feat(guardrails): secure-by-default rule and /guardrails scanner
Always-on rules/secure-by-default.md: hosting, a11y, Supabase RLS, SMS/email consent, cloud functions, API hygiene incl. password storage. Stdlib scanner (FAIL/WARN/MANUAL) + skill, 89-check suite, auditor gate wiring, profiles, routing row (plus Explore rows confirmed through the router dialog).
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# Guardrail checks
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Rule ids the scanner emits, what each proves, and the fix. Severity is the
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default; a judged hit can be a false positive.
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## api
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| Rule | Sev | Catches | Fix |
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|---|---|---|---|
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| API-SECRET-LITERAL | FAIL | provider key or private key block in source | env var, rotate the key |
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| API-PUBLIC-ENV-SECRET | FAIL | `NEXT_PUBLIC_`, `VITE_`, `PUBLIC_` style prefix on a SERVICE_ROLE, SECRET, PRIVATE or PASSWORD name | drop the prefix, read it server-side |
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| API-ENV-NOT-IGNORED | FAIL | `.env*` file with values, not in `.gitignore` | ignore it, rotate what was exposed |
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| API-CORS-WILDCARD | FAIL / WARN | any origin allowed; FAIL when credentials are on | explicit origin allowlist |
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| API-ROUTE-NO-AUTH | WARN | route file with no authentication evidence | add auth, or document why it is public and rate limit it |
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| API-PASSWORD-PLAINTEXT | FAIL | password column typed as text with no hashing library anywhere; stored password compared with `==` or in a SQL `where password = $1` | argon2id, bcrypt or scrypt hash, verified with the library's check |
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| API-PASSWORD-WEAK-HASH | FAIL | md5, sha1, sha256 or `createHash().update()` fed a password | argon2id, scrypt or bcrypt |
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| API-PASSWORD-LOGGED | FAIL | `console.log`, `logger.*`, `print`, `println!`, `error_log` with a password identifier among its arguments, template interpolations included | never log credentials |
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| API-PASSWORD-LITERAL | WARN | `password: "..."`, `DB_PASSWORD=...` with a value of 8+ characters that is not a placeholder, hash, validation rule or label | env var and rotate; a dev default is documented as such |
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## hosting
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| Rule | Sev | Catches | Fix |
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|---|---|---|---|
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| HOST-NO-RATE-LIMIT | FAIL | no rate limiting anywhere in code or config | per IP and per account on login, signup, reset, send, upload |
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| HOST-ORIGIN-EXPOSED | WARN | origin platform with no CDN or firewall mention | put a CDN and WAF in front |
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| HOST-WAF-DDOS | MANUAL | firewall, DDoS and bot rules are dashboard settings | enable and confirm in the dashboard |
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| HOST-SPEND-CAP | MANUAL | hard spend cap is a plan setting | enable the cap; else budget alert plus a written kill switch |
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## a11y
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| Rule | Sev | Catches | Fix |
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|---|---|---|---|
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| A11Y-IMG-ALT | FAIL | `img` or `Image` without `alt` | describe it, or `alt=""` if decorative |
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| A11Y-FIELD-LABEL | FAIL | native input, select, textarea with no label | `label for`, wrapping label or `aria-label` |
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| A11Y-CLICK-NO-KEYBOARD | FAIL | click handler on a div or span lacking role, tabindex or key handler | use a `button` |
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| A11Y-FOCUS-OUTLINE | FAIL / WARN | focus outline removed; WARN when a `:focus-visible` style exists elsewhere | style `:focus-visible` instead |
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| A11Y-TABINDEX-POSITIVE | WARN | `tabindex` above 0 | use 0 or -1 and fix the DOM order |
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## supabase
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| Rule | Sev | Catches | Fix |
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|---|---|---|---|
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| SB-RLS-MISSING | FAIL | table created in migrations, RLS never enabled | `alter table ... enable row level security` in the same migration |
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| SB-RLS-LIVE | MANUAL | dashboard-created tables are invisible to a static scan | run the live queries below |
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| SB-POLICY-OPEN-WRITE | FAIL | `using (true)` or `with check (true)` on a write | scope to `(select auth.uid())` |
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| SB-POLICY-ANON-WRITE | FAIL | write policy open to anon or public, not owner-scoped | `to authenticated` plus owner check |
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| SB-POLICY-PUBLIC-READ | WARN | read policy `true` | confirm the data is public |
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| SB-POLICY-NOT-OWNER | WARN | policy with no `auth.uid()` or `auth.jwt()` | tie to the owner, or to a reviewed helper |
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| SB-VIEW-INVOKER | WARN | view runs as its owner and bypasses RLS | `with (security_invoker = true)` |
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| SB-MATVIEW-EXPOSED | WARN | materialized views cannot have RLS | move out of the exposed schema or revoke |
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| SB-DEFINER-SEARCH-PATH | WARN | `security definer` without a pinned `search_path` | `set search_path = ''` |
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| SB-DEFINER-EXECUTE | WARN | definer function callable by anon | `revoke execute ... from public, anon` |
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| SB-BUCKET-PUBLIC | WARN | public storage bucket | private plus storage policies |
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| SB-EDGE-NO-JWT | WARN | edge function with `verify_jwt = false` | fine for webhooks that verify a signature |
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| SB-SERVICE-ROLE-CLIENT | FAIL | service role or secret key referenced in client-reachable code | server only |
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| SB-SERVICE-ROLE-LITERAL | FAIL | service_role JWT pasted in a file | rotate it, move to server env |
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## messaging
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| Rule | Sev | Catches | Fix |
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|---|---|---|---|
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| MSG-NO-CONSENT-RECORD | FAIL / WARN | sender code, no stored consent anywhere; WARN when every sender looks transactional (contact form, reset, receipt) and no subscriber storage exists | store who, when, channel, source, wording |
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| MSG-SEND-UNCHECKED | WARN | sender file never checks consent or suppression | check before every send |
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| MSG-NO-UNSUBSCRIBE | FAIL / WARN | email sent, no unsubscribe anywhere; same transactional downgrade | link in every email |
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| MSG-NO-LIST-UNSUBSCRIBE | WARN | no `List-Unsubscribe` header | add it, with one-click post |
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| MSG-SMS-NO-STOP | FAIL / WARN | SMS sent, no `STOP` text; same transactional downgrade | add "Reply STOP" to marketing SMS |
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| MSG-SMS-NO-OPTOUT-STORE | FAIL / WARN | no opt-out storage; same transactional downgrade | record STOP replies, check before sending |
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## functions
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| Rule | Sev | Catches | Fix |
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|---|---|---|---|
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| FN-NO-MAX-INSTANCES | FAIL | Firebase, AWS Lambda or Google Cloud with no instance or concurrency cap | set it |
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| FN-CAP-UNVERIFIED | MANUAL | platform with no cap the scanner can read | check the provider docs; rely on spend cap |
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| FN-BUDGET-STOP | MANUAL | budget alert wired to an automatic stop | set it; confirm in the console |
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| FN-SELF-TRIGGER | FAIL / WARN | function writes the resource that fires it (WARN when guarded or file-level heuristic) | `WHEN` guard or idempotency flag |
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| FN-SELF-INVOKE | FAIL | edge function invokes itself | remove, or cap the depth |
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## Blind spots
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The scanner is regex over text. It cannot see:
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- tables, policies or buckets made in the dashboard
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- whether a policy names the right owner column
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- whether consent was actually collected before the stored timestamp
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- whether a STOP reply reaches your store from the provider webhook
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- loops through queues, storage events, schedulers or third-party webhooks
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- keyboard traps, focus order, modal focus handling, color contrast
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- client-reachable code in unusual layouts (the rule uses path and
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`use client` heuristics, `.astro` is never flagged)
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- values built at runtime, minified bundles, anything over 1 MB
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- keys committed in the past: only the working tree is read, use
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`gitleaks git <repo>` for history
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- a password written in clear by code when a hashing library exists
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elsewhere: the column rule fires only when no library is found anywhere,
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so trace the write point by hand (STEP 4)
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- a log call spanning several lines, or `req.body` dumped to a log
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Sender classification is by file path only: names with contact, reset, verify,
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otp, receipt and the like count as transactional, names with newsletter,
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campaign, promo and the like as marketing, anything else as unknown. Test files
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never count as senders. A shared mailer class is therefore judged by the
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project: a contact form beside it and no subscriber storage gives WARN.
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The scanner skips log files and cache directories, and never follows symlinks.
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By design the scanner ignores: policies granted only to `service_role`,
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fields that are never rendered (`hidden`, `display: none`), click handlers
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that only stop propagation or sit on `role="presentation"`, focus styles
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that swap the outline for a border or shadow, UI route components, keys
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inside git-ignored env files, and password literals in test, fixture and
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i18n files.
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## Live Supabase checks (the user runs them in the SQL editor)
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```sql
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-- tables in the public schema without RLS
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select tablename from pg_tables
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where schemaname = 'public' and not rowsecurity;
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-- every policy, to read the owner scoping by eye
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select tablename, policyname, cmd, roles, qual, with_check
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from pg_policies where schemaname = 'public' order by tablename, cmd;
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-- views that bypass RLS
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select c.relname from pg_class c
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join pg_namespace n on n.oid = c.relnamespace
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where n.nspname = 'public' and c.relkind = 'v'
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and coalesce(c.reloptions::text, '') not like '%security_invoker=true%';
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-- definer functions callable by anon
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select p.proname, p.proconfig from pg_proc p
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join pg_namespace n on n.oid = p.pronamespace
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where n.nspname = 'public' and p.prosecdef
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and has_function_privilege('anon', p.oid, 'execute');
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-- public buckets
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select id from storage.buckets where public;
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```
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Two probes on the user's own project, read-only. With the anon key, a GET on
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each private table must return an empty list or 401. With a second test
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user's token, a GET on the first user's rows must return nothing.
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## Manual items by domain
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- **Hosting**: rate rules and DDoS or bot protection on at the CDN; a hard
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spend cap if the plan has one; a budget alert and a written kill-switch step.
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- **Functions**: budget alert wired to an automatic stop (throttle concurrency
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to zero, revoke invoke rights, or disable billing); a timeout on every
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function.
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- **Messaging**: provider-side STOP handling on, a webhook storing opt-outs,
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a retention rule for consent proof.
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- **Supabase**: the live queries above; spend cap on the plan; redirect URLs
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and email confirmation settings reviewed.
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