feat(automode): docker and node framed by the classifier, ask rules retired

This commit is contained in:
Bastien Chanot
2026-09-16 22:03:23 +02:00
parent 823ce42225
commit 5eccc3f1c4
4 changed files with 62 additions and 8 deletions
+15
View File
@@ -28,6 +28,21 @@ Format follows [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/).
destructive command under auto mode.
### Changed
- **Docker and node go through the classifier with a framing, instead of
an inert `ask` tier.** `Bash(docker run|exec *)`, `Bash(docker[-| ]compose
up*)` and `Bash(node -e *)` leave `permissions.ask` (no prompt under auto
mode, re-verified on 2.1.273). A new `autoMode.allow` list, `$defaults`
first, names the two routine cases the built-in `Remote Shell Writes` /
`Production Reads` rules were catching: `docker exec`/`run`/`compose`
against a local dev container whose name does not carry `prod`, running a
SQL file or script from the repo inside it; and project-local node
(`node <file>`, `npm run`, `npx`/`pnpm exec` of a lockfile-declared
package, effects inside the cwd). Two `soft_deny` entries frame what that
opens: docker data destruction (`rm -f`, `volume rm`/`prune`, `system
prune`, `compose down -v`, `--privileged`, bind mounts outside the cwd)
and undeclared node packages (`npx`/`dlx` of a package absent from the
lockfile, `npm install <name>`). `SETTINGS.md` gains the `autoMode.allow`
tier and the reason a static `Bash(node *)` rule cannot do this job.
- **The classifier, not `permissions.ask`, now guards destructive shell
work** (BDR-090). Ten rules left the static tiers: `rsync`, `kill -9`,
`killall`, `pkill` out of `deny`, and `python3 -c`, `python -c`,