chore(memory): BDR-050 universal pipeline + LRN-095 orthogonal gates + journal lot 4

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01XpphkdTosUzokBDNG7PToS

.claude/memory/decisions.md

@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ rules:
 | BDR-047 | 2026-07-01 | ECC audit → zero import; local config ahead of reference | accepted |
 | BDR-048 | 2026-07-03 | semgrep security gate: engine version + rulesets PINNED, never --config auto; upgrade = deliberate visible human jump | accepted |
 | BDR-049 | 2026-07-03 | verifier = fresh + blind (no iteration history) + disk-contract + PROOF-or-fail; mute ≠ PASS; scope enrichment via human micro-gate | accepted |
+| BDR-050 | 2026-07-03 | universal pipeline (contract→dev inline→fresh verify→fresh security, loops bounded 3× in main loop) with per-flow weighting; hotfix failure = revert not loop | accepted |
 
 ---
 
@@ -807,3 +808,11 @@ rules:
 - **Rationale**: dev self-score is always confident → not a gate. Verifier fed history anchors on prior verdicts → telescopic drift. Context-only contract dies at compaction, the verbatim with it.
 - **Alternatives rejected**: dev self-assessment as gate; cumulative verifier context ("cheaper" but anchored); gitignored run files (lose escalation reference + session-death survival).
 - **Reference**: lib/contract-interview.md + agents/verifier.md + lib/tests/contract-verifier.test.sh (31 locks) — branch feature/contract-verifier `6aed5ee`. Behavioral GREEN: planted-gap → ECARTS(2) exact; conform-under-injected-history → CONFORME (blindness held). Twin of [[BDR-048]] (security gate). Conditions [[LRN-048]], [[LRN-083]].
+
+## BDR-050 — Universal verify+secure pipeline, weighted per flow (loops in the main loop)
+
+- **Date**: 2026-07-03
+- **Decision**: every dev flow = contract (verbatim, on disk) → dev INLINE → fresh verifier (request conformity) → fresh security-auditor (`MODE: gate`) → commit. Loops BOUNDED at 3 and decided in the ORCHESTRATOR MAIN LOOP ([[LRN-083]]), never in a subagent. Order invariant: on any security re-loop, re-verify the REQUEST before re-scanning security. Per-flow weight: feat/bugfix = both gates, both loop (nominal 2 dispatches); hotfix = NO fresh verifier (its smoke-check verifies the trivial autofill contract), security gate whose FAILURE REVERTS (`git restore` + escalate to /bugfix), never loops — the 1-attempt model preserved (nominal 1 dispatch). Shared include `lib/verify-secure-loop.md` for feat/bugfix; hotfix inline variant.
+- **Rationale**: the value is the INDEPENDENCE of the gate (fresh subagent vs a rich contract), NOT delegating the dev — so dev stays inline in light flows and weighting lives on loops+questions, never on skipping a gate. hotfix reverts because a 3× loop would reintroduce the weight its identity excludes.
+- **Alternatives rejected**: dispatch the dev too (turns feat into ship-feature-bis); one merged "quality" gate (see [[LRN-095]] — orthogonal gates degrade if fused); hotfix loops like feat (breaks its 1-attempt identity).
+- **Reference**: lib/verify-secure-loop.md + wired feater/bugfixer/hotfixer + lib/tests/loops-light.test.sh (27 locks) — feature/verify-loops `0f0162d`. Behavioral GREEN (feat fixture): CONFORME→BLOCK(1) SQLi→fix→re-verify CONFORME→re-scan PASS, order invariant held. Builds on [[BDR-048]] [[BDR-049]]. Conditions [[LRN-083]] [[LRN-095]].

.claude/memory/journal.md

@@ -318,3 +318,4 @@ rules:
 - Chantier verify-loops LOT 2 (feature/contract-verifier `6aed5ee`): lib/contract-interview.md (verbatim contract on DISK, micro-gate scope enrichment, aborted never dirty) + agents/verifier.md (fresh+blind, PROOF-or-fail, mute ≠ PASS) + 31 structure locks green, shellcheck clean. Behavioral: planted-gap → ECARTS(2) exact; conform under injected fake history → CONFORME (blindness held). Sentinel consumed 4× on guarded lib/tests/. [[BDR-049]] [[LRN-093]]. Merge note: lot 1+2 both append registries at same anchors → trivial stack-conflict expected. Next: lot 3 security-auditor spec.
 - Chantier verify-loops LOT 3 (feature/security-auditor `2b297bd`): agents/security-auditor.md (SAST gate, pinned p/security-audit+p/secrets+p/owasp-top-ten, secrets→CRITICAL, block ERROR only, DEGRADED-still-checks, anti-gaming nosemgrep, PROOF-or-fail) + grafts onboard L3a (complement to cso, both gstack branches) + audit-delta security axis. 28 structure locks + 4 behavioral dogfoods green: vuln→BLOCK(9), nosemgrep→BLOCK(1), DEGRADED→BLOCK(7). owasp REQUIRED (measured: baseline misses SQLi+path-traversal on Flask). [[LRN-094]] + [[BDR-048]] addendum (owasp/severity/FP) applied at integration on feature/verify-loops (index drift LRN-090/091 backfilled same pass). Next: lot 4 loops-light (feat/bugfix/hotfix wiring).
 - Integration: feature/verify-loops = develop + merge lots 1-3 (local, develop/main intact, nothing pushed) so lots 4-5 wiring is dogfoodable against present agents. Memory stack-conflicts resolved (BDR-048/049, LRN-092/093/094 stacked ID-order; BDR-048 addendum applied; LRN-090/091 index rows backfilled).
+- Chantier verify-loops LOT 4 (feature/verify-loops `0f0162d`): lib/verify-secure-loop.md shared include + wired feater (0.7 contract, 3 verify+secure), bugfixer (3.5 contract from diagnosis, 5 gates), hotfixer (1.7 silent contract, 3 security gate FAILURE=REVERT not loop, +Agent tool). 27 structure locks + full pipeline dogfood: feat fixture w/ SQLi → GATE1 CONFORME → GATE2 BLOCK(1) (checklist caught what semgrep taint missed) → fix → re-verify CONFORME (order invariant) → re-scan PASS. [[BDR-050]] [[LRN-095]]. Weighting held: feat/bugfix nominal 2 dispatches, hotfix 1 + revert-on-fail. INCIDENT: re-committed [[LRN-093]] (2nd recurrence, 4 locks w/ \n) — caught at first run; user flagged advisory-insufficient → build deterministic backstop in lot 5. Next: lot 5 heavy flows (ship-feature enrich-at-gate, init-project +security, onboard no-loop) + escalation dogfood (max-3 STOP) + LRN-093 meta-test guard.

.claude/memory/learnings.md

@@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ rules:
 | LRN-092 | 2026-07-03 | SAST smoke test w/ the OFFICIAL example secret = vacuous pass (rules exclude documented example keys by design); validate w/ realistic payloads + measure tier coverage before trusting a gate ruleset | smoke-testing any detector/gate — never the canonical example payload |
 | LRN-093 | 2026-07-03 | grep -F pattern w/ embedded newline = per-line OR = lock that matches anything; structure locks single-line only, flip-test new locks | writing any grep-based structure lock / census test |
 | LRN-094 | 2026-07-03 | SAST severity ≠ exploitability — semgrep ERROR conflates real vulns + hardening recos; metadata does NOT cleanly separate them (measured) → metadata refinement = noisy gate; ERROR-threshold + diff-scoping is the containment | mapping a SAST tool's output to a blocking gate |
+| LRN-095 | 2026-07-03 | orthogonal gates don't contaminate — a conformity verifier must PASS correct-but-insecure code (security is a separate gate's job); proven live (CONFORME on a feature carrying a SQLi); fusing the two degrades each | designing multi-dimension review/verify/audit gates |
 
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@@ -1000,3 +1001,9 @@ rules:
 - **context**: lot 3 security-auditor design 2026-07-03. Measured on 2 real repos (faunosteo, game): the only added blocking ERROR from owasp-top-ten is Dockerfile hygiene, contained because gate mode scopes to the DIFF (a pre-existing infra finding can't block an unrelated code change).
 - **future application**: mapping any SAST to a blocking gate — take the tool's ERROR/blocking level as the deterministic threshold, contain FP by SCOPING (diff, not repo), NOT by a metadata heuristic or a hand-maintained hygiene denylist ([[LRN-049]]: match guard cost to proven stake — build the denylist only if hygiene ERRORs prove noisy on a real project).
 - **cousin**: [[LRN-047]] noisy gate = ignored; [[LRN-077]] non-deterministic gate; conditions [[BDR-048]].
+
+## LRN-095 — Orthogonal gates don't contaminate: a conformity check must pass correct-but-insecure code
+- **pattern**: when a pipeline has distinct gates (request-conformity, security), each judges ONLY its dimension. A conformity verifier must return CONFORME on code that is correct-but-insecure — the vuln is the SECURITY gate's job, not a conformity gap. Proven live: a `get_item` feature satisfying its contract but carrying a `%`-interpolation SQLi → verifier CONFORME, security-auditor BLOCK(1). Fusing the two into one "quality" gate makes each worse: the conformity check starts hunting vulns (scope creep, misses conformity), the security check starts judging feature-completeness (dilutes).
+- **context**: lot 4 verify-secure-loop dogfood 2026-07-03. The orthogonality is WHY the order invariant matters (re-verify request before re-scan security) — two independent axes re-checked independently.
+- **future application**: any multi-dimension gate (review lenses, verify+audit, correctness+perf) — keep each gate single-axis and let a finding on axis B pass axis A's gate; compose verdicts in the orchestrator, don't merge the judges.
+- **cousin**: [[BDR-050]] the pipeline; [[BDR-049]] fresh verifier; conditions [[LRN-083]].