accepted fixes, re-pass to prove them
After the report the skill proposes fixes (plan phase), stops for the
user's acceptance, applies accepted ones via bugfixer and the
verify-secure gates, then re-scans. scan.py gains --assert-absent
(contract oracle, positive control) and --baseline (no new hit).
2026-10-18 19:04:13 +02:00
bchanot f0bcbfef46 feat(guardrails): read-only live probe to confirm a hole from outside
probe.py observes a running target the user owns and names, driven by a
plan built from the static findings. Five probes: anon-read, cross-user,
no-auth route, CORS reflection, capped rate-limit burst. GET/HEAD/OPTIONS
only, --authorized gate, secrets from the environment, same-host redirect
only, bounded request budget. SKILL STEP 5, checks.md reference, docs.
Suite guardrails-probe.test.sh (16 checks) against a localhost fixture.
2026-10-18 18:49:51 +02:00
bchanot 558c49e1a1 feat(guardrails): secure-by-default rule and /guardrails scanner
Always-on rules/secure-by-default.md: hosting, a11y, Supabase RLS,
SMS/email consent, cloud functions, API hygiene incl. password storage.
Stdlib scanner (FAIL/WARN/MANUAL) + skill, 89-check suite, auditor
gate wiring, profiles, routing row (plus Explore rows confirmed
through the router dialog).
2026-10-18 18:10:20 +02:00