feat(guardrails): read-only live probe to confirm a hole from outside
probe.py observes a running target the user owns and names, driven by a plan built from the static findings. Five probes: anon-read, cross-user, no-auth route, CORS reflection, capped rate-limit burst. GET/HEAD/OPTIONS only, --authorized gate, secrets from the environment, same-host redirect only, bounded request budget. SKILL STEP 5, checks.md reference, docs. Suite guardrails-probe.test.sh (16 checks) against a localhost fixture.
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@@ -153,3 +153,54 @@ user's token, a GET on the first user's rows must return nothing.
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a retention rule for consent proof.
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- **Supabase**: the live queries above; spend cap on the plan; redirect URLs
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and email confirmation settings reviewed.
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## Live probe (`--live`, read-only)
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`probe.py` observes a running target the user owns and names. It is driven by
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a plan JSON built from the static findings; secrets come from the environment,
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never the plan or the command line. It sends GET, HEAD and OPTIONS only, with
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one opt-in POST burst for the rate-limit check, and stops at a request budget.
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```json
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{
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"base_url": "http://localhost:5173",
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"supabase": {
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"url": "http://localhost:54321",
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"tables": ["notes", "contacts"],
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"cross_user_paths": ["/rest/v1/notes?select=*"]
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},
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"routes": [
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{"path": "/api/v1/notes"},
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{"path": "/api/v1/health", "public": true}
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],
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"cors": true,
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"cors_path": "/api/v1/notes",
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"rate_limit": {"path": "/api/v1/auth/login", "method": "POST",
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"count": 20, "body": "{\"email\":\"t@t.io\",\"password\":\"x\"}"}
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}
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```
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Environment, from test keys only, never `service_role`:
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`GUARDRAILS_ANON_KEY` (anon-read), `GUARDRAILS_JWT2` (cross-user).
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| Probe | id | OPEN means | Read it against |
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|---|---|---|---|
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| anon-read | `anon-read:<table>` | the anon key read a row | SB-RLS-MISSING, SB-POLICY-* |
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| cross-user | `cross-user:<path>` | a second user's token read these rows | policy owner column (STEP 4) |
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| no-auth route | `no-auth:<path>` | the route answered 200 with no token | API-ROUTE-NO-AUTH, object authz |
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| cors-reflect | `cors-reflect` | a foreign origin was reflected with credentials | API-CORS-WILDCARD |
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| rate-limit | `rate-limit` | the burst saw no 429 | HOST-NO-RATE-LIMIT |
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A verdict is an observation, not a verdict on the project. OPEN is a returned
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200 or returned rows; CLOSED is a refusal or an empty body; SKIPPED is a
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missing key; ERROR is a transport failure. A static FAIL confirmed OPEN leads
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the report. A CLOSED probe on a static FAIL still needs the fix: the dev
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target may differ from production.
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Safety, enforced by the script and by the skill: `--authorized` is required;
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read-only methods only; the loopback or a URL the user named, never one you
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inferred; a login burst only with a throwaway test account on the user's go,
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because it can lock the user's own account; a redirect to another host is
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never followed, so a key never leaves the named host. Fuzzing, writes beyond
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the named login route, or probing a third party are out of scope: that is
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pentest, another contract.
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